


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19 DECEMBER 1990



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Jiang, Deng Inscriptions Hail Chemical Troops

*HK0712051590 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1355 GMT 6 Dec 90*

[Report by Xu Jingyue (1776 0079 6460) and Jing Houyin (2529 0683 1377): "Antichemical Warfare Corps Achieve Marked Results After 40 Years of Hard Work"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 6 December (XINHUA)—A grand meeting was held in Beijing today to mark the 40th anniversary of the founding of the antichemical corps of the People's Liberation Army [PLA]. Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping wrote inscriptions to extend congratulations on the occasion.

Over the past 40 years, the antichemical corps came into being from nothing and tided over numerous difficulties in its gradual process of growth. Today the corps has emerged as one of the PLA's combat supporting arms which backs up the Army under nuclear and chemical warfare conditions. It now serves as an indispensable component part in the modern combined training and operation of all services and arms and an important force defending the motherland and building the four modernizations as well.

Over the past 40 years, the antichemical corps has successfully completed various tasks in national defense, disaster relief, efficiency tests, nuclear and chemical accident salvage, and so on. During the several border defensive wars, the antichemical units participating in the battle fought bravely and tenaciously and perfectly

fulfilled all antichemical supporting missions, displaying the spirit of fearing no sacrifice. A large number of meritorious collectives and combat heroes have emerged. During all the nuclear test missions, the antichemical corps brilliantly fulfilled all the technical testing, efficiency experiment, and security protection missions and thus made great contributions to the development of defense-related science and technology.

The antichemical corps' education and training system which fits the Army's structure has been taking shape. The sense of combined action, commanding ability, and technical standards of cadres at all levels of the corps have been substantially enhanced. The antichemical warfare institutes have trained a large number of commanding and professional technical officers who are devoted to national defense and equipped with knowledge in modern sciences.

The antichemical corps has also established an antichemical warfare scientific and technological research body which contains quite a full range of research branches and is well equipped and capable of developing advanced antichemical warfare equipment. This research body has turned out 330 scientific and technological research achievements since only 1978, of which 108 won awards granted by the state and the Army. The professional antichemical units of the corps are equipped with some automatic and semi-automatic technical equipment, while its combined units are improving and antichemical means updated daily. Now the PLA has already built a basically complete system of antichemical equipment which is composed of all China-made products.

NORTH KOREA**South Criticized on Nuclear-Free Zone Issue**

*SK3011071690 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 1148 GMT 27 Nov 90*

[By station commentator Chong Pong-kil: "Talking Nonsense, Which Is Just Like Servant of Nuclear War"]

[Text] Making the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone appears to be a very urgent issue in maintaining and consolidating Korea's peace today and in guaranteeing peace in Asia and the world.

Therefore, we have repeatedly put forth rational proposals for making the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone. We spare no sincere effort to achieve this and our proposals and efforts are gaining great support and sympathy from the world's people.

However, the South Korean puppets are joining hands with the U.S. imperialists and are opposing the realization of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

In a bull session with reporters on 24 November, the so-called puppet foreign minister concluded that the issue of making the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is unrealistic. He also grumbled repeatedly that in reality they are under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and that they are following the nuclear policy of the United States which does not even admit or deny the existence of nuclear weapons.

Regarding this nonsense, the people inevitably will be dumb-stricken at those who have forgotten the humiliation and have thrown away their conscience and will be astonished at how that kind of brazen-faced doggedness and absurd remarks can be carried out.

This is truly nonsensical talk which can only come from the most intent colonial cat's-paw of the U.S. imperialists and a servant of nuclear war. We can say that this is an open challenge to the peace-loving public opinion at home and abroad.

The puppet Foreign Ministry talked about East Asian military relations, where enormous military capability is dispatched in the neighboring countries, and about the highly developed transportation systems for nuclear weapons. He also said that the claim of making the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is unrealistic. This is an unreasonable sophistry.

The problem is that the puppets are purposely avoiding the stark reality of not wanting to achieve a nuclear-free zone.

The reason the Korean peninsula today has become a nuclear hotbed, the most dangerous area in terms of exploding, is because more than anything else, South Korea is becoming a nuclear advanced base of the U.S. imperialists.

Some 1,000 various nuclear weapons currently are dispatched in South Korea. Its density is four times greater compared with the NATO region.

The U.S. imperialists have dispatched almost all the nuclear weapons which they have developed into South Korea. This ranges from a neutron bomb, which is called the most vicious weapon of the 20th Century, to the nuclear knapsack. Thinking that this is not even sufficient, the U.S. imperialists are continuing to bring new nuclear weapons and means of transporting these nuclear weapons into South Korea.

Also, nuclear war exercises such as the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises are being carried out frequently in South Korea.

The stark reality shows that the source of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is the U.S. imperialists who are making South Korea into a nuclear base, and with this as a springboard they are strengthening maneuvers for a nuclear war.

Because of this, public opinion at home and abroad is stressing the need to withdraw the U.S. imperialists' nuclear weapons and aggressive forces from South Korea and make the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone where there are no nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the reason the puppets are shaking their heads to this practical proposal—while pretending to be a blind fool—is simply that they are blindly and indiscriminately following and trying to protect the U.S. nuclear war maneuvers.

This was further vividly manifested when the puppet Foreign Ministry proudly declared that they are under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and that they are following the nuclear policy of the United States which does not admit or deny the existence of nuclear weapons.

If they had even one bit of conscience, how could those people think about the nation's fate and brazenly say that they are under the protection of the nuclear umbrella? They have even left the U.S. imperialists alone so that they can bring in and accumulate large amounts of nuclear weapons into South Korea; they have entrusted their rights completely to the master so that they can use the nuclear weapons.

Also, the U.S. imperialist aggressors changed the whole land of South Korea into a nuclear explosive warehouse and nuclear launching base without even receiving approval from anyone. Just like that of a parrot saying the same words repeatedly, they then impertinently said over and over again that they are not admitting or denying the existence of nuclear weapons. How can there be even the slightest national pride in these lily-livered traitors?

It is clear that the No Tae-u ring is indeed a wicked traitorous group that is trying to maintain the remainder of its doomed life under the protection of the masters,

the U.S. imperialists, by currying favor with them, even though our nation is driven into nuclear disaster and our land which belongs to our forefathers is destroyed.

Therefore, to remove the dark cloud of a nuclear war that is hanging over the Korean peninsula, it will be inevitable to strongly carry out the struggle to obstruct and destroy the puppet's nation-selling maneuvers, which are blindly following the U.S. imperialists, along with the nuclear war maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists.

If the No Tae-u ring continues to recklessly follow the nuclear war policy of the U.S. imperialists while opposing the nuclear-free zone of the Korean peninsula, it will have to face greater denunciation and criticism by the people at home and abroad and also inevitably pay a high price.

SOUTH KOREA

Medvedev Remarks on Arms Control in Korea Viewed

Soviet 'Diplomatic Offensive' Seen

SK2411064590 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
23 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by reporter O Tae-kyu: "An Attempt to Keep the Balance of Military Forces in the Far East—What Does Medvedev's Call for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula Means?"]

[Text] The speech by Medvedev, member of the Soviet Presidential Council, delivered at a meeting arranged by the Korea-USSR Economic Association on 22 November, can be seen as an indication of how the Soviet Union will deal with the issue of military alliances, including the ROK-U.S. military alliance; Soviet-U.S. relations; and Soviet relations with the North and South, in the Far East and on the Korean peninsula.

Given the fact that he came to Korea as Soviet President Gorbachev's special envoy with the mission of inviting President No to visit the Soviet Union, what Medvedev said in his speech seems to be a multi-purpose attempt to pave the way for a ROK-USSR summit meeting scheduled for next month.

Since Medvedev is a man of enormous influence, known to be the third most powerful official in the Soviet Union, and since he did not deny the fact that what he said in his speech reflects the Soviet government's official stand, his speech is likely to be the standard to measure the Soviet Union's future policy toward the Korean peninsula.

What stands out in his speech are his comments on the military alliances in the Far East, including the ROK-U.S. military alliance.

Medvedev said that "a full-scale settlement of the Korean peninsula question is most crucial for guaranteeing peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The presence of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in the southern part of the Korean peninsula makes the situation more serious." In other words, he made it clear that a full-scale settlement of the Korean peninsula question can be made only through the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons.

For the record, the Soviet Union has never officially called for complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. For this reason, even radical scholars have only guessed that the Soviet Union's official stand on U.S. troops stationed in Korea will be "the stationing in Korea of U.S. troops in reduced form."

Since it was according to ROK-U.S. security treaty that U.S. troops were stationed in Korea, a Soviet call for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops can be seen as being aimed at breaking up the ROK-U.S. military alliance. Reversely, it can also be interpreted, observers pointed out, as an indication that the Soviet Union may go to the length of revoking its friendship treaty with North Korea.

In the issue of nuclear weapons, Medvedev called on the United States to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea, arguing that the Soviet Union has been studying plans to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Judging from this, it seems that the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops and nuclear weapons is likely to create sharp differences in the opinions of the United States and the Soviet Union on their respective policy toward the Korean peninsula, not to mention the fact that it will force a readjustment in the ROK-U.S. treaty of mutual defense.

Since Gorbachev took office, the Soviet Union has exerted substantial effort to hold hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region through Gorbachev's declaration in Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1988.

Seen in this light, Medvedev's call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea can be interpreted as a signal that the Soviet Union has earnestly begun a diplomatic offensive against the United States to pave the way for its becoming a major Asia-Pacific power. In other words, the Soviet Union may be said to have embarked upon the road of putting itself on an equal footing with the United States which has been playing the role of a "supreme ruler" in this region while maintaining its superior military power in this region.

What merits our attention in this regard is what kind of role Sokolov, the man the Soviet Union has internally named as the first Soviet ambassador to Korea, will play.

The unanimous observation of the government authorities and experts is that Sokolov, who was named Soviet ambassador to the Philippines in 1987 in preparation for U.S.-Philippines negotiations over the return of U.S.

military bases to the Philippines and has since remained in that post, is expected, as the first Soviet ambassador to Korea, to exert powerful influence over the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea. What is more, the appointment of Sokolov as Soviet ambassador to Korea is reported to have irritated U.S. nerves.

When it comes to its relations with the North and South, the Soviet Union is expected to maintain an equidistance policy toward both sides and on this basis maintain a policy of treating them differently depending on the situation.

If Medvedev's words that "there are two independent governments, namely the ROK and the DPRK, on the Korean peninsula" means an expression of support for South Korea and of denial to North Korea's "policy of one Korea," his next remarks that "the Soviet Union supports North Korea's proposal for reducing arms of the South and North, pulling out foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula, and building mutual confidence," which made Soviet support of North Korea clear, means the opposite.

By saying that the "setting up of diplomatic relations between the ROK and the Soviet Union should also be seen, in a broader view, as part of efforts to foster cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region," Medvedev hinted that the Soviet Union puts particular stress not only on economic profits from its relations with Korea, but also on the political and security profits. In particular, he made clear Soviet support for North Korea's call for a solution to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons and easing political and military tensions ahead of anything else by saying that "the Soviet Union will keep developing its traditional relations of friendship with North Korea and fully help North Korea achieve peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula through mutual cooperation in the international arena."

Medvedev's remarks as such have not only poured cold water on the rosy view held by some government officials who believed that the Soviet Union would unilaterally support the ROK concerning the Korean peninsula question after it established diplomatic relations with the ROK, but also warned the government that it should enforce its northern policy based on a more cool-headed view of the international situation.

'Impudent Remarks' Criticized

*SK2411080190 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
23 Nov 90 p 2*

[Reporter's Eye column—"Medvedev's Impudent Remarks" by Reporter Yi Chae-ho]

[Text] On 22 November, in a meeting with figures from all strata, including political and economic circles, Medvedev, member of the Soviet Presidential Council,

on a visit to the ROK, comparatively expounded the Soviet position on the Korean peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region.

In a prepared address entitled "The Soviet Union's New Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region," he stressed that what the Soviet Union seeks is a nuclear-free peace zone and arms cuts in this region.

There was nothing new in the contents of his address. A nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the establishment of a multilateral consultative body for peace in the Asia-Pacific region have been included in the Soviet Union's policy toward the Korean peninsula ever since Gorbachev's declaration at Vladivostok in 1986. Arbatov, director of arms control in the Soviet Institute of World Economics and International Relations, who had visited the ROK in October at the invitation of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and Security Affairs, stated the same demands.

A problem lies in his impudent and bold stand. He repeatedly stressed in his address the fact that the Soviet Union is abandoning the thought of a cold war and is newly seeking peace and cooperation. What he really said to us after all is that "the U.S. forces and the U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula."

He not only said that "the U.S. forces and the U.S. nuclear weapons in the South side of the Korean peninsula are further worsening the situation," but also that "the Soviet Union supports the North Korean proposal from May 1990 for withdrawing foreign forces from the Korean peninsula and for establishing trust." More severely speaking, in a single stroke he demanded before our country's figures from all strata that the ROK-U.S. military relations, which have been a basic frame for our security, whether good or bad, be rearranged.

Medvedev is not a scholar who visited the ROK with the intent of attending the meeting. He is what is called a diplomatic special envoy who carried the Soviet president's personal letter inviting the ROK president to the Soviet Union.

Then, have the ROK-Soviet relations really become close enough for a diplomatic envoy carrying a personal letter to discuss the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea? Conversely, could a special envoy from our side visit the Soviet Union and demand that "the joint military exercises between the Soviet Union and North Korea be discontinued at once?"

The thought that someone can say whatever he wants because he is a Soviet and an aide to Gorbachev should not be overlooked. It is not because we do not dislike hearing about the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea, but because it is a matter related to our self-respect.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet General Says No Chemical Weapons Present

LD2911222390 Prague CTK in English 2140 GMT
29 Nov 90

[Text] Prague, November 29 (CTK)—Members of the Czechoslovak parliamentary commission supervising the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia were assured by Soviet General Gennadiy Proposhchev today that the biggest Soviet ammunition depot in Czechoslovakia would be cleared by March 1991.

General Proposhchev, deputy chief of staff of the Central Group of the Soviet Army, said that the depot at Kvetna, East Bohemia, contained 58,000 tonnes on January 1, 1990, of which some 20 per cent are still to be removed.

The general said no chemical ammunition was stored either at Kvetna or at any other locality in Czechoslovakia. This is not true, however, of Soviet nuclear weaponry which was kept in Czechoslovakia at places destined for it by the then Czechoslovak Government. At present, Soviet nuclear grenades are no longer in Czechoslovak territory, the general said.

Member of the parliamentary commission Miroslav Sychra spoke to CTK today about questions concerning compensation for the damage caused to Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops during their stay in its territory since August 1968.

According to Sychra, intensive talks lasting 15 work days were conducted on the issue at the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry which ended in a compromise yesterday. It was agreed to switch the compensation talks from the level of government representatives to the level of governments and to conclude an international agreement which would embrace all aspects of the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

It is not clear how the Soviet side will compensate for the damage, Sychra said.

According to him buildings which are the property of the Soviet Army with Czechoslovak consent will be sold by the Soviet side. So-called "black" builders will have to be pulled down or sold as building material, Sychra said.

Starting Talks on Short-Range Nuclear Arms Urged

LD0612125790 Prague CTK in English 1151 GMT
6 Dec 90

[Text] Prague, 6 December (CTK)—Czechoslovakia is interested in the planned talks on short-range nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States to start as soon as possible.

A statement to this effect was handed over by Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenek Matejka to the ambassadors of the NATO member states and the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia today.

It said that other countries concerned, including Czechoslovakia, should join the talks in later stages.

HUNGARY

Hungary To Eliminate 'Earth' Tactical Missiles

91UF0181A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Gerasimov: "Goodbye, Missiles!"]

[Text] Budapest, 24 November—At a meeting with journalists in the legislature, Lajos Fur, minister of defense and a former agricultural historian, was curt in military fashion as he declared the complete liquidation of "Earth" tactical missiles, which are also able to carry nuclear systems. Simultaneously the targeting and guidance equipment will be destroyed and the center for training missile launcher crewmen will halt its activities.

Alongside those ceilings for weapons that are presently being "measured" in Paris, Hungary has designated its own limits: Its ceilings will be lowered even further. Proceeding from its own proposals that a policy for preserving peace is based on a trans-European system of security and bilateral agreements, the Republic of Hungary is currently devising its own military doctrine. "To conduct a decidedly defensive policy," say a number of government documents. In conjunction with this, not only will 800 people of a composite brigade of missile forces be demobilized, but in the near future the Hungarian Army, which presently contains 107,000 enlisted men and officers, will be reduced to 80,000.

"But even a small army is not cheap," the newspapers wrote recently as they reported on the debate underway concerning the military budget. Lajos Fur and his ministry are requesting 70-75 billion forints for 1991. This is more than for last year.

Behind this debate I see a conflict between certain notions.

"The Hungarian Army should be able to defend itself from the oppression of any neighbor. I call this all-around defense," says Istvan Dyarmati [name as transliterated], leader of the Hungarian delegation to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces.

According to him, Hungary needs an army which could, under attack, deliver a counterstrike that would make the losses incurred by an opponent disproportionately large in comparison to the advantage of capturing the country.

EAST EUROPE

JPRS-TAC-90-034
19 December 1990

"Such a 'deterrence' is effective even with regard to the Soviet Army," declared Istvan Dyarmati.

He believes that it is necessary to begin cooperation with the West to modernize the Hungarian Army. And he says it is necessary to start with air defense.

How much money would be needed for this? An estimate has been made of 100 billion forints (about \$1.7 billion). Are such expenditures necessary after the treaties in Paris? And is "all-around defense" needed at all?

On a visit to Budapest, Manfred Woerner, general secretary of NATO, asserted that Hungary was the first of the countries of East Europe to establish ties with various organizations of the Atlantic union. He added that the Soviet threat has disappeared. "Together with the USSR we wish to build a new Europe."

At the same time it is understood here that the Hungarian "all-around defense" may be effective if the security of the Soviet Union is taken into account.

"Hungary recognizes the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union," asserted Geza Jeszenszky, minister of foreign affairs, recently in Strasbourg at the "headquarters" of the Council of Europe, to which Hungary has been accepted. "Therefore the most important thing in the series of bilateral treaties, which are replacing the Warsaw Pact and which will be signed with neighboring countries, should be guarantees that there will be no attack on the Soviet Union from Hungarian territory or across Hungarian territory."

Defense Official Explains Interest in Former GDR Arms

*LD281113890 Budapest MTI in English 1040 GMT
28 Nov 90*

[Text] Budapest, November 27 (MTI)—According to German press releases, Hungary is showing a keen interest in the weapons of the dissolved East German Army. An MTI staff member asked Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, if the news was correct and what lay behind it.

Colonel Keleti recalled that the Hungarian Army had made it clear even before the reunification of Germany that it had an interest in some of the weapons and technical equipment of the GDR Army. Germany was expected to maintain a smaller army based on the western technology of Bundeswehr. It followed that the majority of the more modern weapons of the GDR Army became obsolete and attracted the interest of several countries including Hungary. The Paris agreement, signed in the meantime, set lower limits for the German Army than its actual arsenal so it dispense with some of its arms in any case.

Our interest is justified by the fact that the Hungarian Army, in an effort to become a smaller but more modern armed force, seeks to replace its obsolete technology with

a kind that is more compatible with current arms systems, Keleti said. Of course, the limits imposed on the Hungarian Army in Paris will also be considered. No agreements have yet been reached on the purchase of the said weapons.

In conclusion, the spokesman said that the current visit to Germany by Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, commander of the Hungarian Army, had no connection with Hungary's interest in these weapons. The news carried to this effect by the German press is nothing more than unfounded speculation, Keleti said. Lorincz's trip, which was announced in public, forms part of the process of intensifying relations between the two armies and that of security and confidence-building in Europe.

Colonel Details Soviet Troop Pullout Progress

*LD3011205490 Budapest MTI in English 1738 GMT
30 Nov 90*

[Text] Budapest, November 30 (MTI)—By late November, 771 Soviet military trains had left Hungary, Colonel Gyorgyi Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, has told MTI's correspondent.

He said that the mechanized infantry division of Szekesfehervar had withdrawn in November, ahead of the original schedule in mid-December.

To date, more than 50,000 Soviet citizens—soldiers, civilian staff, and family members—have left Hungary. The pullout involved 15,000 technical devices, including 11,650 wheeled and 780 caterpillar vehicles, 708 tanks and 1,020 other military vehicles, as well as 220,000 tonnes of materials.

In keeping with the earlier Hungarian promise, the Defence Ministry has handed over a preliminary list of objects qualified as unfit for use to the Soviet side, mainly facilities of inappropriate technical design differing from the Hungarian standards and built without licence, Keleti said.

POLAND

Official Interviewed on Soviet Army Withdrawal

*AU0412111990 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 30 Nov 90*

[Interview with Jacek Ambroziak, chairman of the Government Commission for the Withdrawal of Soviet Forces From Poland, by Elzbieta Pawelek; place and date not given: "Exit"]

[Text] [Pawelek] How many Soviet soldiers are there in Poland? Various figures are given. Some claim there are as many as 200,000.

[Ambroziak] That is a major exaggeration. Right now there are about 50,000 Soviet soldiers, most of them in northern and western voivodships. It is difficult to give an exact figure because the forces are constantly on the

move, are constantly intermingling. That is what creates the impression that there is such a large number.

[Pawelek] The withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Poland is an emotional issue. When will it happen? Poles feel that the presence of a foreign army is a threat to the democratic changes in Poland, especially because, as the Senate has said, the dependence imposed on us in 1945 was no liberation, and the official friendship was humiliating.

[Ambroziak] We want the last Soviet soldiers to leave our country by 31 December 1991. There have been talks in Moscow on this subject recently, and they will be continued in Warsaw soon. As we know, the Soviet forces in Poland are stationed here on the basis of the 1956 treaty, which is unfavorable for us in many respects. It has caused problems with housing and environmental damage, and it raises the question of criminal responsibility which some Soviet soldiers should face because of illegal activities. Therefore new agreements covering the Soviet Army's withdrawal from Poland are required, together with a revision of the conditions governing its deployment in Poland until it leaves our country.

[Pawelek] What conditions is the other side demanding?

[Ambroziak] One must not betray the secrets of the talks because that could harm our own interests. Views on many issues are divergent. The Soviet side agrees to the withdrawal of its forces from Poland, but thinks it should take place over a longer period of time. The Soviet side wants its forces here to provide an infrastructure for its forces in the former GDR. We on the other hand believe such an infrastructure is totally irrelevant now that the Soviet Army is being withdrawn from East Germany.

[Pawelek] Not so long ago (seven months), Ministry of National Defense representatives said that withdrawing the Soviet Army from just one locality—the Brzeg military airfield which is a particular problem for the civilian population—would cause a "loophole in our defense system." How can one justify such a sudden volte-face?

[Ambroziak] Poland has completely altered its defense policy, so earlier views are no longer valid. A medium-sized country like ours will not pursue an offensive policy. The point is to safeguard its peace and security, and we are capable of doing that with our own resources.

Withdrawing Soviet units from Poland is a relatively easy matter. A much more serious problem we are facing is the transit of the Soviet Army from East Germany. Some 380,000 men and their families are leaving that country, a total of about 1 million people. Hundreds of thousands of tonnes of heavy equipment are going to pass through Poland, and this exodus will start before the end of the year. In this situation we have to conduct tripartite talks, not just with the Russians, but also with the Germans. We need guarantees that society will not suffer as a result of this great military movement, that roads will not be damaged or railroad lines blocked. All

this is the responsibility of my commission which, despite what people say, was not appointed just because of the election campaign. It is an interministerial body because of the complexity of the problems. It consists of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of National Defense, and also intends to invite the minister of environmental protection and minister of health to cooperate. We also want the voivodes of those voivodships where Soviet forces are stationed to take part in the commission's work.

[Pawelek] Some people maintain that the commission has been appointed too late and is now facing problems that are too big for us.

[Ambroziak] Polish-Soviet talks were already held last year, so one cannot accuse the government of not being interested in this topic. Proper conditions for the Commission's functioning have only now come into existence, with the commencement of talks on a broader scale.

[Pawelek] The report drafted by the association of areas where the Soviet Army is stationed reads: "In Zagan, a Soviet tank caused a bridge to collapse. In Olawa, a Soviet unit demolished a 19th-century historic building without the knowledge of Poles. In Szprotawa, buildings handed back to Poland by the Soviet Army are so damaged that no one wants to live there." How is the question of compensation going to look?

[Ambroziak] I do not know how to answer this question right now. I think this topic will become the subject of talks, but I cannot envisage their outcome. Hungary is facing a similar problem right now, and a great deal of controversy is arising. It is extremely difficult to put a value on the damage caused by the Soviet Army's stay in Poland, especially because it lasted 45 years. We are trying to do so, of course. For example, a commission, the first of its kind, has just been appointed to examine the damage to the environment in areas where Soviet units are stationed. We will also attempt to establish to what extent the Soviet Army has damaged woodland and farmland. This is Sisyphean work, considering the fact that these units have been transferred elsewhere, but we want to possess the necessary material on which to base our talks. It will be necessary, especially because the Russians also claim to have incurred losses while building and reinforcing airfields and houses in Poland. The Polish Government wants all this to be calculated honestly and the damage repaired. A more urgent matter, however, is to restore to Poland the areas occupied by the Soviet Army, whether for the needs of the Polish Army or the civilian population.

[Pawelek] The Soviet Army is continuing to make use of forest areas and farmland on exactly the same principles as the Polish Army, in other words for nothing. This involves hundreds of thousands of hectares of woodland and farmland, tens of thousands of hectares of lakes and

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reservoirs. We are still subsidizing the Soviet Army's stay, yet there is no question of being able to afford it!

[Ambroziak] Like I said, it is necessary to revise the conditions governing the Soviet Army's stay before it is finally withdrawn. Normal principles of payment must be restored, in other words full charges must be introduced for the use of land and the environment, for the consumption of gas, electricity, water, food, etc.

[Pawelek] Compared with other countries, how far have we come on the road to withdrawing Soviet units from Poland?

[Ambroziak] As far as the number of soldiers is concerned, we have not made any move, but the Soviet Army has been stationed in Poland according to slightly different principles than in Hungary. Soviet forces entered Hungary in 1956 and remained there ever since. They entered Czechoslovakia in 1968 and also remained there ever since. The Soviet Army in Poland was part of the army that went to Germany. Its stay was legalized by the 1956 agreement, which was binding on both sides.

The Soviet Union admits that times have changed and that there is no need for its forces to stay here. In any case, the Warsaw Pact has changed completely. It is heading toward disintegration just like CEMA. The structures that were imposed by a single country are ceasing to be binding. Poland is becoming a sovereign country.

[Pawelek] That is paving our way to the Council of Europe.

[Ambroziak] The presence of the Soviet Army is not an obstacle to our membership in the Council of Europe or the EEC. Obstacles are an absence of democratic parliamentary elections and, in the case of the EEC, the lack of a suitable technical infrastructure and economic institutions. There is no relationship between membership in the Council of Europe and the presence of armed forces. For example, there are various armed forces in Germany, yet Germany has belonged to the Council of Europe for years. In the changing Europe, the stay of any foreign forces in Poland is quite simply irrelevant.

GENERAL

Petrovskiy Interviewed on UN Role in Disarmament

91UF0142A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy head of the USSR UN delegation and deputy foreign minister, by PRAVDA correspondent Al. Stepanov in New York; date not given: "Disarmament—Global Concern"]

[Text] Problems of disarmament are under active discussion at the UN General Assembly 45th Session continuing in New York. A PRAVDA correspondent talks about our country's position on this fundamental issue of international relations with V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy head of the USSR delegation and deputy foreign minister.

[Stepanov] Vladimir Fedorovich, entering a peaceful period of its existence, mankind is freeing itself of the excess arms burden. An unprecedented agreement between the USSR and the United States on a significant reduction in strategic offensive arms is in the offing. Europe has come very close to an agreement on a radical reduction in military potentials and is prepared in the immediate future to embark on the elaboration of qualitatively different, nonpower principles of safeguarding regional security. So is the era of confrontation forever a thing of the past?

[Petrovskiy] You are right; signs of positive changes are showing through increasingly clearly everywhere that an aspiration to dialogue and cooperation are blazing a trail for themselves. The concept of new internationalism implying reliance on consensus, collective actions, the primacy of international law, and the full engagement of the potential of all mechanisms of the multilateral approach—both regional and universal—given the central role of the United Nations, is being engendered in the consciousness of the world community.

But it would be a mistake to see today's world exclusively in radiant tones. More typical of it are Rembrandt's colors: expressive and striking, but at the same time severe and dramatic and, what is most important, suffused with the whole range of objective reality. But, after all, reality also means Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. Consequently, violence and war are not yet the tragic property of the past and are still regarded by some people as a functional attribute of policy.

However, I am convinced that the international community has come very close to the threshold beyond which it will be able to head decisively for a qualitatively new world order. The pioneers of the declining arms race—the USSR and the United States—are stepping up the pace sharply. Bilateral Soviet-American disarmament has been steered onto a fast track. But a locomotive, however powerful, cannot get up the requisite speed unless the train behind it overcomes the force of inertia.

For this reason the globalization of disarmament processes and their extension both to all categories of arms and all countries and regions are today essential.

It is not the first year that we have discussed this problem in the United Nations. We need to bring the UN mechanism that is operating currently in the sphere of disarmament into line with the times. Having finally rid itself of statements made for effect and polemical rhetoric, the United Nations could concentrate on the main areas and embark on practical measures of global disarmament, even if they could at the initial stage appear modest.

[Stepanov] If war is rejected as an instrument of policy, logic suggests the following step—negotiation of the parameters of a reasonable defensive sufficiency of the military potentials. What are the possibilities of such an agreement being achieved?

[Petrovskiy] The way to this lies via broad international dialogue for the purpose of imparting to military doctrines and, consequently, the military organizational development of all states an exclusively defensive focus.

In relations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance such a dialogue has already become reality. With the impending signing of the declaration on nonaggression between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, relations of military confrontation in Europe will conclusively become a fact of history. But security may be reliably assured only in the event of the demilitarization process extending beyond the European continent also. It is essential to make maximum use of the possibilities of regional approaches to the elimination of the military threat in Asian, African, and Latin American countries. The United Nations could be a kind of center of the globalization of defensive sufficiency stimulating regional efforts. In our view, a special UN study of defensive doctrines could help the search for mutual understanding in this field.

[Stepanov] The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed the belief that only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can guarantee lasting security for modern civilization. Has not our approach changed?

[Petrovskiy] No, and we will seek a further intensification of the process of nuclear disarmament and an extension of the sphere that it covers, at the expense of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including naval tactical nuclear arms. The negotiations on tactical nuclear arms in Europe that we propose would apply initially to the USSR and the United States, and then other countries could join in them. The compass of such negotiations should include, in our view, ground-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, aircraft delivering nuclear weapons, and nuclear components of these systems.

No one seriously expects that it to be possible to do away with nuclear weapons overnight. Only a staged approach is possible. Why should the United Nations, guided by

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an aspiration to practical action, not initiate a dialogue on the possible stages of nuclear disarmament? It might be possible simultaneously to commence a discussion of ways to shape a system of deterrence that should in the future replace the model of security based on mutual nuclear-power intimidation. An objective study of the question of banning the production of fissionable material for the creation of the weapons would contribute to the consolidation of the transition from declarations to practical deeds.

The Soviet Union has already terminated the production of highly enriched uranium and promulgated a program for the decommissioning before the year 2000 of all its weapons-grade plutonium reactors. We also attach considerable significance to the problem of nuclear material released as the result of nuclear disarmament accords. We understand the concern being expressed by the public at the fact that merely the storage of this material leaves the door open for its possible use for military purposes. It is important to devise an appropriate control mechanism and conduct a science and technology study of the possibilities of its use for peaceful purposes. In our view, the question of the International Atomic Energy Agency being asked to embark on the expert study of all these problems is urgent also.

Global actions take undoubted precedence in the preservation and strengthening of nuclear nonproliferation. The Soviet Union intends to act resolutely from the standpoint of support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should remain in effect until a nuclear-free and nonviolent world becomes a reality. It can only be replaced by an all-embracing international treaty on the nonremanufacture of nuclear weapons after their complete elimination.

We are not disposed to dramatize the fact that the fourth conference to study the effect of this treaty ended without the adoption of a final document. We see as the main outcome of the conference the fact that the subscribers to the treaty do not question the need for its continuance.

Global actions are essential today for the conclusion of the long-standing efforts pertaining to the elaboration of a convention on the elimination of another weapon of mass destruction—chemical—also. We are convinced that the United Nations could make an appreciable contribution to assurance of the universal nature of the future convention, which is being drawn up in Geneva.

[Stepanov] What else might be done to speed up the negotiations in Geneva to eliminate the chemical and bacteriological dangers?

[Petrovskiy] We support the proposal for a meeting in the first half of 1991 of the Conference on Disarmament at the foreign minister level in order to overcome the final obstacles to the agreement of a chemical weapons convention. Whereas the efforts pertaining to removal of

the chemical threat are as yet only approaching completion, bacteriological weapons have already been “outlawed” by the 1972 convention, and it is now essential to concern ourselves with reinforcing its provisions. The organization next year of a third conference to study the effect of this agreement would contribute to this. The Soviet Union believes that the main areas of an increase in the effectiveness of the convention could be the elaboration of a special control mechanism, the participation in this of all states, confidence-building and an expansion of openness, and the removal of concerns with respect to activity regulated by the convention.

[Stepanov] The war unleashed by Iraq and the threats emanating from Baghdad to use the most modern and destructive types of weapons recall yet another serious problem—conventional arms supplies. And this question also requires a global solution, does it not?

[Petrovskiy] Our position on this aspect of disarmament was recently set forth in detail in a letter from the USSR foreign minister to the UN secretary general. Confirming its readiness for a limitation on the sales and supplies of weapons, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the USSR proposes that action be set in motion in this area by creating within the framework of the United Nations a corresponding information register. Such a measure would make it possible to better see the possibilities of the application of the principle of defensive sufficiency and on this basis embark on a priority reduction in excessive arms flows.

[Stepanov] The genuine globalization of disarmament cannot be achieved as long as sea-based arms remain outside of its framework. Such principles as reasonable sufficiency and strengthening stability, eliminating the capability for surprise attack and offensive operations, effective inspection and mutual openness should, most likely, be applied to the situation on the seas also?

[Petrovskiy] Quite right. As far as we are concerned, we confirmed in the United Nations our proposal for a multilateral meeting along the lines of this organization with the participation of military experts of major naval powers and other interested states. It would be expedient to pay paramount attention there to a discussion of confidence-building measures at sea. We should concentrate on this matter during the examination of naval problems in the UN Disarmament Commission also. We support the proposal of the Scandinavian countries concerning the elaboration of international standards on the safety of on-board nuclear power plants.

[Stepanov] The open publication of information concerning military activity is now becoming an increasingly important additional factor of stability and security as a whole. There was a time when our country was criticized—and rightly so!—for “secret-mania.” But it is becoming a thing of the past, it would seem?

[Petrovskiy] Yes, our country has adopted an emphatic policy of expanding glasnost in military matters. Data on the strength and main types of arms of the USSR Armed

Forces have been made public and disseminated, including in the United Nations. At the present General Assembly session, information concerning the USSR's defense spending has been submitted in accordance with the UN's standardized accounting system.

In order for military openness to become a universal rule of international life, we suggest that measures of openness under the aegis of the United Nations provide, among other things, for:

- states' annual presentation to the United Nations on a voluntary basis of data on the strength of their armed forces (overall and broken down by main service—army, air force, navy, others); on the main types of arms (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, large surface ships, assault-landing ships included, submarines); on the numbers of forces outside of national territory; and for the nuclear powers, intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and ground-based tactical nuclear missiles;
- states' annual presentation on a voluntary basis of data to the standardized system of military spending accounts operating in the United Nations;
- the increased predictability of the military organizational development of the UN members by way of assurance of the open nature of the members' military budgets.

I would say in conclusion that the most important thing required of all states today is realism, political courage and a readiness for decisive action.

'Military Danger' Cited Despite World Changes

PM2011131390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by Colonel M. Ponomarev under the "From the Military Observer's Viewpoint" rubric: "Does the Soviet Union Have Enemies"]

[Text] A great deal is happening nowadays that seemed utterly unthinkable even quite recently. Everyone can cite a host of examples of this—times are very changeable: Everything, in whatever sphere—be it our internal life or the sphere of international relations—is in flux. I will venture to cite just one example, witnessed by everyone watching the "Vremya" program on Tuesday. The USSR president received eminent NATO military leaders—General V. Eide, chairman of the Military Committee, and General J. Galvin, NATO supreme allied commander, Europe—in his office and had a long friendly conversation with them.

I think that this particular fact alone reflected very graphically the time of unprecedented changes taking place today in the military-political sphere. History has sometimes taught us a brutal lesson and we have grown

accustomed to living in conditions of a fortress under siege. First capitalist encirclement, then the system of imperialist military blocs and the network of military bases surrounding our country, then it was China, which declared to the whole world that the USSR was its number one enemy. The majority of these threats were real. We sometimes initiated some of them ourselves, provoking our enemies by policy and actions that were not fully thought-out, as happened when we said publicly that "we would bury capitalism" or when we began siting intermediate-range missiles, not to mention bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

That time has passed with the emergence and formation of the new political thinking and the renunciation of the confrontational approach. Today at long last we do not perceive any particular people in one country or another as enemies whom we suspect of preparing war with us. M.S. Gorbachev said this once again before the whole world at a Bonn press conference in response to the direct question of who is our potential adversary and whether we have one at all. There have been profound changes in the policy of the protagonists on the world arena, including the military powers. They are now increasingly founding their relations on good-neighborliness, partnership, and cooperation in order to meet the historical challenges on the verge of the third millennium.

Let no one see all this as unfounded claims. Let us recall the recent agreements on accord and cooperation with France; on good-neighborliness, partnership, and cooperation with the FRG, and the political declaration on cooperation with Spain. A treaty on friendship and cooperation is to be concluded tomorrow with Italy. The adoption of an Anglo-Soviet declaration is on the agenda.

The new view of the world is also becoming established in the largest and most powerful Western power—the United States. Relations of cooperation are replacing confrontation between the United States and the USSR, which manifested itself so graphically in connection with the Persian Gulf crisis. After long reflection people in the Pentagon have also concluded that the "threat of a Soviet military offensive against the United States and its European allies has largely disappeared." It is therefore allegedly necessary to move on from preparing global conflict with the USSR to preparing for regional "unforeseen circumstances." The military budget and military spending are finally beginning to diminish. Over the next five years it is planned to considerably—by up to 25 percent—reduce the numerical strength of armed forces. Many military bases and facilities on foreign territory, including the largest air base—Clark Field on the Philippines—are to be eliminated. The scale of military maneuvers both in Europe and in the Far East is being restricted.

We can no longer see not only individual Western countries but also their main military-political alliance—

NATO—as direct adversaries. The North Atlantic alliance's main political task now, its secretary general, M. Woerner, said, is to build new European security structures—not against but with the participation of the Soviet Union. According to this statement, all NATO partners jointly aim to increasingly reinforce the CSCE process.

The situation in the Far East has also changed. The normalization of relations with the PRC played a special role here. These relations are now based on good-neighbornliness. Contacts are developing at various levels, including the military level. Neither China nor the Soviet Union sees the other as an enemy any longer.

Sentiments are also changing in Japan. There too people are also beginning to speak with increasing frequency of the need to consolidate security in the Asian-Pacific region. The successful campaign against sending units from the "self-defense forces" outside national territory constituted fresh proof of the Japanese people's peaceable mood.

Changes in the world's complexion are not associated with the subjective views held by a particular country's leadership or a particular politician. They can be the same or different. It is ultimately not personal views but the fundamental interests of states or groups of states united in alliances that are crucial. These interests cannot be guaranteed by means of war now. War was an irrational phenomenon, it cannot be in anyone's interests. It can only destroy everyone and everything.

Thus, today we have no grounds for suspecting anyone of preparing war with the USSR. This has enabled our leadership to adopt a new military-political doctrine—the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency. Its exclusively defensive character has demanded that we embark on restructuring the Armed Forces. Military reform—the draft of which has already been submitted to the government and will then be received by the USSR Supreme Soviet—is on the agenda. Conditions—both internal and external—have become ripe for such reform.

But this is the paradox of our time—there is virtually no threat of war, but there is still military danger, and we cannot help but take this into consideration.

From where does this danger emanate? Above all from the piles of weapons stockpiled in the world. Many thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, tens of thousands of tanks and guns, thousands of aircraft, and many hundreds of warships—all this potential carries military danger.

No one has the right to be indifferent to this. The disarmament process was the behest of the time. But there are still many obstacles in its way despite all the successes that have been achieved over the last few weeks and months at the negotiating table. Perhaps the most important thing is the lag of consciousness (both among statesmen and military men too) behind today's social reality.

Hence the regional conflicts. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has shown that violence and war have still not become a thing of the past. Hence the attempts by some NATO circles when formulating the bloc's new military strategy to once again, as London's THE EUROPEAN and REUTER reported, proceed on the premise that the Soviet Union is still a potential adversary. This approach has become so loathsome nowadays that NATO members have rushed to refute press reports on this score. But there is after all no smoke without fire.

There is another danger—the situation within the country is becoming more and more menacing. Lack of unity in our multiethnic state, the split in society, separatist trends, and paralysis in the executive are, I would say, our main adversaries today.

This fact cannot be discounted in the West. This is what London's OBSERVER wrote: "SS-25 intercontinental mobile missiles, which had their world premiere on Red Square provoked the alarmed question: Who holds power in this disintegrating superpower?" The newspaper was obviously laying it on thick, but the crux of the matter changes little as a result. Alarm for the future of the Soviet Union and the future of its powerful weapons is bound to arouse concern and prompt people to ponder what will happen next. We too should think about this.

Certainly, guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive changes on the world arena have not yet taken shape, they are only beginning to develop. Consequently, there is still military danger. Under these conditions strengthening and maintaining the country's defense capability and security at the level of reliable and reasonable sufficiency are still one of the most important tasks. One of our most important tasks is to consolidate our ranks, prevent the disintegration of the multiethnic Soviet state, and unite it on the basis of the new Union treaty, which is also to serve as a means of consolidating our Armed Forces.

Primakov Attends Nuclear Weapons Conference

*LD2211033290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1610 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow, 21 November (TASS)—An international seminar on questions of nuclear weapons in Europe has taken place in Moscow at the initiative of the European Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, together with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and the Institute for the Study of Problems of Security between East and West in New York. Politicians, scientists, diplomats, and representatives of military circles from the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France, and Poland participated.

Seminar participants were received by Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council. There was discussion of topical questions of the international situation and the course of perestroika processes in the USSR.

Military Analyst on 'Minimum Nuclear Containment'

*LD3011120590 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT
30 Nov 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 30 (TASS)—President Gorbachev said in Paris that the USSR was ready to determine jointly with Western nations the exact meaning of the term "minimum nuclear containment" and fix the limit beyond which the nuclear retaliation potential will turn into an attack force.

The Soviet Union has long since declared its firm readiness to renounce all nuclear weapons. It has declared more than once that it is ready to give up its status of a nuclear power, to exclude nuclear weapons from all defence sufficiency versions and to develop its Armed Forces without any reliance on nuclear armaments. Of course, this is possible only if other nuclear powers act likewise.

However, the United States and its NATO allies stubbornly refuse to renounce mass destruction weapons and insist that "nuclear containment" should exist in the foreseeable future or maybe even "forever."

Can there be any compromise? I believe it is possible. The Soviet Union does not dramatise the existing differences on the role of nuclear weapons in general and is ready to scrap nuclear arsenals stage-by-stage. It is aware that the West and the East are now in accord that existing nuclear stockpiles are excessive and must be sharply reduced. This is borne out by the concluded agreement on medium and shorter range missiles and the practically ready agreement on strategic offensive armaments. Both sides realise that the goals of containment could be achieved with much smaller arsenals.

Realising that nuclear weapons cannot be liquidated all at once and that mankind will have to proceed towards this goal stage-by- stage, and in light of the present stand of the United States and its allies, the USSR moves to include another intermediate stage in the programme for the creation of a nuclear-free world—the stage of "minimum containment." If it is still necessary to contain each other, let's do it at the minimum level.

What criteria should be used to determine this level's parameters? Apparently, they should provide for nuclear equality within limits ruling out the possibility of any side's "complete victory." It ought to be said that the problem of minimum nuclear containment is being discussed actively by specialists, both military and civilian, including in the Soviet Union. Their views on this level are rather contradictory, differing as regards the extent to which the arsenals could be reduced—from 500 to several thousand warheads.

What would minimum nuclear containment yield? It would primarily ensure greater trust and strategic stability. The economic factor should not be overlooked

too. Of course, the scrapping of large numbers of nuclear armaments alone would not yield any substantial economy, because resources have already been spent on the existing forces and they cannot be recouped, while the reduced spendings on the upkeep of nuclear forces amount to a rather modest sum. The main source of economy can be obtained by limiting the modernisation of the existing tremendous nuclear trade, as well as the development and deployment of new weapon systems. This is where tremendous funds could be saved if the existing arsenals are reduced to the minimum.

Petrovskiy Addresses UN Disarmament Conference

*LD0412123990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1026 GMT 4 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 4 December (TASS)—"The present concept of disarmament is a concept of cooperation of states, achievement of consensus on central issues of overall defense sufficiency, and ensuring a balance of interests," stated Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, today. He spoke at an international conference which opened here today on the theme of "The UN Role in the Field of Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects."

The high-ranking Soviet diplomat expressed confidence that the time has come for the globalization of disarmament and demilitarization of international relations with the help of the United Nations. Globalization of this process is understood in the Soviet Union as meaning the participation of all countries—nuclear and nonnuclear—in reducing military arsenals, he stressed. In particular, in his view, in the post-confrontation world the role of nuclear weapons as a means of policy in relations between East and West will be substantially lowered.

Here, special responsibility rests with the nuclear powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. In present conditions, in the words of Vladimir Petrovskiy, the most probable stage on the way to nonforce forms of ensuring security is nuclear deterrence at a minimum level. Apart from that, noted the USSR deputy foreign affairs minister, "if all the nuclear powers declare that they will never support aggression in any form, then nuclear weapons will be still more firmly isolated from the world, up to and including their total disappearance.

He pointed out that banning nuclear tests, strengthening the nuclear arms nonproliferation regime, and constraints on trading arms in general are an important element in the process of disarmament. From the point of view of the USSR, an important and concrete measure will be setting up a register of arms supplies under the auspices of the United Nations. This will make way for bringing order into arms supplies, first of all into crisis regions.

Speaking of the role of the joint security system, provided for by the UN Charter, Vladimir Petrovskiy stressed that to secure the guaranteed rights of each member of the world community, the United Nations must have at its disposal not only the means of persuasion, but also the means for suppressing aggression. With this need in mind it is necessary in the future to turn the Military Staff Committee into an effective body of cooperation.

As before, the Soviet Union, continues the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, considers it necessary to abolish foreign military presences in the world and itself resolutely adopts this way. Returning troops to their national territories is an integral element in making disarmament global and it is important to link it with the strengthening of the whole complex of peacemaking possibilities of the United Nations. Along with this he does not exclude the use of force in the situations defined by the UN Charter, only by resolution of the United Nations with an agreement of the Security Council and within the framework of international law.

Inevitability of punishment for aggression, according to Vladimir Petrovskiy, should serve as a "firm restriction on any claim to military hegemony."

Moscow Conference Views UN Role in Disarmament

Shevardnadze Receives UN Official

*LD0612170190 Moscow TASS in English 1647 GMT
6 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow, December 6 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze received on Wednesday Jayantha Dhanapala, director of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and a group of participants in the international conference on the role of the United Nations in the disarmament and security process.

The conference, held here between December 4-6, discussed key problems dealing with the growth of the U.N. contribution to the turning of disarmament into a global process and analysed new conceptual approaches to the mechanism of multilateral cooperation during the post-confrontation era. Participants in the conference, organised by UNIDIR jointly with the Soviet U.N. Association, also discussed ways of using the United Nations as a key instrument of stability on the stage of most profound positive changes in world politics.

Speaking today at a briefing about the Wednesday meeting of the UNIDIR director and a group of participants in the conference with the Soviet foreign minister, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin said that Shevardnadze had started with calling their attention to the deepening of the disarmament process.

According to Churkin, Shevardnadze stressed that the U.N. would have to work out a scale of specific priorities in the sphere of multilateral disarmament for the 90s, which would include, in the first place, the termination of nuclear tests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all dimensions, the putting of things in order in the sphere of conventional arms deliveries and the release of resources as a result of the reduction of military spendings and conversion to be used for peaceful purposes.

Conference 'Success' Noted

*LD0612190290 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT
6 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, December 6 (TASS)—Jayantha Dhanapala, director of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], has described as success the results of the international conference "Role of the United Nations in Disarmament and Security Processes—Evolution and Prospects". He spoke today at a final sitting of the conference, held in Moscow between December 4 and 6. It was organised by UNIDIR, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet U.N. Association.

Dhanapala stressed that the conference did not set itself the task of working out a final document. The most important thing for its participants was to exchange views on ways of enhancing the efficiency of the United Nations, and they were satisfied with a high level of reports made there. Dhanapala pointed out that all proposals put forward at the conference would be summed up and set forth in UNIDIR publications.

The conference was attended by well-known politicians, high-ranking diplomats, scientists and experts from about 50 countries. They devoted much attention to problems of regional security and the relationship between U.N. Authorities and CSCE institutions.

Summing up the results of a three-day discussion, UNIDIR deputy director Serge Sur said that the U.N. was facing many important problems, primarily, Iraq's challenge to the world community. By invading Kuwait, it put the U.N. before a difficult choice. Either the U.N. will be able to prove the effectiveness of the collective security system, or it will suffer a defeat, which will have irreparable consequences for its activities. Speaking about other priority tasks facing the U.N., Serge Sur pointed to the need to struggle against the arms race in third world countries, to the importance of expanding the very concept of security through including into it non-military aspects (demography, economics, ecology, migration and so on).

The latest developments proved the viability of the U.N. charter, Sur continued. He believes that it did not become obsolete. On the contrary, it proved the correctness of the comprehensive principles recorded in it. This

follows from the Paris all-European summit and resolutions of international human rights conferences. At the same time, he continued, it is time to consider the "revival" of some articles of the U.N. Charter, specifically, Article 26 (on the competence of the Security Council in the sphere of the regulation of armaments), which has never been put into effect.

Dzasokhov Addresses UN Disarmament Conference in Moscow

LD0612143790 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT
6 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, December 6 (TASS)—The Soviet parliament believes that given the profound interrelationships of the modern world, "one should not be guided by time-serving considerations and the interests of the military business," said Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the Soviet parliament's Committee for International Affairs. Dzasokhov spoke at an international conference "The U.N. Role in Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects," which closed here today.

In particular, he said that under the influence of a powerful anti-nuclear movement in the USSR, the Supreme Soviet sought contacts and was in correspondence with the U.S. Congress in order to advance the issue of banning underground nuclear tests.

The Soviet parliament is busy organising expert back-up for major international and regional problems, including conversion of the military industry.

On regional problems, Dzasokhov emphasised that after the completion of the Paris summit meeting of heads of state and government of CSCE member-countries, the Soviet parliament plans to intensify contacts with the parliaments of Asia, the Pacific, Africa and the Mediterranean, where there is a need to defuse tensions.

Soviet legislators, he said, are working towards a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis during the "pause of goodwill."

The Soviet parliament will continue to support U.N. activity in the field of disarmament and security, Dzasokhov emphasised.

START TALKS

Missile Troops Chief on Cutback Problems

PM2011131990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General V. Rodin, chief of the Strategic Missile Troops Political Directorate, by Major A. Dolinin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's permanent correspondent on the Strategic Missile Troops: "If We Sign a

Treaty..."—place and date not given; first three paragraphs are Maj. Dolinin's introduction]

[Text] The understanding of peace as a major common human value has in recent times changed the nature of many states' military policy. But the fact remains that millions of people on the planet continue to create and produce deadly weapons, including nuclear missile weapons. And the Soviet and U.S. intermediate and shorter-range missiles which have been eliminated constituted only four percent of the two sides' nuclear missile arsenal. So we should not yet be talking about the complete elimination of the threat of war.

The treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, for all its huge political significance, will obviously not solve the problem of confrontation once and for all either. For the missilemen remaining in service, however, workloads, far from decreasing, are actually significantly increasing.

It was on this note that the conversation between the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and Colonel General V. Rodin, member of the military council and chief of the Strategic Missile Troops Political Directorate, began.

[Rodin] This is indeed a very difficult question. After all, even as things are today small numbers of missile troops have to resolve tasks on a quite different qualitative level, which are determined by the defensive character of our military doctrine. Unlike the Americans, we have assumed the obligation of not using nuclear weapons first. The Strategic Missile Troops field manual states that the troops carry out only retaliatory combat operations. Just consider it: It is one thing to reserve oneself the right to a first, surprise strike. It is quite another to prepare military units and combined units for retaliatory combat operations. It is very difficult.

[Dolinin] I understand: It is a matter of maintaining constant combat readiness, measured in seconds. But today, I imagine, it is directly linked with people's general social condition. What is this like at the present time? In the same Soviet-U.S. intermediate and shorter-range missiles treaty, for example, the number of missile complexes, methods of destruction, and procedures for inspection are stipulated. But about the missile troops themselves, not a word...

[Rodin] The treaty is a juridical document. Elevated and noble ideas are enshrined in its very essence. But you are correct in saying that the conclusion of the treaty has affected the futures of thousands of people. In the case of many of them, their whole service has taken place with these missiles. For example, officers V. Sokhranov, A. Bukhov, and A. Petyayev started their service by placing them on alert status and ended by loading them for despatch to the destruction center... Of course it was not easy for them to destroy what they had only recently cherished. Veterans even avoid the words "destruction of missiles" in their conversations. In their vocabulary it is "farewell to the missiles." They have even been

assembling with their wives and children for this farewell. There was a tribute of respect in this to the labor of the scientists and engineers who created the technology and to our traditions.

The Soviet-U.S. treaty predetermined the fate of a whole series of combined missile units and of dozens of military units and subunits. We try hard not to hurt or offend anyone. Hundreds of officers and warrant officers were discharged in the reduction of staff. The state provided them with pensions. But I won't try to hide the fact that not everything has come about the way we would have liked. There were blunders and legitimate complaints. We are trying to solve these problems. We see that people do not end up being thrown out on the street, as they say, and that they remain socially protected.

[Dolinin] The opinion is that the strategic missilemen are in a privileged position...

[Rodin] I have had occasion to serve in different branches of the Armed Forces and different geographical areas of the country. I am in a position to make comparisons. For example, as far as the large garrisons are concerned, as a rule, they have adequate conditions. They have everything necessary for life and service, up to and including sports halls and swimming pools. This, I believe, is not a luxury—it is a necessary condition for effective recovery after many days of duty.

But we too, unfortunately, have housing problems. Some 10,000 servicemen and their families are without housing. There are not enough places in kindergartens and creches, and the schools are overfilled. By no means do opportunities exist everywhere for the wives of officers and warrant officers to get work.

And take the following problem. The official wage of the driver-mechanic of a heavyweight mobile "SS-25" launcher (you saw it in the parade today), even with supplements, is less than half that of a trolleybus driver. And on the launch device is a ballistic missile worth tens of thousands of rubles. What kind of privileges are we talking about?

Not so long ago, we held a meeting with missile troops servicemen who are also people's deputies. Questions of providing the troops with all that is necessary were put very bluntly, since the norms decrease sometimes through the fault of local authorities. In short, there are plenty of problems.

[Dolinin] At the present time, when military reform is becoming a reality, much is being said about the professionalization of the Army. What do people in the missile troops feel about this?

[Rodin] I have already spoken about this in the press. Professionalization of the Army is often discussed in very primitive terms. Only from the viewpoint of how much to pay the professional soldier. Of course, any officer would want to deal with professional servicemen. Hundreds of worries would be removed at a stroke. But

at the same time the socioeconomic, legal, and political problems connected with reform cannot be ignored.

We cannot talk about the principles of armed services manpower recruitment in isolation from military-political events in the world, processes going on in our country, and the prospects for society's life in the circumstances of market relations. Although, at the present time around 40 percent of the missile troops are already professionals. Estimates show that this figure will grow to 50 percent in the very near future.

Is a switch to manning our units with soldiers and NCO's on contract a realistic prospect? I think the answer for the time being is no. The appropriate basis has to be created for this. I have in mind the drafting of military legislation and the creation of the corresponding social and cultural conditions, a training base which takes the troops' development prospects into account, and a system for training mobilization resources.

And are not the problems of the prestige of military service in connection with this a cause for great concern? How are we to prevent rubles from obscuring concepts such as "military honor," "a soldier's duty," and "loyalty to the oath of allegiance"?

[Dolinin] Recently much has been written and said about bullying and military crimes. The president of the country recently received soldiers' mothers, who raised these questions, among others. As a former missile officer I know that in our branch too these questions have, unfortunately, not been entirely solved...

[Rodin] The state of discipline as a whole ensures that we accomplish our tasks. But we are not trying to embellish the true state of affairs. Significant blame for negative phenomena, including so-called nonstatutory relations, lies at the door of the command and political personnel. Some officers and warrant officers are too remote from the men. But there are phenomena which do not depend on us alone. I mean desertion and absence without leave from units. Recently cases have been observed whereby parents arrive to visit their son and then they take him away with them, even though the unit is an excellent one with no bullying at all. Who should take the responsibility for this? These problems require solution, not only on the scale of the branch, or of the Armed Forces, but on the scale of the whole country. After all, among the military we have representatives of 90 nations and nationalities. What this means, I think, it is not necessary to explain today. I could say a lot more, but we do not hold commanders and political workers in high esteem when they seek to hide their responsibility behind a palisade of objective causes.

[Dolinin] One last question, Viktor Semenovich: Suggestions are being more frequently heard that, given the political and economic situation in the country today, we have no time for holidays. Some people have even been shaking their fists at the October anniversary and military symbols...

[Rodin] There are different kinds of holidays. There probably are some that were born of arbitrary decisions, of the vanity of some leaders. In others, there is the wisdom of the people, a historical commemoration of our people's heroic past. Missile Troops and Artillerymen's Day is just such a holiday. It is by no means accidental, and is connected with our troops attack on the Volga in 1942. Therefore, for missile soldiers and artillerymen, this holiday is a tribute to the memory of our fathers' and grandfathers' feats and a reason to reflect on the present. We should not lose everything that is elevated and sacred in our life just for the sake of everyday circumstances.

I want to wish all who wear our shoulder boards, in the difficult conditions of current circumstances, that they remain people of military duty, of honor and responsibility. That they remain patriots to their Motherland.

Over Forty Missile Silos Destroyed in Novgorod

LD2411161490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 23 Nov 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe was signed a few days ago at the Paris conference.

The path to detente and to a considerable reduction in armaments began considerably earlier.

Our country today is true to the obligations undertaken in the SALT II Treaty:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Batalov] [Video shows explosion site] There are torn sheets of metal, broken ferro-concrete blocks, and broken earth; a very powerful explosion occurred here just a few days ago; yet another missile launching silo ceased to exist.

A total of over 40 launch silos have been destroyed on Novgorod oblast territory.

[N.I. Litvin, head of the rayon civil defense staff] The explosions are conducted by first-class specialists, specialists in their field who carry out their work very precisely. After the destruction of the constructions [word indistinct] came here and checked the radioactivity, which is virtually zero here. Instruments register the natural background radiation.

[Batalov] Barbed wire, strongly battered doors of the missile launch complexes, subterranean labyrinths with very strong walls, all of this proves there was a high danger zone here.

Today, we say goodbye to the weapons, and the first step on this path was the destruction of Soviet and U.S. medium and shorter range missiles.

The powerful explosions, wiping the missile launch complexes from the face of the Earth, show that an atmosphere of trust between people and between states is replacing confrontation. [end recording]

Public Attention Focuses on Geneva Arms Talks

LD0512001490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 4 Dec 90

[Report by correspondent F. Seyful-Mulyukov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Now, after the signing in Paris of a multilateral treaty on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, it is quite natural that public attention should be focused on the USSR-U.S. talks in Geneva on this issue:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent F. Seyful-Mulyukov] It was in Geneva five years ago that the leaders of the two superpowers stopped the world's slide toward a nuclear catastrophe. Now the preparation for a USSR-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons [START] is on the agenda. A month remains before the conclusion of the work on this treaty. A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet was present at the latest round of the USSR-U.S. talks, which has been taking place at our mission in Geneva.

What is the situation at the talks in Geneva? Will Presidents Bush and Gorbachev be able to sign a treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons in Moscow at the beginning of the next year?

[R. Burt, head of the U.S. delegation, in English with superimposed translation into Russian] Harold Wilson, ex-prime minister of Great Britain, once said that a week is a long time in politics. That is why it is not safe to try to predict what is going to happen in a month's time. But, Ambassador Nazarkin, I personally, and both our delegations are persistently working in Geneva on preparing a treaty for our presidents to sign.

[V.N. Ochirov] In the first place, we as deputies have been in contact with the documents on which both delegations have been working for a very long time. We discovered that it is very hard, tedious, and responsible work, and we have seen that there are real possibilities for our presidents to sign this treaty between our countries.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] How can the forced preparation of the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons be combined with our continuing buildup of nuclear missiles, about which we were surprised to learn from our press after the meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney and the members of two parliamentary commissions, the members of the Committee for Defense and State Security and of the Committee for International Affairs?

[Ochirov] In my opinion, it was not so much the question of a direct buildup, but of improving and modernizing the weapons. I think this process is natural as science does not stand still, and this treaty provides for limitations in this process. [end recording]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Commentary Questions U.S. Weapons Development

*LD0212112990 Moscow in English to North America
0000 GMT 2 Dec 90*

[“Weekly Commentary” by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] I'd like to draw your attention to a report carried by the American newspaper DEFENSE NEWS which is directed at a very narrow circle of readers. This report bypassed the pages of leading American newspapers, so the American public remains relatively unaware of the circumstances that deserve close attention.

According to the DEFENSE NEWS, at a time when the Washington authorities are bending every effort in reducing the budget deficit, the Pentagon plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in the next two to three years on the development of the most up-to-date kinds of weapons. They include laser weapons for waging what is termed as electronic war. A special accent is laid in this program on the laser system called Miracle, already being tested secretly at the White Sands testing range in New Mexico. If we add to this the stubborn unwillingness of the Pentagon to give up the SDI project despite its high cost and technical failures happening one after another during the testing of major elements of the system, then all this suggests a series of important questions.

Question one: Why do the American military go ahead with the development of the most up-to-date and costly military technology, knowing that the situation on the international scene has improved radically and that the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union has ended? The answer to this question lies in the sphere of interests involving major war and industrial corporations of the United States. What we deal with is not simply the desire to make as much profit as possible on arms manufacturing, but also an attempt to create an entirely new market for dealers in weapons. By the end of the 70's, the most farsighted managers of the American war business have already understood that the opportunities of the conventional weapons market were practically exhausted. The American arsenals have since filled with weaponry that was in high demand in the post-war period, and brought a lot of profit [as heard] to war concerns that something new should be invented to keep profits at the same level.

Hence the appearance of the Star Wars program—or SDI. It has opened new vistas for the companies that are the chief contractors at the Pentagon. The desire to

create for many years to come a stable market for a few privileged war corporations explains a remarkable vitality of the SDI program. The work on it continues in defiance of any political logic and economic and technical faults. Each of these reasons would have been enough to give the SDI project up. Especially now that it isn't very clear who it should be directed against. Yet President Bush preferred to violate his promise not to raise taxes further than raise his hand against the SDI.

And now we learn that there exists no other less costly programs. Certain groups in America go ahead with the policy aimed at creating a long-term sales market for military concerns favored by the Pentagon. Today the Pentagon chiefs plan to spend thousands of millions more on the development of electronic war weapons. They order the destruction of obsolete weapons and ships and prepare at the same time, without letting the American public know about it, for a new extremely dangerous spiral of the arms race.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

INF Implementation Experience Bodes Well for START

*LD0712070390 Moscow in English to North America
2300 GMT 6 Dec 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Three years ago in December 1987 President Gorbachev and the then U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed a bilateral treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles [INF]. We've asked Vladimir Medvedev, chief of the Soviet National Center for Reducing the Nuclear Threat, to sum up what has been done under this treaty:

[Begin Medvedev recording in Russian with superimposed translation into English] The Soviet Union today has 66 missiles left of the RSB-10 type, known in the West as the SS-20s, which are capable of carrying no more than 200 warheads. The American side has 191 missiles of this range left because every U.S. missile carries one warhead, whereas ours carry three. Initially the Soviet Union was to destroy 1,846 missiles and the United States 846. The last Soviet missile is expected to be destroyed next mid-May.

The Soviet-American treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles pioneered nuclear disarmament. Successful cooperation of our two countries in carrying out is understandably very important. Our cooperation with the America side primarily concerns inspections—the broadest sphere of contact in carrying out the treaty. Both sides have carried out a large number of inspections. The American one—more than 300 short-term inspections; the Soviet one—about 150 short-term inspections on the territory of the United States, in countries where American missiles are deployed. The inspectors have found no major violations of the treaty on either side. There have been mutual complaints,

however, and to settle them a special commission was set up and has done good work. [end recording]

[Announcer] The experience accumulated during the preparation and the realization and the inspections of the treaty will most certainly be taken into account in the expected treaty on offensive strategic weapons [START]. General Medvedev's center will have a hand in implementing it. So, the three years of the treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles give hope for a good strategic missiles treaty and a good future for disarmament and confidence-building between our two countries.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

CFE Tank Destruction Provisions Criticized

91WC0023A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 45, 12 Nov 90 p 19

[Article by Major Yu. Selivanov under the rubric "Pages of Regional Publications": "That Is What Glasnost is Like," reprinted from the 31 October LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, newspaper of the Southern Group of Forces]

[Text] A good deal of time has passed since the USSR minister of foreign affairs, E. Shevardnadze, and his American colleague, J. Baker, reached an agreement in New York on the final variant of the treaty for the reduction of conventional troops and arms in Europe, which should be signed in the middle of November in Paris. It would seem that this would be plenty of time to inform the public about the essence of the forthcoming agreement, the more so because, as far as one can judge from the fragmented reports, it touches upon the very basis of the power of the Warsaw Pact and NATO—their conventional forces. Yet the only factual information our official organs have considered it possible to relay to the Soviet public so far amounts to figures about arms ceilings that will be established in Europe as a result of this treaty.

At the same time, with respect to another issue which is no less important, especially to us military personnel—by how much the Soviet Union will have to reduce its military equipment and how much the NATO bloc will—nothing is clear yet unless you count one phrase from J. Baker quoted by PRAVDA on 14 October: "The Soviet Union will have considerably greater commitments for destroying equipment than NATO will... We will have to destroy 4,000 tanks in NATO. And the Soviets or the Warsaw Pact—19,000. The figures are similar in other categories, and with respect to certain indicators the figures are even more in our favor..."

Perhaps this is enough information for Baker, but as an officer in the Armed Forces and a USSR citizen, I would like to know precisely how great the NATO advantage in arms reduction is.

Even the fact that our officials are in no hurry to make the corresponding data public cannot but put us on our guard. The more so since the information about this coming in from Western sources literally boggles the mind. It turns out that, according to the present treaty, the Warsaw Pact will have to eliminate 40,000 tanks, 50,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 50,000 artillery systems in the European zone. Even if only three-fifths of them belong to the USSR, if this were true we would have to eliminate 70-80 percent of our military potential in Europe. And the corresponding reductions on the part of the West are so insignificant that they are not even worth mentioning. The fact that not all of the military equipment that is cut will have to be destroyed is hardly worth mentioning. What good will it do us to be allowed to take a certain quantity of technical equipment to the other side of the Urals. After all, it still has to be stored somewhere. And do you think we have created the corresponding storage capacities especially for this occasion? Of course not, and that is not anticipated; that is, the equipment will be deliberately left out in the open and doomed to a slow death.

Thus essentially, in the case of signing the conventional forces treaty, we are faced with the prospect of physical destruction of a major part of the combat equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces, that is, that which has been created over the decades at the price of incredible deprivation of all the people and whose cost runs into the hundreds of billions of rubles. And again it would seem that they do not want to confront us with what has already been done, as has repeatedly been the case in the past. In this connection let us recall the circumstances of the declaration of the reduction of our armed forces by 500,000, the signing of the treaty on medium- and short-range missiles or the agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.

One wants to exclaim: "People! What are we doing? Are we not too engrossed in selling off the state's national property? Will it really be better for us all if we add powerlessness to our poverty and disorganization as well?" And why are all these "great victories" against the background of disarmament organized on the sly and kept secret from the people themselves, without consulting with their legal representatives? Is this not the explanation for the striking "flexibility" of our disarmament diplomacy which increasingly verges on downright unprincipled behavior? Why, for example, was it that yesterday while still in Vienna the Soviet delegation insisted on the USSR leaving 40 percent of the conventional arms ceilings in Europe, doing everything it could to prove that any further reduction was unacceptable for security reasons, but today we simply agree to NATO's demand for 30 percent? And at the same time we are just as eager to prove that this is quite enough for us. Moreover, they are suggesting that we take pride in the fact that our diplomats managed to achieve for the USSR "the highest levels of arms sufficiency of any

country in Europe," that is, it is also good that in this respect we were not put on the same level with Romania or, say, Hungary.

But here is the question: Who has seriously tried to figure out in general how much surplus we have? I must admit that I have not read or heard of anything except the mundane discussions of this topic on the pages of OGONEK and certain other publications, which rehash in all possible ways the same unexamined idea that we have a surplus of tanks, even though I keep fairly close track of articles in this field.

But do we really have too many tanks? On the whole how do we scientifically determine where this "too many" begins? The Americans have 15 times as many aircraft carriers as the Soviet Union but nobody in America thinks they have too many of these ships. Everything in the world is relative. In 1941 20,000 tanks were not enough for us to resist the German tank group which was one-fourth as large. No, one cannot reduce the algebra of the military balance to the level of simple arithmetic as is now being done. Incidentally, one NATO tank crew of professional soldiers, in terms of their qualifications, are actually equal to two or three crews of our "amateur" tank drivers. And in combat everything is decided by the people—so who really ends up with more tanks?

Incidentally, that seven to 10 percent, which our diplomats so easily conceded to the West at the last moment, are equivalent to no less than 20 full-fledged divisions, including 10 tank divisions. Are these gestures not too sweeping? We understand that it does not come out of their pockets, but still, but still.

Idle speculation that the elimination of arms is justified by the current lack of a military threat ignore the truth that is apparent to every person with common sense: that the military potential created over the decades and for decades to come cannot be destroyed completely every time the situation in the world becomes more or less stable. Because then we would be risking the possibility of not being able to react promptly when it takes a turn for the worse which, as the present crisis in the Persian Gulf shows, could happen almost instantaneously.

It is not difficult to foresee that in connection with the dramatic agreements now being prepared they will again start eying the military—allegedly, all negotiations are being conducted and disarmament agreements are being signed with their participation and knowledge. Be that as it may, there is one nuance here which immediately puts everything in its place again. The negotiations are being conducted and agreements are being signed within the framework of decisions of the highest level at which the military has only consultative functions. Therefore they can act contrary to these decisions only by opposing their own government, which is quite unrealistic.

What are they afraid of, those statesmen who do everything they can to conceal from the people what kind of future they are preparing for the Army? Do they think the people are stupid, that they will not understand

anything? But that is not true; our people are wise, and they are capable of understanding and accepting any policy as long as it does not go against common sense and historical experience. Apparently, in this case even those who inspired the current disarmament race are not sure that this condition is met. This is why they obfuscate and play hide-and-seek with their compatriots. Apparently, not without reason...

Text of Estonian Appeal to CFE Signatories

*91UF0209A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Nov 90 p 1*

[Appeal issued by the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet to the Signatories to the Conventional Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty in Tallinn on 13 November]

[Text] Proceeding from the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet decree of 30 March 1990, which initiated the process of the actual restoration of the independence of the Republic of Estonia as a subject of international law, the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet decided in conjunction with the Estonia Committee to address to all signatories to the Conventional Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty and participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the following statement:

1. The Republic of Estonia supports the signing planned for the very near future of the Conventional Arms in Europe Limitation Treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This treaty will create favorable prospects for a limitation of conventional arms throughout Europe and a start of the process of the withdrawal of foreign military contingents from the territories of other states, including a pullback of Soviet forces to the territory of USSR.
2. The Republic of Estonia notes that the state territory of Estonia is not *de jure* a part of the territory of the Soviet Union. This ensues both from the decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR of 24 December 1989 and from the policy, traditional for Western countries, of nonrecognition of annexation, which was recently confirmed also in U.S. Senate Resolution No. 334 of 10 October 1990.
3. The Republic of Estonia requests of all signatories to the Conventional Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty that they express in this treaty their official position concerning the independent status *de jure* of the Baltic states and prevent legalization by representatives of the Soviet Union of the presence on the state territory of the Republic of Estonia of military contingents of the USSR, which would simultaneously serve as recognition of the territorial affiliation of the Republic of Estonia to the USSR.
4. The Republic of Estonia seeks to ensure that its state territory receive special mention in the Conventional Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty, which would enable Estonia on a parity basis and in cooperation with the

other states that have signed the said treaty to guarantee compliance with the terms of the treaty on the territory of Estonia, in the sphere of verification included. Simultaneously the Republic of Estonia expresses a readiness to participate in the activity of the Conflict Prevention Center being created within the framework the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The principles of states' territorial integrity combined with the peoples' right to self-determination and nonrecognition of annexation are the actual foundations of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process. The Baltic issue must be settled peacefully, by way of negotiations, and realization of the Conventional Forces in Europe Limitation Treaty should be an integral part of the CSCE process.

A. Ruutel, chairman,
Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet
13 November 1990, Tallinn

Talks With Poland on Troop Withdrawal Continue

PM2211164190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Nov 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Soviet-Polish Talks"]

[Text] Soviet-Polish talks on the terms governing the stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory and their withdrawal were held 15 November in Moscow. The participants set out their positions on the given questions and agreed to continue work at commission level in order to carefully prepare the relevant draft agreement and to discuss it further at talks. The question of the transit of the Western Group of Forces across Polish territory was also examined.

The talks took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere and were characterized by the desire for mutual understanding and accord.

Navy Works Toward Closure of Base in Poland

PM2011170390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by V. Kocherov: "Soviet Ships Leave Poland"]

[Text] It has been decided to withdraw the force of Soviet ships from Poland. How this will take place is described by Lieutenant General O. Anikanov, Navy deputy commander in chief for construction, maintenance, and billeting.

[Kocherov] Oleg Karpovich, the information that we have warships based in Poland will be news to many people. When did they go there and what kind of ships are they?

[Anikanov] Our force in Swinoujscie was set up in 1946. There are eight missile and torpedo boats stationed there, as well as auxiliary ships. We built the docks and electricity and water supply systems ourselves. We also

reconstructed the storage facilities. The housing, however, was always leased from the Poles.

[Kocherov] On what terms are we leaving all these facilities behind?

[Anikanov] The sale of the permanent dock is being negotiated at the moment. A buyer has already been found. The floating docks which are to be written off will be converted into scrap and we will sell that at current prices. The good floating docks will be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. It has been decided to stop replenishing the fuel stocks. We are starting to use up the emergency supplies. This will also spare us unnecessary expenditure on bringing it back. In short, we will attempt to compensate for all the outlay.

[Kocherov] When is the withdrawal planned?

[Anikanov] The specific deadline has not yet been set. We have been given the job of carrying out all the preparatory work during the 1991-1992 period. During this period we are to prepare conditions for the redeployment of officers and warrant officers and their families and personnel back home and decided where the ships are to be based.

The ships will probably be redeployed to various places in the Baltic. A commission has been set up under the chairmanship of Navy First Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets, which is considering various options. Our main concern today is to provide housing for around 700 officers' and warrant officers' families. To that end the Navy's military construction detachments will start construction work in 1991.

[Kocherov] How are our military personnel treated in Swinoujscie?

[Anikanov] The situation is calm. There is no sign of the excessive behavior that has occurred in Poland in the vicinity of other places where Soviet units are stationed. I believe this is because they have been neighbors for many years and the Soviet sailors have always been involved in the city's life and activities.

General Moiseyev Favors 'Joint Security System'

AU1911143490 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 18 Nov 90 p 11

[“PB” report: “Chief of Red Army for Joint NATO Security System”]

[Text] Brussels—During his visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, General Mikhail Moiseyev suggested a joint security system in Europe.

This can be seen from a protocol on the results of the visit, which has become available to WELT AM SONNTAG. According to this protocol, Moiseyev stated during a talk with members of the military committee at

the NATO headquarters near Brussels on 25 October: "The Soviet leadership is in favor of the creation of a new pan-European security system."

Relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are developing on a new basis, which makes possible the solution of complicated problems—such as the Gulf crisis, Moiseyev stressed. The Soviet Union envisages a Europe without military blocs. This development is becoming irreversible.

Referring to German unification, the general chief of staff of the Red Army stated that the Soviet Union is deeply convinced that a united Germany must lead to a united Europe. The sovereign Germany is no longer viewed as a site where great contingents of foreign armies are deployed.

Concerning the military doctrine of NATO, the Soviet official stated that people should ask themselves what NATO's future target might be. Certainly not the former GDR, Hungary, the CSFR, or Poland. The same applies to the Soviet Union, because Moscow and Washington are both trying to safeguard peace for all nations. NATO is developing into an organization without hostile targets; to an army without an enemy.

Moiseyev also commented on the results of the Vienna disarmament talks. The treaty that is to be signed by the heads of state and government in Paris tomorrow regulates the reduction of the five main conventional weapons systems in Europe on 170 pages (battle tanks, artillery pieces, armored combat vehicles, fighter planes, and attack helicopters). Moiseyev stated: "Once the agreement is concluded, large-scale aggressions will become inconceivable in Europe. All military activities from the Atlantic to the Urals will become as apparent as the life-lines on your palm."

Referring to future disarmament steps, the Soviet general stated: "It would be a crime to destroy the new types of weapons while still using the outdated weapons among the troops."

In addition, it is uneconomical and unacceptable to order similar military equipment from the Defense Ministry at a later date, and to spend more money on its deployment. For this reason, Army units behind the Urals are getting rid of outdated equipment and receiving modern weapons from East Europe.

Europe Urged To Counter CFE Arms 'Renewal'

PM2111144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondents A. Bovin and Yu. Kovalenko: "Toward a Europe Without Danger"]

[Excerpts] Paris—In the final analysis, the purpose of the Helsinki process is to ensure a Europe ("common European home," "confederation," etc.) in which the danger of wars and armed conflicts disappear. The European

theater of military operations must disappear. The indispensable precondition for this is disarmament; that is, a deep reduction on a very significant scale in the armed forces and arms on the European continent. Both nuclear and conventional. [passage omitted]

Just as happened after the conclusion of the treaty on Euromissiles, voices will probably be heard saying: Why are we giving in, why are we pledging to destroy far more arms than the West? In principle, the answer is very simple—he who has more destroys more. The logic is transparent. And yet the habit of identifying security with force, having a tenfold safety margin, and regarding superiority as a natural state and as a sign of sufficiency is a telling one. The obvious is perceived as the improbable. A return to common sense is treated as a concession. But this will happen, must happen....

A careful analysis of the treaty will take time. For now, we will make two observations—one particular and one general.

Way back the Western press was carrying reports that, in order to remove combat hardware from the impact of the future agreement and to preserve it, the Soviet Union had started moving it beyond the Urals ahead of time. Thus, citing the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan's SANKEI SHIMBUN reported the relocation of half of the armored and artillery combined units to Asia. Rumors went around Moscow that U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker had sent a special letter requesting an explanation. According to the same rumors, E. Shevardnadze replied approximately as follows: Yes, we are moving tanks, armored personnel carriers, and guns to the east; we are moving them in order to replace the old models there with new ones, which were stationed mainly in Europe; the old ones will be destroyed, so that all our obligations will have been fulfilled.

This would seem understandable. Although you are left with a vague feeling of some kind of "ruse." We have been deceived just too frequently and for too long. So we would like to have precise and detailed information. Further, in order to make our positions as honest and convincing as possible, we would like to know just what tasks are being set for our tank and artillery troops in Asia. Let us hope that light will be shed on all these and other questions in the course of the USSR Supreme Soviet's ratification of the treaty.

The second observation concerns a more alarming subject. The point is that intensive work on the creation [sozdaniye] of new types and kinds of nonnuclear arms is being conducted in parallel with the disarmament process. Here emphasis is placed on the intellectualization of weapons and, in the long term, on the creation [sozdaniye] of autonomous arms systems capable of fulfilling combat tasks with the minimum involvement of the "human factor." And if the situation does not change, if the arms which have to be destroyed are replaced by qualitatively new and more sophisticated

weapons, what is the point of such "disarmament"? Does it not turn out that disarmament objectively acts as a form of legitimated renewal of the arsenals of death?

It seems to us that the time has come to make the question of a ban on the qualitative improvement of weapons and on the creation [sozdaniye] of new types and kinds of weapons the subject of negotiations. And Europe could take the initiative here.

The deepening of military detente in Europe has always been associated not only with disarmament but also with the destiny of the bloc structure which rigidly divided the continent. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been the two main characters in the postwar confrontation in the European theater of military operations. Confrontation has now receded into the past. Things are more complex as regards the blocs. The social changes in East Europe and the westward drift of the former "fraternal" countries have eroded the Warsaw Pact's foundations. Juridically, this organization still exists, but de facto it can no longer be regarded as a real military-political factor.

Can we rejoice? Do fewer blocs mean greater security? No, the political arithmetic does not work. The Warsaw Pact's disintegration coupled with NATO's preservation will inevitably create an asymmetry which, depending on the circumstances, will have some kind of destabilizing effect.

But why NATO, if not the Warsaw Pact? If there is no enemy? If the Cold War is over? It is hard to give convincing answers to these questions. But the Atlanticists are trying to do so. They set out the following chain of deductions: The situation in the USSR remains extremely uncertain, and no one can say how perestroika will end or whom the West will have to deal with. The situation in East Europe is also full of vagaries; it is impossible to rule out its "neo-Balkanization" and outbreaks of conflict, and the West must be ready for such a prospect. Moreover, as the Kuwait crisis has shown, a threat can also arise outside Europe. Hence the need for NATO.

At the same time the question is being raised of revising NATO strategy and adapting it to the new reality and to a broader understanding of security. In principle, the "flexible response" strategy is being retained, but with stress on the fact that nuclear weapons are an "extreme means." The idea is that the North Atlantic Alliance is to become a political-military rather than a military-political alliance. But it is hard to say yet what this means in practice. It is also hard to say what direction the continuing activation of the West European Union will take.

J. Baker has proposed the following scheme: The European security and cooperation structure will be a mosaic of structures. Its four mainstays are the EEC, the system of institutions within the framework of the Helsinki process, the Council of Europe, which is conceived as a parliamentary assembly for the whole continent, and, finally, NATO as the essential basis of security. All these

are real dimensions of the European space. But what are their relative importance and significance in the development of a new European order? The impression is that Washington and its closest allies are inclined to see the perspective in traditional NATO tones. They conceive of Europe through to the Urals as an expansion and spread of Atlantic Europe to the east.

An abstract dispute would be pointless. Political practice, economic cooperation, the reduction of weapon stocks, the continuing deideologization of interstate relations, and the fading of confrontational instincts will gradually Europeanize Europe. At any rate, the USSR's European policy is geared to precisely this.

'Organizational Structures' Urged To Support CSCE

PM211144690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Nov 90 Second Edition pp 4-5

[Report by special correspondents V. Bolshakov, V. Drobkov, and T. Kolesnichenko from Paris: "New Era for Europe"]

[Excerpts] Paris, 19 November—The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the joint declaration herald a new era in European relations, in which states with different social systems are no longer adversaries. [passage omitted]

"East and West Bury the Cold War," "Reconciled Europe Seeks Roads to Its Future," "Victory for Human Rights," "NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Equal Terms"—these are the headlines over a series of articles in today's LE FIGARO devoted to coverage of the Paris conference. Many other European newspapers carried banner headlines in similar vein. The majority of commentators give similar assessments of what is happening in Paris.

But let us try to avoid euphoria. Yes, an important step has been taken toward a new Europe of confidence and cooperation. But the transition to that Europe is far from completed. The old military-political structures still persist, although they are undergoing considerable transformations. In this connection the interview published in LE FIGARO today with NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, who comes out in favor of preserving the bloc regardless of the changes in Europe, is indicative. "Soviet expansionism has disappeared. But the need to balance Soviet might still exists," Woerner states.

In present conditions many leaders of North Atlantic bloc countries not only recognize the USSR's lack of aggressive aspirations, but also promise to build relations with us on a basis of confidence and cooperation, as is graphically indicated, incidentally, by the joint declaration signed in Paris today. But at the same time they are not yet renouncing the war machine that was created in the cold war years, although they are prepared to embark on a marked reduction in it. And that means

that the struggle for the real triumph of good-neighbourliness and cooperation on the European continent is far from over.

The situation in Europe, as the USSR president accurately described it in his speech today, is one of transition. In order for the all-European process to become irreversible, it is necessary today urgently to erect organizational structures to support the CSCE, and to continue the policy of disarmament, rather than resting on our laurels. [passage omitted]

WFTU Official Voices Support for CSCE Summit

*LD2011214290 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT
20 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondents Igor Agabekov and Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow, November 20 (TASS)—The international trade union movement fully supports the current meeting in Paris of the heads of state and government of the member-countries of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a news conference, devoted to the results of the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions in Moscow, was told here today.

Addressing the news conference, Deputy Chairman of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Vladimir Shcherbakov, the leader of the Soviet trade union confederation, recalled that the WFTU was founded in February 1945, a few months before the end of World War II.

"It is significant," he said, "that the present congress, which has renewed the WFTU structures and gave new substance to the interrelations between trade union centres in different countries, ended its work when the Paris summit got under way, testifying to the termination of the cold war".

"We expect very serious changes to occur in the international trade union movement in the near future in connection with changes in international relations," Shcherbakov said.

"I can very well imagine the mood prevailing at the Paris summit," said WFTU Deputy Secretary-General Alain Sterne. He expressed confidence that all working people the world over wanted one thing—for the summit to pave the way towards the signing of a treaty on complete disarmament.

"We want all mass extermination weapons to be scrapped in the near future and the released means to be used to improve the living standards of the planet's workers and to solve such social problems as unemployment, lack of housing, famine and poverty," Sterne said.

Sterne favoured the disbandment of all military alliances.

Scowcroft Says USSR Understated CFE Arms Figures

*PM231112990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Nov 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Report by Yu. Subbotin: "Security Is Trust"]

[Excerpts] Paris—Two of the three days of the Paris conference are over. Yesterday the plenary sessions, at which the heads of the delegations made speeches, continued. Whereas the previous day the speeches of the USSR and U.S. presidents attracted greater interest, the central event of the second day was the address by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. [passage omitted]

On the same day the U.S. military made their presence felt in Paris. A few hours after the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, General Brent Scowcroft, the U.S. President's advisor for national security affairs, questioned the authenticity of the quantitative data presented by the Soviet side.

"We have a whole series of questions regarding this data," the general declared, "and it looks as though this may cause certain problems in the future."

U.S. experts claim that the Soviet Union has presented understated figures, particularly with respect to artillery pieces subject to reduction. We are also accused of the mass transfer of various military hardware to beyond the Urals on the eve of the signing of the agreement, and also of disclosing only half of the places of deployment subject to inspection. Admittedly Scowcroft did say that this did not detract from the significance of the agreement.

Soviet experts believe, for example, that the NATO countries' steps toward giving this organization a mainly political rather than military character could have been more substantial, in view of the Warsaw Pact countries' actions. So far the Western media have reported that Britain intends to close two of its four Air Force bases in the FRG and that France has decided to withdraw all 55,000 of its officers and men from that country. As of today, the United States has transferred half of its forces stationed in Europe to the Persian Gulf region. Whether they will return in the event of a settlement of the crisis is a question that is now the subject of lively debate in the lobbies of the Paris conference.

The NATO countries' "chilly" reaction to the idea that future reductions of forces and arms in Europe should affect the naval forces—a sphere in which the West has an obvious advantage—is still a problem. [passage omitted]

Commentaries View CFE Treaty Implementation

Issue of Equipment Shifted East of Urals
*LD2211153390 Moscow TASS in English 1505 GMT
22 Nov 90*

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 22 (TASS)—The signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in Paris is a major contribution towards attaining a goal shared by all countries: to build security and enhance stability in Europe.

A new era is beginning in the life of European peoples. More than 120,000 units of various armaments will be reduced to eliminate dangerous military confrontation in Europe.

But some people in the West are now trying to question the importance of the newly signed treaty. In particular, they maintain that the Soviet Union began to move military hardware beyond the Urals in advance, so that it would not fall under the provisions of the CFE Treaty. Soviet news media also mooted the topic.

However, detailed explanations were forthcoming at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Recent changes in the amount of Soviet armaments in Europe were called forth not by a desire to somehow circumvent the CFE Treaty that was being elaborated in Vienna, but were prompted by quite realistic goals long put on the agenda by the Soviet leadership and approvingly regarded both in the West and East.

What is meant, is firstly, that implementation of the Soviet new military doctrine, which envisages basing the Armed Forces on reasonable sufficiency for defence and, secondly, carrying out large-scale unilateral troop and arms cuts, announced by President Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988.

To "overlook" these two major circumstances when reporting changes in the amount of Soviet armaments in Europe and interpreting them in one's own way is not conscientious, putting it mildly.

In addition, is it advisable to eliminate in Europe the armaments and combat hardware which are more up-to-date than those available to the Armed Forces and units stationed in the Asian part of the country?

It seems natural to eliminate outdated weapon systems in Asia and those that have exhausted their service life, replacing them with those that were previously in Europe.

The possibility of selling arms subject to cutbacks to third countries should not be discarded either.

The United States is guided by the same motives. It already supplies tanks to Egypt, moving them from Europe, and is planning to transfer its latest weapon systems subject to cutbacks to NATO allies to replace obsolete weaponry. Unfortunately, prior to the signing of the CFE Treaty, the United States did not make unilateral cuts in its armaments on the European continent.

What actually happened to Soviet armaments in Europe? As of July 1, 1988, the Soviet Union had 41,580 tanks in Europe. Within the context of measures to implement the new doctrine and effect unilateral cuts, the number

of tanks was substantially reduced: by 70 tanks in armoured divisions and by 105 tanks in motorised divisions.

As a result of the cuts, as well as in view of the new pattern for the Soviet Armed Forces, slightly more than 20,000 tanks remained on European territory (according to data as of the end of September 1990). The number was cut approximately by half.

Four thousand tanks were scrapped, converted into training facilities or exported. About 8,000 tanks will be used to reequip and complete the provision of Soviet forces and units stationed in the Asian part of the country. The other tanks will be eliminated.

The number of armoured cars and artillery systems has changed similarly. Over the past two years, 15,900 armoured cars and 18,000 artillery systems were moved from Europe to beyond the Urals. Out of that amount, 500 artillery systems were eliminated and 11,200 armoured cars and 1,100 artillery systems were used to reequip and complete the provision of forces and units stationed in the Asian part of the country.

Depots in Siberia and Central Asia now have available 4,700 armoured cars and 16,400 artillery systems, brought from Europe. They are intended for the gradual replacement of armament and combat hardware that exhaust their service life.

As old weapon systems are replaced by new ones, the antiquated models will be eliminated. So, there is no arms build-up in Asia by the Soviet Union.

The USSR will fully meet all its commitments under the newly signed treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union deems it necessary to carry on talks on further troop and arms reductions in Europe and to launch similar talks in the Asia-Pacific region.

Size of Reductions Highlighted

*LD1911142790 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] In Paris the leaders of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries signed earlier today a treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Some of the signatories were Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, Francois Mitterrand, and Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher. Now a commentary prepared by Yuriy Solton, this is what he writes.

The agreement is unique. There have been and there will be unilateral reductions. The Soviet Union and the United States are eliminating in Europe medium and shorter range nuclear missiles, but it is for the first time that 22 countries, whose armies have been aimed one against another for decades, have decided to renounce a considerable part of their military potential. I'd say that in no war more tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and other

kinds of armaments were destroyed than will be scrapped within the next few years. And the treaty signatories are doing this voluntarily.

Someone has calculated that about one quarter of a million units of arms will be scrapped or remade into something useful, and the arms are offensive and highly dangerous. Equal low ceilings are set for the two blocs in tanks, armoured personnel carriers, aircraft, helicopters and artillery pieces. Many asymmetries in arms that existed for a long time are being eliminated, for example the Soviet tank armada which the West believes could have reached the English Channel within a few days is being reduced to just over 13,000 units. Equal numbers of other arms will also remain.

The reductions are so huge that some people who have got used to the division of Europe into the two antagonistic military alliances are even confused. I also mean the Soviet people, especially Army men. Calculations have been made to find out who has cut more and who less, and who has won and who has lost. I am sure that there are no losers, writes Yury Solton, all are winners, and it's not only the big reductions of arms that matter, what is important is the new quality of trust and the realization that it's possible to agree on the most complex issues. The treaty on conventional arms is backed up by joint declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO on new principles of relations between the two alliances.

The most essential part of this accord is an end to regarding each other as adversaries and the renunciation of the use of force or its threat. The ongoing fundamental shift of Europe from former confrontation to new relations is so deep that it's even hard to comprehend it in full today, and yet this is only the beginning of a new process to build security structures that differ from those in the cold war years. These structures are to be based on the European summit conference. But a new peaceful order in Europe would be inconceivable if the Warsaw Treaty and NATO leaders would have agreed on the need for radical disarmament and more trust between the two alliances. [sentence as heard] The Soviet Union favors continued talks without delay on the reduction of not only conventional but also nuclear forces in Europe. These negotiations could be joined by all European countries.

Law Expert Kudryavtsev Assesses Summit

*LD2211175390 Moscow TASS in English 1737 GMT
22 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondents Veronika Romanenkova and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, November 22 (TASS)—The conventional arms reduction agreements reached in Paris considerably expand possibilities for interaction and cooperation of all countries, Vladimir Kudryavtsev, Soviet leading specialist in law told TASS.

Kudryavtsev was a member of the expert group who prepared the legal basis on which to draw up documents of the Paris summit.

Kudryavtsev said that the results of the Paris CSCE meeting allowed the Soviet Union and other East European countries to take an active part in the processes of political and economic integration on the continent.

Noting that the Soviet Union was about to join a number of international organisations, including the Council of Europe, Kudryavtsev said that this would enable European countries to jointly tackle economic cooperation problems on a qualitatively new level.

Speaking about possible spheres of cooperation between lawyers, Kudryavtsev pointed to the need to work out new norms for the exercise of human rights in the Soviet Union.

The experience accumulated by Western democracies can be very useful in preparing a new Soviet constitution, Kudryavtsev, who is working on the draft, said. He believes that this will make possible yet another step towards a common European home.

Commander Discusses Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

*LD2411125590 Moscow International Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 23 Nov 90*

[Interview with Colonel General Mikhail Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group, by unidentified correspondent, on Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary—Burlakov's comments are in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary started in March. The troop withdrawal has to be completed by 30 June 1991.

[Burlakov] The military trains and equipment will leave Hungary in full accordance with the intergovernmental agreement and the schedule. Of the effective force, 55 percent has already left for the Soviet Union. Fifty-five percent of the military engineering equipment and the armament of the Southern Army Group is already in Soviet territory. As for the tanks, the main offensive weapons, they were withdrawn first. So far, 73 percent of the tanks have arrived in the Soviet Union, said Mikhail Burlakov.

To date we have left behind 76 military residential quarters for the Hungarian side. This real estate was valued as high as one billion rubles by the Soviet-Hungarian mixed committee. Unfortunately, we have not received a single ruble or forint from the Hungarian side so far, says Colonel General Burlakov. We will need this sum very much so that we can build apartments for the families of officers and lance corporals. I think that this issue should be solved as soon as possible, said General Burlakov in conclusion.

Yazov Assesses Conventional Arms Treaty

AU2911162190 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 23-25 Nov 90 p 2

[NOVOSTI interview with Soviet Defense Minister Marshall Dmitriy Yazov; place and date not given: "The More Weapons—The Greater the Reduction"]

[Text] [NOVOSTI] What is your view on the treaty on conventional arms reductions in Europe that was recently signed in Paris?

[Yazov] The treaty was signed by 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. However, the leaders of all the 34 states that participated at the Paris summit have pledged their support for the treaty and expressed their willingness to strengthen security by reducing arms, deepening political dialogue, and to developing cooperation in economic and other spheres. Sound reason demands this. This can only benefit security and stability in a new Europe.

[NOVOSTI] According to the treaty, the Soviet Union is going to have to reduce much more of its arms than Western European countries. What is your view on this, because this is giving rise for concern among a certain section of our society, as well as some of our specialists?

[Yazov] In this case, the asymmetry is understandable. One cannot compare the Soviet Union to, for example, Iceland, which has no army, or to some other European states.

Owing to the fact that the Soviet Union possesses a great deal more arms, it is obvious that its reductions will be greater.

[NOVOSTI] Do you see this asymmetry—provided for by the Paris treaty on conventional weapon reductions—as fully justifiable.

[Yazov] Absolutely.

[NOVOSTI] Nevertheless, some people are claiming that such substantial reductions will "weaken our security." What would you say to that?

[Yazov] Of course, one could argue that any reduction of arms weakens the Armed Forces, but it is another thing to claim that it weakens security. Seeing that nobody intends to attack us, can we claim that these reductions weaken our security?

Television Program Considers Disarmament Costs

LD2411221190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1500 GMT 24 Nov 90

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Stanislav Kondrashov]

[Text] The past is usually highlighted by specific accords changing the basic features of the past. The main practical document signed in Paris was an accord on conventional armed forces in Europe. As is well known, it was

concluded not by the 34 states that took part in the meeting but by just 22, 16 NATO states and six from the Warsaw Pact. The sum total of conventional arms in the military blocs is evening itself out by means of a reduction of 120,000 types of various weapons. The treaty, unprecedented in history, was prepared in just 20 months. It is the best proof of the fact that military confrontation in Europe is ending. I would like to single out one feature that is quite often dealt with timidly in victorious accounts by our mass media.

Army General Moiseyev, chief of the USSR General Staff, who gave an interview on the occasion of the signing of the treaty to my own newspaper IZVESTIYA, also dealt with it. He cited the figures mentioned, about 120,000 units of weapons reduced, but did not say that our reduction is a gigantic one while the NATO reduction, it could be said, is symbolic. And not because we were again deceived by someone but because we have been deceiving ourselves for many decades—thanks to our closed system and our short-sighted leadership which was quite wasteful at the people's expense. We are not hastening to cite our own data here either, but according to Western Data the WTO, that is the Warsaw Treaty Organization, is reducing tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems by around ten times more than NATO. And when I say WTO, I mean first and foremost the Soviet Union. Of the sum total of WTO reductions, no less than forth-fifths fall to us.

A number of examples. According to the treaty, the Soviet Union has received the largest national quota in all types of weapons. We are allowed to keep 13,300 tanks on the European part of our territory. But do you know how many of them there were on 1 November 1990 according to official data from the USSR Ministry of Defense—63,900. That is 50,000 more than allowed. It is true that these are not only on the European part but on all of the territory of the USSR. Also according to Ministry of Defense data there were 41,000 tanks on the European part only six months ago in contrast to the 13,000 now permitted. This was later reduced by 10,000 but, nevertheless, during recent months thousands of tanks have been urgently transferred beyond the Urals, that is outside the limits of the treaty area. There, many of them, it is reported, rust in the open fields. All of this has been done, essentially, before the very eyes of the Americans who, meanwhile, during recent weeks have been transferring some of their own tanks from West Europe to Saudi Arabia. And this was not done only to maintain some of the tanks, to prevent them from being subjected to reduction, but also because the destruction of surplus in accordance with the treaty is very costly in relation to resources. On the order of 20,000 tanks had to be destroyed during the 40 months allotted to this procedure.

In his interview General Moiseyev notes that nothing can be done. Disarmament is expensive and this reality has to be reckoned with. This is true. It is said that the miser pays twice. I would add that generous fools also pay twice... or for their stupidity. First, they do not count

the money for creating over-armament, impoverishing and ruining their people. Later their successors and their people have to pay dearly for disarmament. And those in the West who are more clever, profit twice over.

I cite a few more figures. We are permitted 20,000 armored vehicles now. Also more than anyone else. But until 1 January 1990, we had 76,520 of them on our territory as a whole. Again tens of thousands of vehicles need to be destroyed. In the European part 13,700 artillery pieces are allowed. On Soviet territory as a whole there are 66,800 of them.

And so there is a new type of conversion, turning military hardware into scrap metal for bulldozers or fire-engines—which also costs quite a lot.

Weekly 'Observers Roundtable' Views CSCE Summit

*LD2511191990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1230 GMT 25 Nov 90*

[“International Observers Roundtable” program with Professor Radomil Grigoriyevich Bogdanov, doctor of historical sciences; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, Moscow Radio commentator]

[Text] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades! Taking part in today's International Observers at the roundtable are Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, a political observer; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, a commentator for all-Union radio.

Not surprisingly, the main topic for our chat will be the CSCE summit held this past week in Paris. We will try to analyze the documents signed there—the Charter for a New Europe, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Joint Declaration of the 22 states.

Of course, all these three documents have a common denominator, but I would say that we should start with the document signed last in Paris, the Charter for a New Europe. And we should start with that because it sets out very fully and clearly the principles by which the European states, the United States and Canada—which also have been taking part in this process—are supposed to be guided. First and foremost, I should once again like to draw our listeners' attention to the wording of that document: The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.

[Shishlin] The way I see it, the Paris charter itself stems from the new realities that have appeared in Europe, because the old Europe is no more. It is another matter that the whole of the new Europe is still in ferment, with various competing forces. This is, of course, particularly true of the countries of Central and East Europe, and the Soviet Union. But it also affects the West European states, to wit: Thatcher's departure from the post of

leader of the Conservative Party. In fact, this seals her departure from the post of prime minister, and, as one British journalist put it, heralds a new era in British history. And even though we can today see more or less clearly the shape of the European political landscape, nevertheless the actual map references for moving ahead across this new European political landscape are not very clearly marked. I would say that the Paris charter is the first attempt to mark out, to define these map references. In actual fact, this attempt is bound up with the previous experience of human and European history. It is connected with an affirmation of pan-human values, and it is connected with the breakthrough into a world of cooperation, a world of accord, and a world of trust. But it will, of course, be no simple matter to actually get into this world of trust, cooperation and accord.

[Bagdanov] These documents contain some paragraphs that enshrine and sum up the results of the lengthy process of European disarmament, which is bound up with the Vienna talks. But, esteemed comrades, I must share with you some feelings I have which perhaps exceed the framework of the topic, but which I believe have a direct bearing on this important event. For instance, I did think that the moment when the end of this post-war page—a post-war page almost 50 years long—had been reached. But then I found myself thinking that there are perhaps more emotive points, as some actors say, than these events. And I have been trying to tie them in with the present-day reality that we find ourselves in, with our country. For instance, I have been wondering how our citizen—the so-called man in the street—will perceive, what sort of impression these documents will make on him. What do they mean to him? To what extent will they influence his way of thinking?

I should just like to single out two points in this charter. I believe they are of great significance: there is the right—as stated by the leaders of the European countries—of everyone to possess property, to own property, and the right to freedom of movement, the right to defense, and the supremacy of the law in any society. Now, tell me, please, what sort of topic is this? International, or rather a topic whose basis has been turned from international into domestic. Or take this matter: A huge quantity of arms is being eliminated; many combat-ready divisions are being scrapped. Several decades have been spent training these divisions. And I just started wondering—how are the officers and soldiers going to perceive this? The ones who are to be withdrawn and returned home?

In saying all this, I have no desire whatever to minimize the epoch-making nature of all this. But I would just introduce a certain note of, if you like, well, the fact is that I do not want to use the word skepticism, but a healthy realism. For instance, there might be the viewpoint that none of this means anything. And I have heard that viewpoint. What is the significance of the declaration that I can own property? Who am I? And there is a whole range of other questions.

[Levin] I might even expand on that. I agree with you that at present we gauge any international action against our domestic problems. And if you set the Paris Charter for a New Europe against the Helsinki Final Act, you will notice a great move forward, specifically in the sphere of the declaration of human rights, and an emphasis that these rights must be guaranteed. I am sure that for many—indeed I would like to hope for the majority—of our citizens, the Paris Charter will be a sort of stimulus for further development of initiative and for the further strengthening of the idea that the process of perestroika and glasnost, as an integral part of perestroika, will gain even greater foundation, will become even more consistent, and will be developed further. But generally speaking, on the whole, the principles which you, Radomir Georgiyevich, have mentioned were for many years the object not only of ideological criticism, but—let us be blunt—of criminal persecution. And those people, let us say, who advocated implementation of the provisions of the final act, who spoke out in public and who set up small committees which gained the name Helsinki committees, these people were regarded as enemies of our society. Yet now the president of the Soviet Union has appended his signature to a document which maintains that these rights should be extended. These really are the inalienable rights of a human being, and the way I see it, this document—the Paris charter—will provide a very powerful stimulus to perestroika in the political sphere.

[Shishlin] I believe that if we turn the Paris charter to the purely practical level, as applicable to Soviet affairs, to our country, then there are two aspects. In the first place, the Paris charter lays certain obligations on the Soviet Union. This is a document of obligation.

[Bogdanov] Nikolay Vladimirovich, at the very least it obliges us to ensure that all our domestic legislation, and the system of our domestic laws are finally brought into line with those international obligations which we shouldered under the Helsinki act and under these documents, even those this must be...

[Shishlin, interrupting] Unquestionably! Generally speaking, this is a code of conduct for the European states, the United States, and Canada in the new climate. It is, to be sure, that move toward an assumption of the norms of international law which is absolutely essential in the run-up to the 21st Century. In other words, the one side is that the Paris charter does indeed place many obligations on the Soviet Union, as indeed on the other states which have signed this document.

But the reverse is that the Paris charter is a document which, if properly implemented, will liberate the spiritual, intellectual and material energy of society. That is the point. And of course it is an enormous task to sensibly harness the liberating element of the Paris charter. It is a task for our legislators, our government, our official departments, and of course for the presidential authority.

And here I am in full agreement with Radomir Georgiyevich's remark that at the very least our legislation must be brought into line with this international document. But how should these opportunities created in the new European situation be utilized? How should those opportunities offered by the process of deep cuts in conventional weapons be utilized? By progress in reducing strategic weapons? How are those talented minds and powerful hands which could be transferred to some creative occupation to be utilized? This is a very tough problem. We are well aware of how we are bumbling along in the course of the conversion process.

[Bogdanov] Yes, indeed. That is a very interesting point. For many years the illusion prevailed that as soon as you cut military expenditure, pennies will automatically start dropping from heaven. But it transpires that in fact this is a very complicated process. But I should like to introduce another twist, or rather two twists, to the topic under discussion.

You know, from time to time, I hear the following view expressed: Have we not paid too high a price for this new situation in Europe? My question: What price? The price is a unified Germany. Is that not the price we have had to pay for these documents? Another question: When you read the treaty on arms and troop reductions in Central Europe, or rather in Europe, people say: You know, it is terribly difficult to understand. In the first place it is very long, in the second place it is very technical from the military point of view. But what is the essence of it? You know, when all is said and done, in spite of our weaknesses, our domestic inadequacies, our shortages or our great decline, all the same we have always been firmly confident—indeed, even somewhat proud—that we have made up for it all with our enormous military might and the certainty of our security. But now, what are 20,000 tanks for a power like the Soviet Union? Just look at our borders, they say. Tens of thousands of kilometers! Divide those 20,000 tanks by that, and what have you left? You know, I think that is a hard question for public opinion to handle. A totally new entity has appeared on the scene—a unified Germany. It is a giant. An economically unknown factor. Totally unknown. On the other hand, through, Europe is being delivered of an enormous quantity of armaments. There is another element that should be added to this: the state of internal instability and uncertainty that we have. I tell you frankly, I was a little taken aback when I heard the claims advanced by some of the leaders who are staking a political claim to the leading role, that they should hold nuclear weapons within the borders of their republic. And you know, shivers ran up and down my spine when I heard that!

[Shishlin] I believe public consciousness—or rather a section of the public consciousness—is sort of entrapped. It is in thrall to the magic of figures. And it makes comparisons. Let us say, you put the unification of Germany on one side of the scales, and on the other you put the billions of marks which Germany is paying the Soviet Union, quite freely, in compensation for the

withdrawal of her troops, etc. In my opinion this distribution of the cargo is quite wrong. Quite wrong. Because the side of the scales that holds the West Germany marks....

[Levin, interrupting] German.

[Shishlin] Well, German now, but all the same they are...

[Levin, interrupting] They originate in the western part of the country, yes.

[Shishlin] Somehow they are not like the marks of the GDR. Anyway, on that side of the scales you should also place much, much more. Much more. We are not so much losing as gaining from the fact that in Europe today there is a genuine opportunity to ensure stability. We are not so much losing as gaining from the fact that in European relations today there is a real opportunity to switch to truly peaceful, productive, and mutually advantagous contacts in all fields. We are not so much losing as gaining when we have a greater opportunity than ever before to concentrate on our domestic affairs. And even though some of our military comrades are upset—genuinely upset—that our troops are being transferred from Central and East Europe to the European and other parts of the Soviet Union, nevertheless, if you work things out in earnest, if we venture to cut our armed forces and if we venture to do what, if the development of international relations had been more propitious, should have been done long, long ago, then that releases a hitherto untapped potential to develop our country and to augment the true might of our state. By that I mean the economic, cultural, and political might. And therefore, the way I see it, the side of the scales which holds the pluses that have emerged as a result of these very complex and indeed largely painful processes which have led to the birth of the Paris charter—by themselves, these pluses undoubtedly outweigh the minuses. If the Paris charter becomes the object of practical concern for all states, then the charter will bring us great benefit if we are the most consistent—or one of the most consistent—advocates of its implementation.

[Bogdanov] You know, I have conceived a feeling of what I would call great admiration for our president, from the point of view of his great political courage. At a time when we are in the middle of a domestic argument, when there is a domestic tug-of-war going on, and when there is a war of laws in progress, the president has displayed the utmost resolve and signed these documents. I wonder to myself what guided him in this instance. It is likely that he regarded this package of documents from two angles. In the first place, as a means of still further freeing the resources and manpower to tackle domestic needs. But he might also have been guided by the desire to bring about domestic conciliation, conciliation and domestic stabilization. For instance, there is a cluster of provisions in the Paris charter which, were we to implement many of them in our democratic laws, would lead to a significant leap

forward in satisfying many of the desires, demands, and aspirations of the public. But in any case, I believe that, given the climate, if the president still decides to sign these documents, then that is a positive factor.

[Shishlin] Undoubtedly, and I think moreover that the Union treaty draft should today be viewed not just from the point of view of commonsense, and not just from the point of view of an objective requirement for the development of our state, for its transformation and its growth into a totally new union of sovereign states, but also through the prism of this Paris charter.

[Levin] Yes, and if we do this, then we will simultaneously be resolving very many problems. I, too, pay tribute to our president for affixing his signature to the Paris charter. But if we were to pursue the principles enshrined in this charter with the same constancy in our domestic life, then—and I am profoundly convinced of this—the situation in the country would be significantly better.

I will just return to the document now. You see, it extols human rights. The words are: human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law, it is the primary duty of a government to defend and promote them.

You see, I can imagine that many of our comrades will be surprised to read this. They will shrug and recall the inviolable principles, etc. But this is all new. We have never encountered this before. But we must realize that we are leaving the era of confrontation and entering a totally new era. And this extends not just to the political sphere, but also to the sphere of ideology. I remember very well how, after the Helsinki final act was signed, people were saying that here we have political detente; that now we have to supplement it with military detente; that peaceful coexistence has got its second wind, yet, they would say, there is not, and cannot be any peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology.

[Bogdanov] And therein lay the seeds of the collapse, the cracking and crumbling, of the Helsinki process. Because—and what is the point of concealing it—several of our public figures believed that what had taken place in Helsinki was a show put on for the benefit of international public opinion, while inside our country there was no obligation whatever to meet the undertakings which we had shouldered under the Helsinki Agreement. With one hand you spout about human rights, while with the other hand you dispatch to the prison cells those groups set up to monitor the Helsinki agreements which Viktor Nikolayevich has mentioned. That is what was going on.

It could be that at the present time the uniqueness of the situation lies in the fact that these provisions of the charter are genuine; they are genuine because they are not hedged about with ideological stereotypes. They really do bear the stamp of primacy in law. They really do draw the human being into the forefront. And meanwhile, what we used to regard as state interests, for the sake of which some—I don't know—10 million people

could be exterminated and any injustice perpetrated within the country, all for the sake of this abstract notion of state interest. At long last we are saying: No! The human being and his interests are above any other interests! And all that occurs in the country ought to be for the sake of the human being.

If that comes to be the case, and if we all come to regard the charter from that point of view, then I believe it would sound significantly more upbeat than it might under other circumstances.

[Levin] But we still have a duty remaining—the law on exit. And here I also see that same tendency to inveterately speak about one thing on the international arena and to do something different inside the country. And no explanations about the internal procedure, that legislators do not have sufficient time to adopt this law, have sounded convincing to me. As far as problems of security are concerned, I agree with what Nikolay Vladimirovich said, that we have indisputably only gained from the unification of Germany for it was a seat of internal tension, of colossally explosive strength, and the German striving toward unity was an evident factor in this. And if a peaceful unification had not occurred, this could have led to very great danger. This seat of tension has been eliminated today. But, after all, let us look at this from the military point of view as well. Yes, an even more powerful Germany has appeared in the center of Europe. Although, honestly speaking, I do not see that qualitative changes have occurred with the increase in the 60 million by 16 million people and with the addition to the West German lands of five East German lands. No. There, in the East German lands there are difficulties now. These difficulties, I am quite profoundly convinced, will be removed during the next five years. But there will be no qualitative leap in Germany's economic potential. There will be a certain, purely rhythmic increase. And if we look at this from the military point of view, it should not under any circumstances be forgotten that the united Germany has taken upon itself the obligation not to possess armed forces numbering more than 370,000 men. It has confirmed its renunciation of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons. That is, this is indisputable evidence of the fact that this Germany does not intend to be some kind of military force which will exert pressure. As far as the economy is concerned, let us compete!

[Bogdanov] In your analysis there is much rationality and much reason. Rationalities. But there is also an emotional aspect to the issue which we can in no way just throw aside. However much you might try to convince me that, well, everything is positive, yes it really is positive. However you might speak about there being only 330,000...

[Levin, interrupting] Three hundred and seventy thousand.

[Bogdanov] Three hundred and seventy thousand. But these are 370,000 Germans, it is not 370,000 others.

Incidentally, after the Versailles period, if I might remind you of the numbers....

[Levin] One hundred thousand

[Bogdanov] Yes, 100,000 and then the Reichswehr and what it turned into. It seems to me that this is not, perhaps, quite convincing. I would propose to you, well it is not convincing from the point of view that I, in answer to your numerical arguments, could find five or six responses.

And so, to change the subject, a new generation of Germans has appeared. A new generation of Germans. Germans who have gone down the path from defeat, crippling defeat and of a transformation—this was a totally impoverished Germany, as it were, consisting of zonal formations—into this greatness. By what means? Indeed, by political means. This is a unique example. Not by a war, not by an army, not by nuclear weapons, nothing. Just by using economic might, you may win such political positions that you are not only respected but very respected, and held in very high esteem. Is this not altogether an example of a change in certain very customary components in international power? How were things before? The army, a number of tanks and some kind of navy was launched into the ocean. Do you have a so-called blue water ocean fleet? No. It is not this which is decisive today. Today the efficiency of the Krupp factories is decisive, and the efficiency of BMW. Look at what Germany grew from. This reassures me, in the sense that it is unlikely that this generation of Germans will exchange its economic prosperity which has been converted into political might and authority for certain, as it were, ephemeral transformations at the expense of the territories of some or the other countries, and so on. I do not know whether this is convincing. But for me personally this seems more convincing than purely numerical arguments.

[Shishlin] It seems to me that this is convincing. It seems to me that this is convincing. Because such great power ambitions, customary to the world, represent a world of labyrinth. And to be more precise a world of impasse. Because you may flex your military muscles as much as you please, but if your economic legs are not strong, you will collapse under the weight of these very military muscles.

[Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I would just very much like our radio listeners not to understand this as an allusion concerning us directly.

[Shishlin] Why? Why do you not want this? [speakers make simultaneous interjections]

[Bogdanov] That is how it is. That is how it is, unfortunately.

[Shishlin] Although I would just like, Viktor Nikolyevich, to express one small thought in connection with the fact that you do not believe that the agenda of

our legislature is overloaded—in relation to the law on freedom of entry and exit. No, the agenda really is overloaded.

[Levin] But this law should be adopted.

[Shishlin] It will be adopted. I would just not dramatize the situation here. All the more so as the practical situation with regard to entry and exit has, in itself, changed now to such an extent and it really has freed itself to such an extent from all possible limitations that it really does look like a question of just time and a question of when parliamentarians will really be able to move from the most burning and most (?acute) problems to well, such practical, everyday, and incidentally very necessary work.

[Bogdanov] There is another point of view as well. There is a very, very large element of distrust in the authorities, in the government, in the political leadership. And the fact that this law has still not been adopted, whatever kind of rationality might be heard in your words [changes thought] after all what are people saying? Well, look, they promised again and have done nothing again and will do nothing, they say.

[Levin] Moreover, this is not just a promise, it is an obligation, an international obligation. We signed this in Vienna and a year has passed. Here is a rather complex feature. But, of course, I would like to return to a point concerning the emotional nature of attitudes toward the problems that are occurring. Alongside all of our meditations, alongside all of the arguments and counterarguments being put forward in connection with the Paris meeting, it seems to me that one must all the same proceed from the fact that a new era is beginning in the life of Europe, and a new era in our life.

You have been listening to the program International Observers at the roundtable. Taking part in it were professor Radomil Grigoriyevich Bogdanov, doctor of historical sciences; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, all-Union radio commentator. All the best! Goodbye!

Grinevskiy Reviews Resumed Vienna Talks

LD2611153790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1210 GMT 26 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 26 November (TASS)—Beginning today, the Hofburg Palace in Vienna has again been placed at the disposal of the diplomats and military experts of the 22 states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which are starting the follow-on talks on reducing conventional weapons in Europe. After plainly failing to catch up on their sleep after the sleepless nights of the last few weeks of agreeing on the formulations for the treaty on conventional forces in Europe signed at the pan-European summit in Paris, they set about working up an agreement on additional measures not included in

that document. This agreement is aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe—including limiting the number of personnel of the member countries' armed forces—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Taking into account the range of important problems for European security covered by the Vienna mandate, special envoy Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, said in a conversation with a TASS correspondent that it has been decided that the talks should be held with the previous mandate and composition of the participants. At the same time, it is necessary to start preparing the groundwork as soon as possible for the second stage of the talks on disarmament, which will start after the CSCE summit in Helsinki in 1992. Like many other states, the USSR is proceeding from the fact that, as distinct from the present talks, these talks should be of a pan-European nature in their composition, and embrace a wider spectrum of problems regarding the provision of military security on the continent. The issue of naval forces occupies a special place among them. All this requires modification of the talks' mandate in effect today, or a new mandate. The sooner such work starts, the better. The pan-European disarmament process should not lose its momentum, the Soviet diplomat stressed.

Today the talks resumed in Vienna on measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe with the 34 states of the CSCE states taking part.

Military Analyst Views Second Vienna Arms Talks

LD2611153790 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 26 Nov 90

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 26 (TASS)—The second phase of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe—Vienna-2—began in the Austrian capital today, with 22 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries participating.

The second phase of the negotiations, which are conducted with the same mandate, seek to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability on the European continent.

It is a question of resolving issues concerning the limitation on and reduction in conventional armed forces in Europe that were not included in the Paris treaty: a cut in the numerical strength of the troops of negotiating countries, coordination of procedures for aerial inspections, and a number of other important problems connected with eliminating the threat of a sudden attack and large-scale offensive operations.

It must be recalled that from the very outset of the Vienna forum, Warsaw Treaty countries proceeded in their proposals from a three-stage plan to strengthen

stability and security in Europe through deep cuts in conventional armed forces and thereby establishing a balance at lower levels, under which the two military alliances would have forces and facilities essential only for defence.

It was suggested to reduce and limit the numerical strength of the armed forces of the sides at all stages, for it is precisely this component that plays the central role in seizing and holding a territory, not to mention the fact that without combat and attending personnel, neither tanks, artillery nor armoured cars can function.

It is clear that, when eliminating imbalances concerning the main types of armaments, as was done as a result of the Vienna-1 talks, it is impossible to leave the personnel out of account.

This is why the question of specific obligations of the sides to reduce and limit the numerical strength of personnel should be one of the most important aspects at the second phase of negotiations.

During the negotiating process, the Warsaw Treaty countries formulated specific proposals on that score. An agreement was proposed to reduce personnel down to equal collective levels of 1,350,000 men for each alliance on a Europe-wide scale from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Soviet Union favoured reaching an accord at the Vienna talks to reduce NATO and Warsaw Treaty troops in the central European region down to the level of 700-750 thousand men.

Other tasks were also set, such as limiting one country's troops in Europe at a certain upper limit (920,000 men) and limiting the number of one country's troops stationed on foreign territories in Europe.

However, in view of NATO countries' unpreparedness to tackle matters concerning the reduction and limitation of personnel at the first stage of the Vienna talks and due to the first stage time limit, connected with a desire to prepare the first treaty for the Paris CSCE summit, all these issues were postponed until the Vienna- 2 talks.

Will the old proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries remain on the negotiating table? It seems that actual events are substantially ahead of the negotiations themselves. The situation on the European continent has changed for the better.

It cannot be ruled out that the Warsaw Treaty countries will make new proposals. It is also highly important that NATO countries formulate their approach to the troop reduction problem as soon as possible.

General Staff Aide on CFE Treaty, Bloc's Future

*PM2911163990 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English 26 Nov 90*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin,
USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate

chief, by IAN correspondents Vladimir Markov and Viktor Onuchko: "General Ladygin on the Treaty on Conventional Arms"]

[Text] [IAN] How do you see the treaty on European-based conventional arms signed in Paris in the overall military and political context and in terms of maintaining military parity in Europe?

[Ladygin] The world is no longer split into two opposed blocs. The aim is now to reduce armories in order to enhance security. From this point of view, the treaty is of immense significance.

Strategic parity was achieved earlier, but there remained disproportions in some defence areas. Specifically, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as a whole had an advantage in conventional weapons in service with land forces. Rough parity existed in air forces, but NATO and the US had significant superiority over the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in naval capabilities. This preponderance is still there. Given the doctrine of non-offensive defence and further qualitative improvement in our armed forces (the task set by the President of the USSR as Supreme Commander), and following the cuts required by the treaty, our forces and resources will be sufficient to guarantee foolproof defences.

The defensive military doctrine seeks smaller yet efficient and adequately trained and equipped armed forces that would be able, in the event of attack, to guarantee security predominantly through defensive actions. In this sense, the treaty signed in Paris does not diminish our security in military terms.

[IAN] What can be done about disparities in naval forces?

[Ladygin] We have always been saying that the military capabilities of the sides generally should be reduced in parallel. Yet the NATO countries, the US first and foremost, would not agree to this arrangement.

In an attempt to give fresh impetus to the process of disarmament, we agreed to redress conventional arms imbalances in land and air forces, with a view to scaling down naval capabilities.

We are going to insist on talks to sort our naval force issues, even though the US, backed by some of its NATO allies, would not like them to figure in the negotiating process. For all that, there are reasons to believe that such talks will take place after all.

[IAN] To what extent is NATO going to change, in your opinion?

[Ladygin] Signs of change are most certainly there, yet not to the degree that would match the realities in Europe. Unfortunately, some of the old military stereotypes still endure. Evidently, it will take some time for the new trends to prevail definitively in NATO as well as

the Warsaw Pact. Anyway, it is to be hoped that the pace of change regarding NATO's doctrines and military structure will quicken.

[IAN] How do you see the future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Ladygin] I think the military-political alliances will ultimately cease to exist, dissolving in a new system of European security. We will do our best to make sure that a new kind of Europe provides equal security for all countries without exception.

TASS Observer Denies Arms Buildup in Asia

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in Russian 27 Nov 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by V. Chernyshev, TASS observer for military questions: "About the USSR's Conventional Arms in Europe"]

[Text] The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in Paris represents a major contribution to achieving a goal common to all states of the continent and the whole world—enhancing security and stability in Europe. It is quite clear that a new era is beginning in the life of the European peoples. Suffice it to say that over 120,000 different weapons will be reduced with the aim of eliminating the dangerous military confrontation in Europe.

But some people in the West are now trying to cast doubt on the significance of the new treaty. In particular, a thesis that is being used is that the Soviet Union, in order to remove combat equipment from the operation of the future agreement, transferred it in advance to beyond the Urals. The same theme is being raised even in Soviet news media. So I think there is a need to clarify this issue. We are obliged to do this by the clear policy adopted by the Soviet Union of openness and transparency in military matters.

The changes in the strength of Soviet weapons in Europe carried out in recent years stem not from the desire attributed to the USSR to somehow sidestep the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe elaborated in Vienna but from the very real goals long since placed on the agenda by the Soviet leadership and greeted with approval in both West and East. I am referring, first, to the implementation of the USSR's new military doctrine, which envisages a switch to building the Armed Forces on the basis of the criterion of reasonable sufficiency for defense, and, second, to the implementation of the large-scale unilateral reductions in troops and armaments announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988. To "lose" sight of these two important circumstances in reporting on the changes in the strength of Soviet arms in Europe and offering your own interpretation of them is to be less than entirely scrupulous in informing the public, to put it mildly.

There is also another aspect. Is it advisable to eliminate in Europe arms and combat equipment that are more modern than those in service with the Armed Forces formations and units stationed in the Asian part of the country? I think that any sensible person will agree that it would be natural to destroy the obsolete or worn-out systems in Asia, replacing them with those that until recently were in Europe. Nor can the possibility of selling the reduced arms to third countries be left out of account. Incidentally, the United States too is guided by the same motives in its actions. For instance, it is already delivering its tanks from Europe to Egypt and is planning to transfer its state-of-the-art arms systems subject to reduction to its NATO allies, to replace their obsolete weapons. Unfortunately, the United States did not carry out unilateral reductions of its arms on the European Continent before signing the treaty.

So what has actually happened to Soviet arms in Europe? Take tanks, for instance. As of 1 July 1988, the USSR had 41,850 tanks stationed in Europe. In the context of measures to implement the new doctrine and with a view to carrying out unilateral reductions, the number of tanks in formations and units was substantially reduced: Tank divisions were reduced by 70 tanks each, and motorized divisions by 105 tanks. Thanks to these reductions, and also as a result of the change in the entire structure of the USSR Armed Forces, a little over 20,000 tanks were left on European territory (according to figures for the end of September 1990)—in other words, there was a reduction of approximately 20,000. Of that number, 4,000 tanks have been used for scrap, converted into simulators, or exported. About 8,000 tanks will be used to reequip and bring up to strength [doobespecheniye] the Soviet formations and units stationed in the Asian part of the country. The remaining tanks will be destroyed.

The number of armored vehicles and artillery systems has been changed in similar fashion. In the last two years 15,900 armored vehicles and 18,000 artillery systems have been transferred from Europe to beyond the Urals. Of those figures 500 artillery systems have been destroyed, and 11,200 armored vehicles and 1,100 artillery systems have been used to reequip and bring up to strength units and formations stationed in the Asian part of the country. At present 4,700 armored vehicles and 16,400 artillery systems withdrawn from Europe are at storage depots in Siberia and Central Asia. The intention is to use them to gradually replace worn-out arms and combat equipment.

As the old systems are replaced with new ones, the obsolete models will be destroyed. Thus the Soviet Union is carrying out no arms buildup in Asia. It will implement in full all its commitments under the new treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union deems it necessary to continue talks on further reducing troops and armaments in Europe, and also to begin similar talks in the Asian and Pacific region.

**Foreign Ministry's Karpov Discusses CSCE
Summit**

LD2711222790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1215 GMT on 27 November carries a 22-minute interview of Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov by commentator Vladimir Pasko under the title: "Toward European Security." The date and place of the interview are not given.

Pasko opens the program by saying that the recent European summit in Paris has put an end to confrontation on the continent after almost 40 years. He continues: "Confirmation of this was the treaty to cut conventional armed forces in Europe, which was signed by the participants in the summit. This treaty is the topic of our conversation today with Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, someone who has been dealing with the problems of disarmament and arms control for many, many years."

Karpov says most listeners will be familiar with the text of the treaty from the press, and states that the summit participants have asserted their desire to create a new Europe of peace and security. This intent, Karpov says, is contained in the sum of the documents adopted by the meeting. The Joint Declaration of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO opens the way for European integration and partnership in a common European home. This political statement combines with the military measures to reduce confrontation, which are embodied in the CFE treaty. The Paris Charter for a new Europe eliminates the divisions of Europe into two blocs, which remained after the Helsinki Final Act, he says. It provides a genuine basis for real cooperation in all areas of the European process.

Asked just what "big stick" is being laid aside to extend the hand of friendship, Karpov says: "According to the assessment of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the overall number of weapons subject to cuts in Europe under the treaty will be approximately 120,000 units. If we also take into account the unilateral reductions made by the Soviet Union, which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev announced as far back as December 1988, in New York, the level of weaponry is being cut by approximately half. This is, of course, a substantial reduction. It is important to bear in mind here—you talk of casting aside the big stick—but it is not just a case of casting the stick aside and keeping it in reserve, but of taking real measures to eliminate the weapons being reduced or to refit them for financial economy objectives. Moreover, all of this is to take place under international monitoring [kontrol]. This international monitoring is an important element of the accord, monitoring which should make all the participants in the accord confident that it really is the case that no one is trying to deceive anyone else, and that everything will take place as envisaged by the treaty in strict accordance with the approved regulations and provisions."

Asked how critical he is of the CFE Treaty, Karpov acknowledged that since it is the first collective treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on arms reductions, it naturally fails to cover all elements of the "equalization" that lies at the basis of European security. Karpov continues: "Certain other elements went by the wayside, to be precise, issues connected with cutting the number of the armed forces and those linked to naval activities in the European area. In my opinion, these elements should be the subject of subsequent talks. As for the number in the armed forces, these matters are already to be discussed—since there is a consensus between the participants in the talks of the 22—beginning on 26 November at the stage of the talks which, by convention, is called Vienna-IA. This period will continue until the Helsinki summit in 1992, and will primarily be devoted to matters of cutting the numbers of armed forces and certain other issues linked to reducing offensive potentials, pontoon equipment, for instance, and other engineering aspects of the armed forces which are able to facilitate the carrying out of offensive operations. Next, it should be said, that it is also intended through the channel of confidence-building and security measures to attempt to expand this sphere to which these measures apply by comparison with what has thus far been agreed in Vienna so that more is covered, ground forces, which is what have been talked about in the main thus far—restrictions on the scale of troop transfers, troop concentrations, holding exercises—to cover also the air forces and their activities, and activities of the navy in the European area, which are directly linked to Europe's security. These elements should also be an inalienable part of subsequent talks."

Karpov points out how structural changes will follow from armed forces reductions as embodied in the Vienna Treaty. Cuts are by unit; as a regiment or battalion loses its hardware, its nature changes; it no longer needs personnel to service equipment it no longer possesses; troop cuts are envisaged for the German armed forces in the wake of unification. Soviet troops are to withdraw completely from Germany by 1994 and from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in 1991, he notes. The concentration of armed forces personnel in Central Europe will, therefore, be entirely different and several times smaller, he points out.

Karpov continues: "In this way, favorable grounds are already coming into being for there to be an agreement on cuts in the armed forces personnel of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries at the next stage of the talks, before 1992, and the Helsinki summit. I think a good start has already been made." Karpov says the fact that some Soviet politicians criticize Soviet disarmament is an "intertia of thinking." While it is true that the Warsaw Pact will no longer have a concentration of offensive potential aimed at the whole of Western Central Europe, since reductions are bringing their levels to those of NATO, this does not mean that Soviet security has been weakened, he says. He cites Moiseyev in

PRAVDA, who stated that the level of weaponry stipulated by the treaty fully corresponds to the principle of sufficiency necessary for defense, and provides a reliable defense capacity for the USSR.

Pasko asks: "To what extent does the treaty which has just been signed in Paris affect the talks on nuclear forces? Is there a connection here?"

Karpov responds: "I think there is a connection, although neither the NATO side or our own has made any direct associations. It is natural, however, to draw the conclusion that profound cuts in conventional weapons and subsequent cuts in the armed forces, in armed forces personnel, alters the concepts linked to nuclear weapons. The declaration of the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries enshrines a readiness to begin talks on tactical nuclear weapons. At the first stage, it is envisaged that these talks would be between the United States and the Soviet Union, while subsequent stages will be determined depending on the results of the first stage. We are ready to begin talks with the United States very soon. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev suggested in Paris that these could begin in one or two months' time, so we could embark upon these talks some time in January. True, there are rumors that NATO has not yet worked out an overall position, and that this will take some time, that divergences of view have emerged between the participants over what should be covered by the talks, what kind of tactical nuclear weapons, must missile technology or, say, landmines, aircraft bombs, artillery shells, aircraft technology which can deliver nuclear weapons to their targets, etc. In other words, these matters will evidently still be under discussion by NATO. As for the Soviet Union, we are prepared to have a flexible approach to these matters and to adopt a gradual approach regarding the kind of nuclear weapon and its geographical restriction. If the West is not yet ready for complete elimination, fine. Let us at least agree on reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to minimum levels. The other direction, to be precise, that of strategic weapons, is the subject of Soviet-American talks which have been under way since March 1985."

Pasko says: "People have been saying that a treaty will be ready by January," to which Karpov replies:

"I think this is a real task, since the main issues have already been resolved, yet there are literally two or three matters outstanding which have not yet been resolved, and which are actually significant. These, I would say, are first the question of constant observance of missile and missile technology production. The second question is that of the throw-weight of the missiles. And the third question is that of not impeding access to telemetric data transmitted to earth from missiles during testing. I think the next meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state, which is apparently to be held in December, and is to prepare the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of the U.S. President, will be devoted

to looking for solutions, which will provide an opportunity for solving other, technical matters connected with drafting a treaty."

Karpov says that he hopes that when the Supreme Soviet discusses the CFE Treaty it will look at it from the point of view of Europe's attempts to create new structures of security based not on opposing blocs but on the national interests of all states and their integration in the military, legal, economic and humanitarian spheres. Integration into Europe and the European economy is vital if perestroika is to proceed, he says. The old security system prevented the USSR from having access to Western scientific and technical achievements as they could have been exploited for military ends. NATO is now undertaking conceptual and structural reviews, and this is largely due to the Soviet Union, which took the first steps, he notes. Karpov, in conclusion outlines the Paris decisions. He says that they pave the way for the new structures, and these are in themselves an initial structure.

Talks With FRG on Troop Withdrawal Noted

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in Russian 1345 GMT 27 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sosnovskiy]

[Text] Bonn, 27 November (TASS)—The inaugural meeting of the Joint Soviet-German Commission—provided for under Article 25 of the Treaty on the Conditions for the Limited Stay and Planned Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from the Territory of Germany—was held today at the FRG Foreign Ministry. The Soviet delegation was headed by Army General B.V. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, and the German delegation by FRG Foreign Ministry State Secretary Franz Bertele.

The treaty provides a firm legal foundation for the limited stay and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the FRG. As such, it is of particular significance for Soviet-German cooperation.

It is the commission's task to examine any matters connected with the interpretation and application of the treaty.

At this first meeting the sides adopted provisions on the Soviet-German mixed commission. The steps needed for a rapid transition to the practical implementation of the treaty were defined. Working groups were set up to handle various issues encompassed by the treaty. They will be engaged in working out appropriate specific settlements.

The meeting passed off in a constructive and frank atmosphere, and a characteristic feature of the meeting was the desire shown for productive cooperation. The next meeting is to be held in February next year.

Army General B.V. Snetkov was today received by FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher.

Deputies Attend Vienna CSBM's Session 28 Nov
*LD2811161990 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT
28 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 28 (TASS)—The first full-delegation session was held here today at the talks on Confidence and Security Building Measures [CSBM's] in Europe. It was attended by a group of USSR people's deputies who arrived here to familiarise themselves with the course of the Vienna talks.

The new stage of negotiations will focus on ensuring a new quality of confidence and openness in the military-political sphere in Europe by relying on the accords reached at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Paris.

Speakers at the session stated the need to be exceptionally responsible in the determination of objectives for further work during the 18 months that precede a CSCE summit in Helsinki in spring 1992.

In a speech at the session, Academician Sergey Ambartsumyan, member of the Soviet parliament presidium and the parliamentary Committee on International Affairs, said that the spreading of confidence-building measures to naval activity in water areas adjacent to Europe should become a priority at the current stage of the forum of 34 countries.

Now that land-based arms in Europe are being reduced, naval forces acquire the highest destabilizing potential, he emphasised.

"We take a similar approach to the spreading of confidence-building measures to the military activity of air forces in Europe," Ambartsumyan said.

"An impressive number of new problems has arisen before the Vienna forum of 34 countries. The comprehension of these problems will be best served by a new seminar on military doctrines, which will help evaluate events correctly, instill awareness about the current military and political situation in Europe and determine prospects and main directions for the development of global confidence-building measures," Ambartsumyan added.

On the same day the Soviet deputies met James Woolsey, leader of the U.S. delegation at the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Matters connected with prospects and main directions for the development of the negotiating process at the forum were discussed during the conversation, in which ambassador at large Oleg Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet delegation at the talks, took part.

Discussion Continues on CSCE Summit Results

Deryabin, Grinevskiy Comment

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in Russian No 48, 28 Nov 90 p 14*

[Statements by Ambassador Yuriy Deryabin, head of the USSR delegation on the preparations committee for the Paris conference: "Formula for Security"; and Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna negotiations: "A Major Battle"; with introduction by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent K. Privalov; published under the rubric "The World Around Us": "Echoes of the Paris Meeting"]

[Text] Paris—They lie in a dense sheaf—they would appear to be ordinary sheets of paper fastened together in a loose-leaf binder. I take them into my hands—they are heavy! The historic "weight" of these documents cannot be measured on any scales.

The summary documents of the all-European Paris summit. The Paris newspaper LIBERATION called it a diplomatic monument. Immediately after the close of the conference of the heads of state and governments of the 34 CSCE countries, I met with people who were among the creators of the all-European "monument" that was erected in the French capital. The head of the USSR delegation on the preparations committee for the Paris conference, Ambassador Yuriy Deryabin, and the head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces and measures for strengthening confidence and security in Europe, Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, agreed to make statements for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

Yuriy Deryabin: FORMULA FOR SECURITY

Not so long ago any foreign political action on the part of the Soviet government was called epochal and unprecedented. These words, unfortunately, have become hackneyed, but if one is to speak of the Paris conference, there is actually nothing that can compare to them. Not one of the documents that were adopted actually has any analogs.

The Paris "monument"—a good image, in my opinion—consists of three parts. First of all, the summary document of the conference itself: "The Paris Charter for a New Europe." The document has the same force as the Helsinki Final Act and is based on it. In second place there is the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. Its economic effect for our country is immense. Is it not simply criminal extravagance to spend the lion's share of our national income on the accumulation of deadly arsenals? And, third, there is the Joint Declaration of Warsaw Pact and NATO Countries.

The 22 states that confronted one another for four decades, looked at one another from the trenches of the cold war, will now be partners in the construction of a

new, unified Europe living in security. This is a departure from the "bloc" mode of thinking. In the declaration there is not a single mention of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO. The point of the declaration is to relieve tension in the relations of the 22 countries and increase their number to 34—the all-European level. The renunciation of the use of force and the affirmation of existing borders are not new commitments in themselves, but they acquire special significance in the context of new relations among the participants in the two alliances—yesterday military and tomorrow political.

The Helsinki process did not follow a simple path. Perhaps only now is it getting a historical chance to disclose its rich potential. The power of this process lies in the most delicate balance of interests and the ability to find compromises without resorting to pressure. Everything is built on consensus. Any country—even just one!—can block any decision it wishes if it does not like the decision. Respect for national positions is the basis of everything.

The cold war has been put to rest—that is a fact. In spite of the fact that the military confrontation is being surmounted, the ideological confrontation will go down in history, there are still "sparks" for possible "fires," and new factors that destabilize the world can appear. Thus more and more frequently we speak with alarm about the problems of ethnic minorities and the danger of ethnic conflicts at various points in Europe. The Helsinki process can help to avoid these. Thus in the summer of 1991 in Geneva there will be a seminar on the problem of ethnic minorities in Europe.

An important theme of the Paris Charter is the openness of Europe. The continent does not exist in a vacuum. We must not fail to regulate other conflicts in other regions. During 1-2 October 1990 at a meeting of CSCE foreign affairs ministers in New York, an "extra-European" resolution was adopted for the first time—on the Persian Gulf. I know that there are misgivings that after we reach an all-European consensus the hotbeds of tension will shift from our continent to other points. It is in everyone's interest for the impetus of European detente to have a favorable effect everywhere.

The Helsinki process is an entirely different understanding of security from what it was before. It is not at the expense of the taxpayer and not at the expense of our bellies, finally! Perhaps no one will any longer question the fact that previously our military security undermined our economic and social security. It envisions a distribution of military power whereby everyone has security.

Many of the initiatives adopted and recorded in Paris came from the Soviet Union. For instance, the idea of creating a center for preventing conflicts is a joint proposal of the USSR and the FRG. This center will begin its work in Vienna immediately after the end of the meeting. For the time being it will work only in the military and political area, on problems related to security. Later it will take on broader functions, including

those directed toward resolving political conflicts. In turn, we responded to the American proposal to create a bureau for free elections which would contribute to the exchange of information about conducting democratic elections.

State leaders are reaping the fruits of many years of painstaking work on the part of diplomats. Work not only at the official negotiating tables but also in the hallways and during business meetings. In the corridors, unofficially, they raised the question of the participation of representatives of our republics in the Paris conference. We suggested that they be included in the USSR delegation, but only six republics responded. The question of the participation of state formations in federative or confederative states is, among all the other things, an international legal question: The subjects of the CSCE are sovereign, fully independent states.

...I recall that on 22 November 1972, exactly 18 years ago, in "Dipoli" near Helsinki, multilateral consultations began among representatives of 34 countries in preparation for Helsinki-1. The organizers gave each of the participants his own table, but in Paris the heads of our states and governments all sat at the same table.

Oleg Grinevskiy: A MAJOR BATTLE

In no battle throughout the entire history of mankind has such a quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft been destroyed as in just one hour in the Elysee Palace. The largest obstacle on the path to European unity has been torn down. If one is to speak of the political repercussions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, I would compare it with the repercussions from the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. Today the line of military confrontation in Europe has ceased to exist and tomorrow—or, more precisely, according to the treaty, in a little more than three years—there will be no signs left of the confrontation between East and West in Europe.

A qualitatively new situation is developing, one characterized by a balance of forces over the expansive territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the threat of a sudden attack and large-scale military operations will be reduced to a minimum and practically eliminated. But the treaty is not restricted to just cleaning up after the cold war. It goes further, creating a basis for a new system to ensure security.

Under these unprecedented conditions, the two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact— forfeit their military functions. Created for purposes of confrontation, they would now seem to have lost their meaning. But I do not think that we should be in any hurry to plan their funerals. In Paris the states that are members of these alliances moved from the sphere of military cooperation to the sphere of political cooperation. The treaty, which was conceived as a document between the blocs, under the influence of changes in Europe has been transformed into a multilateral agreement of 22 sovereign states.

The basis is the commitment of the two groups of states of the East and West to reduce the numbers of their conventional arms in such a way that within 40 months after the agreement goes into effect, their collective maximum levels will not exceed:

combat tanks—20,000 units;
armored combat vehicles—30,000 units;
artillery systems of 100-millimeter caliber and greater—
20,000 units;
combat aircraft—6,800 units;
attack helicopters—2,000 units.

The reduction of the arsenals will run into the tens of thousands of units of combat equipment! The participating states agreed to designate zones on the map of the continent: Central Europe, rear regions, and flanks. They reached agreement both on the arms in the zones that would be acceptable to all and on the procedure for shifting them from one zone to another. In each region there is a balance of forces so that it is impossible to concentrate troops for dealing a striking blow. The toxic sting has been ripped out of war!

I shall not discuss the details and figures; I will just say that the concrete conditions that are envisioned meet the requirements of reliability and the criteria of reason from the standpoint of material expenditures. And there is no need to be concerned about whether the treaty will lead to a weakening of our country's defense capabilities. In our society, where it has been drummed into people since childhood that we can live in peace only when "from the taiga to the British seas the Red Army is stronger than all," such a delusion is quite understandable. It is no secret that our country's recent policy of increasing its arsenals—we had not to be stronger than any individual state but stronger than all the states taken together—certainly did not lead to increasing the international authority of the USSR. On the contrary, it contributed to the West's consolidation in anti-Soviet positions, increased the military threat, and exhausted our economy. Yes, we are getting rid of a lot of arms. But this simply means that we have accumulated more of them in our arsenals than others have.

Yes, the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe will come under rigid restrictions. But the same restrictions are being placed on the armed forces of the NATO countries. Take, for example, the united Germany. According to the treaty, its military potential will be considerably less than the number of men in the FRG just before the unification. And in general Germany will have the highest disarmament quotas. The majority of arms to be eliminated will be destroyed. And, to be honest, I have considerable misgivings about this. We must not allow a gigantic cemetery for combat equipment to be formed in our country beyond the Urals. This could cause another source of great ecological pollution. Unfortunately, in our country we have not yet given much thought to where we will go when these mountains of technical equipment are being converted? For instance, before turning a T-55 tank into a peacetime prime mover

should we not ask ourselves whether or not such a vehicle is economical to operate and where it will be used? Resmelting it is also extremely expensive. If one is to believe the newspaper LE FIGARO, the construction of a special furnace will cost \$3-4 billion and will take a minimum of five years.

A state is strong because of the well-being of its citizens. And the Paris treaty should serve to raise our standard of living. We will no longer be a country that declares its peaceful principles but in reality is building nuclear muscles. Regarding nuclear disarmament, I believe that we and our partners will soon be faced with the question of this just as we were faced with the reduction of military personnel and special negotiations on the navy.... The CSCE is a broad base for the most diverse agreements.

And the last thing is about how we prepared the treaty. Very frequently U.S. Ambassador Jim Woolsey and I worked late into the night at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York or the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs mansion on Aleksey Tolstoy Street in Moscow, and then the next morning we would go together to report to ministers Shevardnadze and Baker. They would discuss and make decisions after hearing the report that one of us had made—for the Soviet and American sides. Both at the same time—for both the Soviet and the American side.

Would it really have been possible even to think of such a thing just a couple of months ago?

Deryabin Cited on Baltics at CSCE

91UF0176A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Nov 90 p 3

[Report by TRUD correspondent V. Prokofyev: "The Contours of Europe's Future. The Summit Meeting Continues in Paris"]

[Excerpts] Paris, 20 November—What will Europe be like in future decades? What must be done to make our continent, whose peoples have left fierce confrontation in the past, and hopefully forever, into a unified democratic and flourishing community of nations and states? The answers to these and many other questions affecting the fate of the 600 million Europeans are to be heard in the speeches by heads of state and government at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris. [passage omitted]

Incidentally, the question of the presence at the summit meeting in Paris of the Baltic republics has been discussed quite actively both in the lobbies of the center on Avenue Kleber and in the press. Representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are now present in Paris. They have the status of "invited executive secretary to the summit meeting." And why not "invited Soviet national delegation"? Is that not a more accessible means of participating in the "summit"? For an explanation I turned to the chief of the Soviet delegates in the preparatory committee for the Paris summit meeting, chief of the Department of Security and Cooperation in

Europe in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yu. Deryabin. This is what he said:

Before both the CSCE meeting on humanitarian issues and the Paris summit, the Baltic republics raised the issue of their being given the status of observers. I had a meeting with the Estonian minister of foreign affairs, L. Meri. I laid out the position for him, and explained that this was not our position but the standard of the all-European process. And it is as follows: According to the "blue book" of recommendations defining the parameters of CSCE, its participants can be sovereign and independent [nezavisimyye i samostoyatelnnye] states. It is they who are the subjects of the process. With respect to the Baltic and other republics, their status is different. And this is understood perfectly well in the international preparatory committee for the meeting, and therefore the matter has never been officially raised.

There is another side to the matter. If we recognize that the Baltics have a right to be participants in or observers at the CSCE, this starts a chain reaction. It would affect Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Kosovo), Canada (Quebec), Spain (the Basque country, Catalonia).... I then proposed the following to the Estonian minister: If you have specific interests with respect to the Paris meeting, until the Union treaty has been concluded let us approach the issue in a businesslike manner: There is a welcome in our Union delegation and it is open to all the republics. One the eve of the Paris meeting we suggested that the republics send us their ideas, which we could consider in terms of the all-Union position, and we also officially invited representatives of the republics located in the European part of the country to be part of the delegation. But no recommendations were received from the Baltic. And Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are represented in the delegation.

So that is the story with respect to the Baltic "representatives," and in my opinion it does not show them in a good light.

Serious, thoughtful debate on the most important problems and the outlines of a future Europe, and on peace and friendly cooperation, continue at the meeting. Continuing his contacts within the framework of the summit, M.S. Gorbachev has, in particular, had talks with UN Secretary General P. de Cuellar, U.S. President G. Bush, and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher.

Bovin, Kovalenko Assess CSCE Talks

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21 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1*

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondents A. Bovin and Yu. Kovalenko from Paris under the general heading "Finally Disposing of the 'Cold War': 'Paris: Hopes and Fears'"]

[Text] It has been rightly remarked that statesmen often see themselves as architects, at any rate they eagerly use

words and expressions commonly used by builders. This was also shown extremely graphically during the current summit meeting. Many countries' leaders are talking about the "architecture" of the new Europe, how they view the "common European home," its "foundations," and so on. Admittedly, some observers have remarked that politicians do not always have enough imagination. So, former French foreign minister, Michel Jobert, regrets the "lack" of ideas on the nature of the new European order.

Unlike at Helsinki, Albania was present in Paris. It was accorded observer status. The USSR's three Baltic republics did not receive this status. But the summit's organizers, according to LIBERATION, "found a diplomatic trick": The Baltics were the "guests of the French Republic"....

While resolving security problems, the conference is putting the emphasis on questions of disarmament, consolidating confidence-building measures, and reducing military confrontation. Moscow is no longer a source of threat for the West today. "We will build Europe with, rather than against, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries," NATO Secretary General M. Woerner has just said in an interview with Paris' LE FIGARO.

Under the new conditions the security and stability of the old continent are, to no lesser degree, linked to other factors. Namely the threat of ecological catastrophe, international conflicts, and problems of mass emigration. For this reason Europeans need new mechanisms that can prevent potential confrontations. One such mechanism could be the body proposed by France which would, in the manner of an arbitration tribunal, tackle interethnic conflicts. For their part Switzerland and the Soviet Union have submitted an initiative to hold an all-European symposium next year on the problems of national minorities.

We cannot allow, the weekly LE POINT wrote recently, an explosion of nationalism to result in the revision of existing borders. Therefore, the magazine believes, Europeans should formulate a mechanism that would curb passions as far as possible and aim to prevent the conflagration from spreading.

The tremendous significance of the Helsinki process, former French foreign minister Jean Francois-Poncet said, resides in the fact that it firmly "binds" the Soviet Union to West Europe politically. And not only politically. The building of a new Europe will make it possible to create the kind of structures that will help shape a unified European economic, cultural, legal, ecological, and even power generation space.

The fact that East Europe and the Soviet Union are switching to the market, thus expanding the opportunities for exchanges and cooperation, promotes the formation of the economic space. During the 30 years or so that it has existed, the EEC has attained a high level of integration and over the next few years it will hardly

agree to take new members. Nevertheless, according to Western leaders, the EEC should remain the core of both the European political and economic structure of the future, of which the Soviet Union is an inalienable part. The community is seeking new forms of cooperation with other regional associations such as the European Free Trade Association, which includes six countries, and also with East European states.

Let us recall that late last year the EEC and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Brussels on trade and commercial and economic cooperation which envisages gradually granting our country most-favored-nation status. Last fall, EC Commission experts were working in Moscow studying the problems of our economy; they are to provide recommendations regarding the switch to the market. During the recent European Council meeting in Rome the commitment to offer the USSR aid in effecting reforms and the transition to democracy was confirmed once more.

However, democracy cannot develop amid the serious economic crisis being experienced by the countries of East Europe and for that reason Western politicians are voicing the fear that Europe, which has overcome the division of the continent into two military and ideological blocs, is now threatened by a new—this time an economic—“curtain.” The eastern part of the old continent is already described—not unfoundedly—as the “Third World” of Europe....

As is well known, the Helsinki process helped formulate general principles—pluralism, a multiparty system, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, and free elections. Let us recall that our first rights defense organizations, which were for a long time ranked as dissident organizations in our country, set themselves the task of fulfilling the Helsinki accords in the humanitarian sphere.

After the Vienna meeting the participants had an opportunity to ask for any information linked with the situation in the human rights sphere in other countries without fear of being accused of “interfering in internal affairs.” Polish Premier T. Mazowiecki sees the main merit of the Helsinki movement as being the fact that throughout its 15 years it has tackled human rights and been an important instrument in the fight against those people who disregarded the laws.

At present the human dimension of the Helsinki process, the “third basket,” which has always been the scene of the most embittered disputes, is moving to the fore. The disputes have died down today. They have been replaced by the realization that we are bound together by common values. We have finally realized that the country can only develop successfully in conditions of democracy and complete freedom for the individual. So Moscow and Paris are proposing the creation of a European legal space in which uniform universally applicable norms would operate.

We have seen that there is also a humanitarian aspect to the security problem since violation of human rights is fraught with a social explosion. Our experts now favor “linking” the internal and external aspects of security in the humanitarian sphere, that is, bringing domestic policy into line with current international standards, above all in the human rights sphere.

The Soviet Union wants to use common European institutions as a kind of “school in democracy.” The experience of the Council of Europe in elaborating the principles of a rule-of-law state is of exceptional interest for us, and we are therefore prepared as a first step to subscribe to its conventions. Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, favors handing over the entire “third basket” to this organization lock, stock, and barrel. However, this organization only comprises 24 European states at present, while the United States and Canada are not members and the USSR and a number of East European countries have observer status.

Beside interethnic conflicts, the problem of the migration of the work force—above all from East to West Europe—is one of the most acute for the old continent. Our Supreme Soviet has still not examined the draft law on exit from the USSR, the adoption of which will make it possible, in theory at least, for millions of Soviet citizens to go to the West in search of a better fate. While lifting the barriers to free movement of people within the community of the Twelve, West European governments are now adopting harsh measures to protect themselves against “newcomers” from the East. French Interior Minister P. Joxe recently said that he is afraid of a new invasion by immigrants and indicated that the authorities are preparing to defend their job market. We believe that mechanisms should be set up within the “common European home” to regulate the problems of migration on a European scale.

By and large the new Europe, the blueprint for which is being collectively studied in Paris, is not only a continent where wars will become pointless and where there will be considerably fewer soldiers and weapons than the “norm.” It will be a continent where people will be able to live—as reasonable beings are supposed to live—according to the laws of reason. Another utopia? Possibly. Practice and Europe’s future will provide the answers to this question.

Karaganov on CSCE Repercussions

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[Interview with Sergey Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Europe Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by IAN correspondent Viktor Dolya on behalf of Netherlands newspaper KRANT OP ZONDAG: “Sergey Karaganov on the CSCE Summit”—date, place not given]

[Text] [Dolya] What is the historical importance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit now that the positions of European countries and relations between them have changed; Germany has re-united, Albania has changed its attitude to the CSCE process, major changes are under way in East European countries and the Soviet Union, etc?

[Karaganov] The historical importance of this summit is obvious. In 1989-90 Europe has entered a new stage in its history, and the main problem now is to seal it organisationally, determining the institutions and rules necessary for the creation of the future system of European security.

Changes in Eastern Europe and the two German states clearly show that the existing institutions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, though they may be useful, cannot meet the challenges facing European security now. These are the challenges of the transition period, such as instability and the new natural and unfounded fears of East European countries before each other and the power of the re-united Germany.

It is obvious that we need new institutions, and I think the Paris summit will lay the foundations for their creation (such as centres for averting the risk of conflicts at the CSCE secretariat). The new historical stage which we have entered reminds me of Europe in 1949-55, when the foundations of the current security system were created. But at that period Europe created the systems and structures of a world of confrontation. Today we shall attempt to establish systems of a non-confrontational world.

[Dolya] What will the signing of the agreement on conventional reductions mean for the military situation in Europe?

[Karaganov] To begin with, it will mean the alleviation of the military burden weighing down on all states, the growing belief in national security in the USSR and other countries, and the beginning of overcoming military confrontation, which only seems to have become a thing of the past but has not actually been eliminated yet. The signing of the agreement on conventional reductions will pave the way to further reductions of military arsenals.

I am not sure that further reductions will be a result of negotiations. It is very difficult to hold talks now that the Warsaw Pact is becoming a less monolithic organisation. But is it clear that the current ceilings, provided for in the Vienna agreements, will go down in a few years and countries will start unilaterally reducing their armaments on a much greater scale than now, on condition that the political situation does not worsen.

It is also important that the Vienna agreement was complemented by the unilateral reduction of the Bundeswehr. I do not believe that a military threat is emanating from Germany, but that country, with its history of wars, is engendering a feeling of psychological

suspicion. The major reduction of the armed forces of the re-united Germany will add trust in the peace-loving aspirations of that great European state.

[Dolya] Why has the problem of tanks in each member country appeared in the Warsaw Pact? How was it solved? Are there any differences in the Warsaw Pact as regards conventional reductions?

[Karaganov] As far as I know, all questions have been settled in principle, less the small ones and those that concerned technicalities. The problem appeared when the Soviet Union was left more or less without allies due to the dramatic weakening of the Warsaw Pact's integrity. The Soviet Union was forced to regard its armed forces largely from the viewpoint of the task of equalling NATO's forces.

This logic can be questioned, yet it is reasonable from the military viewpoint. That is why the Soviet Union advanced the idea, semi-officially, of having a greater share of tanks than that accorded it under the preliminary agreement. The Soviet Union suggested that it should have some 40 per cent of tanks remaining in Europe and 80 per cent of the Warsaw Pact's tanks. NATO thought that the Soviet Union should have some 30 per cent of tanks in Europe and, consequently, about 60 per cent of the Warsaw Pact's tanks.

The sides eventually reached a compromise agreement, with the coordinated figure closer to that suggested by NATO. In general, the issue raised by the Soviet Union was treated with understanding and we settled the problem.

[Dolya] Quite new problems appeared in Eastern Europe and the USSR. There are ethnic conflicts (in Moldavia and other regions of the USSR, as well as in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania). How will this influence the CSCE process? Has this raised a new task before the CSCE, namely the task of settling ethnic conflicts and problems? What will happen if some nations (ethnic groups) in Europe decide to change borders? Will the solution of such problems become a new sphere of activity within the CSCE process? How can the CSCE solve such problems?

[Karaganov] It is absolutely clear that there will be two key problems among the multitude of issues which the new system of European security is called upon to resolve. The first concerns ethnic minorities. The elimination of confrontation has created a situation in which many historical and underlying contradictions came to the fore and become more acute. I mean the many problems in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav-Hungarian, Hungarian-Romanian and Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations. There are also such problems between Soviet republics.

We are in for a protracted period of acute ethnic problems. This can affect, and is already affecting, international relations. It is obvious that there is no more effective mechanism than the CSCE process to settle these problems. Sooner or later we shall have on the

agenda the question of creating an agency for mediating in these conflicts, a centre for settling them. Maybe we shall have to think, and not in the distant future but very soon, about creating special limited multinational forces for maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and rendering assistance in case of calamities.

As for changing borders, I think that if nations or ethnic groups in Europe decide to change them, the CSCE and all European political organisations, be it the European communities or NATO, should clearly express their attitude to the problem. If we give the green light to the changing of borders in Europe in any way other than by peaceful mutual agreement, this will throw us back fifty, a hundred and even more years.

We must do everything in our power to prevent the revision of borders recognised by the CSCE. At the same time, in the near future we must give small nations, and probably parts of state (in our case republics), the possibility to become members of corresponding CSCE bodies, which would satisfy their craving for sovereignty. In this case the CSCE would be not only a prohibiting but also an alleviating mechanism.

We are witnessing a parade of sovereignties, but after a while countries and republics will come to understand that they will have it harder if they try to fare alone. At the same time, to understand this they should see the world as it is, which many of them do not know. The real world is best understood through such a body as the CSCE, which is the focus of all European problems. This educational function of the CSCE is useful also for the new elites in East European countries.

[Dolya] We expect a great flow of emigrants from Eastern to Western Europe, in particular to Germany (some 30 million people). Will this raise a new problem before the CSCE, meaning the promotion of a quicker economic progress in the USSR and East European countries (in order to prevent or at least bring down this wave of "emigration of poverty")? What will happen in Europe and the USSR if the Soviet Union opens its borders for all, that is, if it lifts restrictions on the freedom of movement? What will be the role of the CSCE in this case?

[Karaganov] At present the flow of emigrants from Eastern to Western Europe is considerable, but I do not think that 30 million people will emigrate to Germany. This figure was prompted by panic. However, it is clear that the opening of borders will raise new problems. Even in conditions of peace migration can become a problem for the USSR and East European countries, as well as for Western states.

For the former this will mean the emigration of highly educated specialists. But apart from them the poorest, the least adapted people will be emigrating to the West, which can aggravate many social problems and crime there. This can negatively affect relations between the East and the West, force the West to close its borders,

and consequently shatter one of the key aims of the CSCE, the one of an open Europe.

That is why we should establish within the CSCE a service or a centre to regulate migration. Otherwise the new Europe will not be able to open its borders.

I do not think it would be expedient to use the CSCE for promoting the quicker economic progress of the USSR and East European countries. The CSCE should take a more active part in regulating economic processes in Europe and facilitate the creation of a common European space.

But there are organisations that could be used to promote a quicker economic progress of the USSR and East European countries. I mean the European communities and, possibly, dialogue between them and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

We should probably establish a small division at the CSCE to facilitate the interaction of these organisations. This could be done on the basis of the UN European Economic Commission, which includes nearly all CSCE countries but has been sleeping. It should be woken up.

Yazov on Paris Summit, Defense Sufficiency

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[Article by Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov: "A High Point In History"]

[Text] The results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in the French capital on 19-21 November 1990, are recorded in documents that are of vital importance for the future of the peoples of the European continent and, indeed, of the whole world. In essence, a **high point** in the history of mankind was reached through the joint work and common efforts of 34 states. A point that draws a line under the era of confrontation and opens up real prospects for the creation of a really reliable, all-embracing security system based on political methods as a priority and for the establishment of lasting world peace without coercion.

1. The Decisive Factor

The cornerstones of the foundations of the new era, which the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" calls the era of democracy, peace, and unity, were laid 15 years ago by the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. The all-European process, for all its complexity and contradictions, has established over these years a solid base of goodwill, constructiveness, and responsibility, which contributed to the success of the Paris conference and the transformation of the **possibility** of a qualitatively new system for Europe into a reality.

There are four and a half decades between the end of World War II and the Paris conference. For the peoples

of Europe and for the whole of mankind they were above all years of tense, exhausting cold war. Unleashed by reactionary, aggressive circles, it drew dozens of states into its orbit, planted them on different sides of a barricade, and separated and divided them with an "iron curtain." An unending quest for political dialogue, for a sensible and constructive solution to problems went on throughout this period. In particular, back in 1949 the Soviet Union submitted a proposal on banning the production and use of nuclear weapons. But like many subsequent peace proposals and initiatives by us, it did not find support. The fruitful quest for new approaches to safeguarding international security was impeded by the intensive sowing of the seeds of enmity. Falling on the fertile soil of the military force mentality, the seeds produced an abundant crop of distrust, suspicion, and fear. The fine shoots of collaboration and cooperation which had emerged in the joint struggle against the common fascist enemy during World War II and the experience of mutual understanding and trust enshrined in Helsinki got lost among them. The state's "granary" was not only filled to the brim but was dangerously overloaded with means of destruction, lethal to all living things on Earth.

Few managed to avoid participating in the rivalry that led to superarmament. Our country bore that burden too. Faced with a military threat that had assumed very concrete shape in the sinister plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR such as "Trojan," "Offtackle" or "Drop-shot," we were **forced** to take vigorous steps to safeguard our own security as well as making selfless efforts to eliminate the fearful aftermath of the grim war years and implement creative plans. Our state's very existence—in essence, the question of whether there would or would not be a new world war—depended to an enormous, if not decisive degree on our achievement of **military-strategic parity** with the United States.

Of course, one could say today that some of our steps toward that goal could have been different, not symmetrical with the other side, and, above all, more effective and less expensive. Certainly that is true. But, as we know, history recognizes no "if only's." The fact remains that the Soviet Union failed to avoid being drawn into the arms race and failed to overcome the obvious discrepancy between the scale of the defensive effort and the measures and actions to explore political, economic, diplomatic, and other ways of safeguarding national, collective, and general security. But it is also a fact that the achievement of West-East military-strategic parity was a very important condition for preventing a new world war and preserving peace.

In fact, the "Paris Charter for a New Europe," the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the joint declaration by 22 states, and other documents became a reality not least because of USSR-U.S. military-strategic parity. It is generally accepted that the fundamental breakthrough in Soviet-U.S. relations in all areas, including the military sphere, initiated fundamental changes in international development. In this sense the

Paris conference and its adoption of documents of worldwide-historic significance were prepared and to some extent programmed by the previous Soviet-American summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, Moscow, and Malta.

The stability and new quality of the Soviet-American dialogue and the willingness to act together in the interests of peace and security made it possible to transfer the mutual awareness of the senselessness of nuclear war to the plane of constructive political initiatives and practical steps to radically lower the level of the balance of military forces. Indeed, it is absolutely clear that a critically high level of parity only ensures a very unstable balancing act on the edge of a razor-blade—on the line between war and peace. Any break in this paper-thin line as a result of military rivalry would mean a catastrophe not just universal, but terminal for mankind.

That is why a resolute winding down of the arms race, a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation, and a substantial reduction of the sides' armed forces and armaments all constituted an urgent requirement, a modern-day imperative. For this demand to be met it is not enough just to acknowledge its global significance for the whole of mankind. It is important to throw off the rusty fetters of military-political dogma, overcome the inertia of age-old stereotypes, destroy the common ideological clichés, and get off the beaten track that is leading civilization to destruction. By the mid-eighties this had become an urgent necessity. Boldness and responsibility were required to take the decisive step and not only declare the new thinking, but transfer it to the plane of practical policy and set it in motion. This the Soviet Union did. During the Paris summit we saw again how statesmen, politicians, and the media essentially representing all regions of the world pay tribute to our country as the initiator of the real shift in world development.

The new thinking, as we know, is not a closed, complete doctrine. It derives from the policy of perestroika, from the dialectics of the renewal of society, which means that policy can be developed in accordance with democratization and humanization and with the actual course of real life. Perestroika, which is geared to the primacy of common human values, has enabled the peoples of the world as it were to "rediscover" our country for themselves, imparted dynamism and effectiveness to our international course, and helped rid the world community of distorted ideas about our military policy and greatly widen the range of trust.

In this sense it was our perestroika that created beneficial prerequisites for a radical change in the international situation and was the **decisive factor** in the world community's overcoming military-force attitudes and the bloc mentality and in the dismantling of confrontational structures.

2. Toward Reasonable Sufficiency

Probably no one doubts any more that the urgent present-day problems cannot be solved without solving **disarmament** problems. And the fact that the Paris meeting was pegged to the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is deeply significant. As we know, this document, without precedent in human history, was devised on the basis of the consideration of mutual interests, reasonable compromise, and identical security for the sides.

In essence, the recent political statements on the end of the cold war are embodied, thanks to the treaty, in specific levels of arms that significantly reduce the opposing military potentials over an extensive area—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Vienna talks involving the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states (the number of participants was reduced to 22 as a result of German unification) were not easy and involved difficult discussions. Each position was calculated and checked and comprehensively analyzed from the viewpoint of both current considerations and the long-term perspective. Despite the complex and at times rather acute nature of a number of questions, solutions that do not impinge on anyone's interests were found.

This was the case, in particular, with problems connected with the inclusion of combat aircraft in the treaty, with the incorporation of light tanks, and with questions of limiting personnel numbers. It is a fundamentally important fact that during the talks it was possible to rid the old notion of **reasonable sufficiency** for defense of past deformations. Whereas until recently this concept implied, above all, the readiness and capability of states' armed forces to wage active offensive actions, now it implies, it seems to me, that armed forces correspond to the level of actual war danger and minimum defense requirements. The treaty envisages the elimination of imbalances in the basic types of armaments and the elimination of the potential for carrying out a surprise attack and for launching large-scale offensive actions in Europe. Within the bounds of the application of the treaty the total quantities of conventional armaments and equipment limited by it should not exceed 40,000 combat tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 artillery pieces, 13,600 combat aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters.

Obviously, progress toward defense sufficiency means something only when **everyone** is doing it. This is the logic of life. And only its practical observance can make for real, genuine security. It is this logic that dictated the treaty signed in Paris. In the context of the aforementioned total number of armaments and equipment it establishes equal collective levels for the groups of states in NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.

Mutual exchange of military information is envisaged, combined with regular, reliable, and all-pervasive monitoring of military activity. In effect, a step has been taken toward **transparency** in the military sphere, that is, toward the maximum possible openness, toward transparent relations between the sides that rule out any attempts whatsoever to bypass the treaty or covertly prepare for aggression. This renders defunct the military doctrines of "direct confrontation" or "flexible response," and ultimately the actual military functions of the North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact Organization as well. Incidentally, a review of the U.S. and NATO military doctrines has already begun, with a view to bringing them to a common, purely defensive "denominator." There is a pressing need to transform the military-political alliances, to transform these institutions, created in the cold war era, into instruments for maintaining stability and developing good-neighbornliness.

The foundations of a modern **security model**, laid by the new political thinking, were strengthened in Paris. Everyone is familiar with the elements of this model. It essentially stems from political principles which are becoming increasingly firmly established—freedom of choice, diversity of development, supremacy of common human interests, internationalization of interstate dialogue, and demilitarization of international relations. So the new model's supporting structures are, first, the indivisibility of national and general security; second, the shift of the center of gravity in safeguarding it from military to political means; and, third, the creation of an effective security mechanism.

All this is reflected in the joint declaration by 22 states, adopted in Paris. It is noteworthy that the document was initially conceived of as a treaty between two blocs. But in the form in which it was adopted it is a qualitatively new document, whereby each of the 22 signatory states pledges to make a corresponding contribution to maintaining security and stability that is common to all. In other words, it is a multilateral nonaggression pact—one of the first documents in the era of democracy, peace, and unity.

The immediate aims and tasks for the future movement from the historic point that was reached in Paris are clearly mapped out. They are the immediate continuation of talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence measures and their completion by the date of "Helsinki 2"—the 1992 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Finnish capital. The start of new talks involving not 22 states but all the European states, the United States, and Canada. And the creation of new institutions and mechanisms for security and cooperation in Europe: regular political consultations at various levels, a conflict prevention center, and an all-European legislative assembly.

The Soviet Union has arrived at the new point in European history together with the other states. The implementation by all the participants of the decisions

adopted at the Paris conference and joint progress toward the level of reasonable sufficiency offer our country favorable opportunities for implementing the very difficult tasks of perestroika and achieving a civilized level of prosperity for the people and socioeconomic progress.

3. For the Benefit of the Fatherland

The implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe enables our country to exploit its considerable intellectual and material resources in the interests of the national economy and, at the same time, to ensure that the USSR's defense capability and the Armed Forces' combat readiness are maintained at a reliable and adequate level.

Of course, the implementation of the Treaty's provisions demands that a complex range of large-scale and laborious measures be carried out in the sphere of defense building. In the context of the total quantity of armaments envisaged by the Treaty for the Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union will have 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,175 artillery pieces, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 attack helicopters in its European part. In order to achieve these levels in the space of three years, the Soviet Union will have to eliminate (destroy or adapt for use in the national economy) over 19,000 items of armament and equipment. The NATO countries will have to cut 16,000 arms.

A question arises in this connection: Why does the USSR have to cut more armaments than the other side? Let us try to examine this question by using tanks as an example. One of the lessons of World War II is that tanks were the main means of routing the enemy. With this lesson in mind and in view of our military doctrine's military-technical principles, which right up until spring 1987 geared the forces to preparing mainly for offensive actions in the event of an aggressor's launching a war, and also in view of the specific historical conditions of the nuclear confrontation that was imposed on us, definite priority was given to the development of tank forces. The idea was that tanks and other armored equipment and artillery were the most effective means of withstanding the destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons and of preserving a high level of capability to perform combat actions in conditions of the use of such weapons. As a result, by mid-1988, there were around 41,500 tanks, 45,000 armored vehicles, and 50,300 artillery systems in the USSR Armed Forces in Europe.

With the adoption of the new defensive **military doctrine** in 1987 and its consistent implementation, the situation began to change radically. I would point out that as a system of officially adopted fundamental views on the prevention of war, military building, and preparation of the country and the Armed Forces to repulse aggression, and also of the methods of waging an armed struggle to defend the socialist Fatherland, our doctrine stipulates that the Soviet Union will never under any circumstances initiate hostilities, regards no other people as its

enemy, and will never under any circumstances use nuclear weapons first. It is easy to see that all these fundamental provisions are deeply in tune with the ideas of the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in terms of their spirit and the aim of maintaining peace.

In the period of just over three years since the Soviet Union adopted the new military doctrine, we have already done a great deal to put it into practice. Moreover, it is a most important part and conceptual basis of the thorough **military reform** that is being conducted in our country. In the course of implementing practical reform measures, the number of items of combat equipment, in particular the types that are addressed in the Treaty, has been considerably reduced. The quantity of tanks in ground forces' formations and units has been reduced. Some tank formations and units have been disbanded. As a result, our total tank strength in Europe has been cut by 10,000. In addition, as a result of the implementation of the enterprising USSR decision to reduce forces and armaments by 500,000 unilaterally, the number of tanks has been reduced by a further 10,000. As of the beginning of November a total of 20,500 tanks, 19,300 armored vehicles, and 28,400 artillery systems had been withdrawn from the forces in Europe. A considerable proportion, mainly obsolete types of these armaments, have been written off for scrap or converted to auxiliary equipment (tow trucks, fire trucks, training simulators). By the end of 1990 our Armed Forces in Europe will have a total of around 21,000 tanks, 29,600 armored vehicles, and around 14,000 artillery systems left.

What are the levels of reasonable defense sufficiency which the reductions will attain at the stage determined by the treaty framework? The following fact must be borne in mind here. The political processes currently taking place in East Europe and in the Warsaw Pact countries and the changes in the nature and functions of the Warsaw Pact military organization have meant that an assessment of the correlation of military forces now takes into account, as a rule, the armaments of the USSR and NATO rather than the armaments of the Warsaw Pact as a whole and NATO. If this method is used, following the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe this indicator will look as follows: 1:1.5 in NATO's favor for tanks and armored combat vehicles and 1:1.3 for artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. If NATO reaches the upper level for artillery (20,000 units) the correlation for that type of armaments will be 1:1.5.

As a result of the implementation of the Treaty the Soviet Union will have, in all, approximately one-third of the total quantity of armaments that remain with all parties following the reductions. It is clear to see that the highest national ceilings for conventional armed forces have been set for our country, in view of the USSR's geostrategic position. Combined with a powerful nuclear shield, this will ensure the guaranteed implementation of defensive tasks in any circumstances.

The implementation of cutbacks prescribed by the treaty is organizationally and technically coupled with the transformations being effected along the tracks of military reform in the composition, structure, and command system of the Armed Forces, their training, and the organization of comprehensive backup services for the Army's and Navy's vital activities. When elaborating the concept of military reform, we took into account the prospects for the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which has now become a reality, as well as the future Treaty on a 50-Percent Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms and other practical steps in the disarmament treaty process which are being either prepared or envisaged. The withdrawal of our troops from East Europe was also planned with due consideration for the cutbacks envisaged by the treaty. Our principled approach toward the solution of all these tasks is to fully implement the agreements and treaties which either have been or are likely to be adopted, while maintaining parity and the country's reliable defense in this process.

One probably does not have to be especially skilled in military affairs to perceive that the problems associated with the development and implementation of the disarmament treaty process link up with problems stemming from the reduction of defense expenditures, the curtailment of military production and its conversion, and the transformation of the Armed Forces themselves, and then focus on people in uniforms. On the officers, the Army and Navy warrant officers, the sergeants and petty officers, the soldiers and sailors—on those who, to use K. Marx' words, "produce the defense."

It is they—via their conscientious and selfless labor in complex and frequently extreme conditions—who implement a treaty, a declaration, or a charter, make the defensive doctrine a reality, advance the really difficult cause of military reform, and at the same time perform combat alert duty, master their weapons, improve their military training, and maintain the necessary combat readiness.

Meanwhile, the Army and Navy servicemen often have to perform the responsible tasks assigned to them by the Soviet people in complex conditions. Moreover, this is due not only to the difficult social and daily life conditions and the acute shortage of housing, but also—and even more so—to the tension around the Armed Forces which is being single-mindedly whipped up by separatist, nationalist, and extremist circles.

Matters are also aggravated by the fact that a number of republics are adopting unconstitutional acts and unlawful resolutions and decisions aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces and the military duty, at discriminating against servicemen and their families.

This is why it is so important to ensure effective legal and social guarantees to enable the Armed Forces to perform their duty. It is no accident that the program of radical measures to improve the situation in the country,

proposed by the USSR president and approved as a whole by the USSR Supreme Soviet, emphasizes the need to give more attention to the Army's problems, to ensure social protection for servicemen and their families, and to immediately adopt laws which will enable the Armed Forces to perform their mission and ensure the prestige of those who guard our state's security.

The solution of the problem of consolidating social and legal protection for servicemen and their families is a statewide task. For its own part, the Ministry of Defense is channeling all the facilities and resources at its disposal toward its solution, primarily toward housing construction. Thus, the Ministry of Defense's military construction organizations alone will build about 57,000 apartments for cadre servicemen in 1990, and more than 64,000 apartments in 1991. The total planned for construction during the 13th Five-Year Plan is 436,000 apartments, taking into account the proportion represented by Ministry of Defense participation in housing construction carried out by the Union republics.

In addition to the recently adopted USSR Law on Pension Provisions for Servicemen and a series of government decisions aimed at improving their social position, the USSR Council of Ministers recently adopted a resolution to increase the money earnings of all categories of servicemen in 1991, as well as the allowances paid to reservists called up for training and refresher camps. Specifically, this resolution increases fivefold the rate of pay for rank and file personnel on compulsory service. There are also substantial pay rises for sergeants and petty officers on compulsory service, as well as for cadets in military education establishments. Wage payments are being introduced for cadets in the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools and for students in military music schools. There are provisions for material incentives for troop echelon servicemen with high vocational skills and serving in special conditions. They will receive higher money remuneration for class skills and increased allowances for special service conditions as crew members of tanks, combat vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and submarines and for periods on standby combat alert duty. Additional special service conditions payments are being introduced for servicemen serving on surface ships and vessels who ensure the flight safety of aircraft and helicopters or make regular parachute jumps and were not receiving such additional payments earlier. Pay rates have been increased for diving work and parachute jumps, as have money allowances for service at sea. The amount of one-time separation allowance on discharge from active military service has been increased for some categories of Army and Navy warrant officers, and for servicemen on extended service.

The Armed Forces perceive with profound gratitude the concern shown by the people, and express their resolve to ensure peaceful conditions for successful fulfillment of the responsible tasks of the current crucial stage of perestroika and the building of a qualitatively new security system. They are clearly aware of the vital importance of ensuring for the country a reliable security

commensurate with the present state of affairs in the world and of the objective need to strengthen the integrated all-Union and all-people's Armed Forces as the most important guarantor of the freedom, independence, and sovereignty of all peoples living in our multinational fatherland—the USSR.

Warsaw Pact, NATO Experts Discuss CFE Treaty Data

LD2911143490 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 29 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 29 (TASS)—The first session of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO joint consultative group of experts opened here today within the framework of the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The talks involve 22 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries.

The functions and tasks of the group are to consider matters connected with the observance of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, signed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Paris, including the settlement of unclear situations and differences over the interpretation of the document, and to coordinate measures to raise the effectiveness of the treaty.

In their first considerable step towards implementing the CFE treaty, participants in the session exchanged preliminary data on their armed forces. The data is being thoroughly studied and analysed.

Defense Committee Member Views New Vienna Talks

LD3011114390 Moscow TASS in English 1113 GMT 30 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 30 (TASS)—The agenda of a new phase of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe includes a number of items dealing with cuts in conventional armed forces, the reorganisation of their structure and location on the principles of reasonable defence sufficiency. The first plenary meeting was held at the talks on Thursday.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed at the recent conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Paris obliges representatives of 22 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries to carry on the forum with a view to concluding an agreement on additional measures aimed at strengthening security and stability on the continent.

Prominence among such measures is given to limiting troop numbers of the participating countries.

There is already a certain margin in this respect, Nikolay Britvin, member of the Soviet parliament and the parliamentary Committee on Defence and State Security, told the plenary meeting.

He is currently in Vienna with a group of USSR people's deputies who arrived here to familiarise themselves with the talks.

Over the past two years, the Soviet Union has been effecting unilateral cuts in the Armed Forces by 500,000 men, Britvin said.

"As representatives of the state which was the first to launch such large-scale cuts, we welcome the German Government's pledge to reduce the personnel of the Armed Forces of the reunited Germany down to 370,000 within three to four years of the date the CFE treaty takes effect.

"Another important subject at the talks will be apparently to coordinate provisions for air inspections. The task here is to work out a specific mechanism for such inspections, coordinate the number of air inspections which the parties to the treaty will be bound to accept and have the right to make.

"An air inspections accord in Vienna could be promoted by progress at the open-skies conference," Britvin said.

On the same day, Soviet deputies met the leaders of the delegations of Germany, France and Britain. The importance of the earliest ratification of the CFE treaty and transforming the obligations contained in it into specific accords was emphasised at the meetings which were attended by Ambassador at Large Oleg Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet delegation at the talks.

Grinevskiy: 8,000 Tanks Shifted East of Urals

AU3011203690 Paris AFP in English 1537 GMT 30 Nov 90

[Text] Vienna, November 30 (AFP)—The Soviet Union has transferred some 8,000 modern tanks from its western territories to behind the Ural Mountains, the head of the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on Conventional Disarmament in Europe (CFE) admitted here Friday [30 November].

Earlier, NATO representatives expressed surprise and demanded "explanations and clarifications" after the Soviets reported possessing a far lower number of weapons in Eastern Europe than NATO had expected.

The military statistics provided by the Soviets in the framework of the CFE treaty signed November 19 in Paris are intended to serve as a base for reductions in forces mandated by the accord.

Western diplomatic sources here had said that the Soviet Union had transferred 21,000 tanks and more than 28,000 artillery pieces east of the Urals, where they are not subject to reductions contained in the CFE treaty.

Questioned about the Soviet figures, Mr. Grinevskiy said that Soviet ground forces in Europe had been reduced from their July 1988 total of 41,580 tanks to the current total of under 21,000 through a variety of means, and not only by sending them east of the Urals.

He said that after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral reduction of some 10,000 tanks, the restructuring of ground forces and the transfer of the 8,000 modern tanks behind the Urals, the number of Soviet tanks in Europe fell to 24,898 by August 1 this year.

The Soviet delegate said that less than 21,000 Soviet tanks remained in Europe following the destruction or conversion to civilian uses of some, and the use of others for target practice.

According to the CFE accord, the Soviet Union must reduce its tanks west of the Urals to 13,200 by the end of 1994.

"The same thing goes for other categories of armaments," said Mr. Grinevskiy, adding that he did not rule out "human error" in the compilation of the figures.

Grinevskiy: Any 'Mistakes' in CFE Data To Be Corrected

AU0212151290 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
1 Dec 90 p 2

[Report by "BB": "Soviet Ambassador: 'Erroneous Data Will Be Corrected'"]

[Text] Vienna—Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, chief Soviet delegate to the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), commented on a DIE PRESSE report to journalists on Friday [30 November]. In the report, it was said that the Western countries were surprised at the small number of military objects and artillery systems listed by the Soviet Union in the data material distributed.

Grinevskiy said that the data supplied have only been analyzed provisionally. Therefore, people should avoid speaking about "surprises." He added that corrections also had to be made in the Western data material. Should the Soviet documents contain mistakes, they would also be corrected.

Sergey Ambartsumyan, Supreme Soviet Presidium member, said at the same news conference he was sure that the CFE agreement would be ratified by the Soviet legislature following a detailed debate. He said that all the current domestic policy difficulties could not hinder the USSR's disarmament efforts.

Karpov Meets NATO Official for CFE Talks

LD0312231590 Moscow TASS in English 2055 GMT
3 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, December 3 (TASS)—It has been officially announced here that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov today received Henning Wegener, NATO undersecretary-general, who is currently in the Soviet Union on a visit.

Matters connected with the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, as well as prospects for a continuation of the Vienna negotiating process—Vienna I A and Vienna-II—were substantively discussed.

Both sides expressed interest in developing contacts between the Soviet Union and NATO with a view to jointly looking for ways to strengthen stability and build security in Europe, and lower arms levels still further.

Chernyshev Views NATO Military Doctrine

LD0512123190 Moscow TASS in English 1216 GMT
5 Dec 90

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, December 5 (TASS)—An advance in arms cuts and disarmament is crucial to forming a non-confrontational system of inter-state relations in Europe. Evaluations of military threat, which have changed in West and East, create favourable conditions for this action.

The implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the fulfillment of the second stage of Vienna talks, the elaboration of a new generation of confidence-building measures in the military field, talks on cuts in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—these are the short-term steps that have to be taken in order to keep up with political reform, which helps diminish the role of military force in ensuring security.

I think that many in the West realise that the North Atlantic Treaty cannot remain unchanged under changing circumstances. Its military doctrine must also be overhauled. Nevertheless, when reconsidering NATO's strategic concepts some Western strategists seek to ensure that NATO preserve obsolete provisions of the military doctrine and exempts weapons, both existing and developing, from reduction.

Despite the London declaration, which proclaimed the goal of transforming the North Atlantic Treaty and rethinking the military doctrine and strategy, there has been a tendency recently to strengthen NATO's military organisation rather than politicise it. The authenticity of "defensive" inclinations among NATO leaders is made doubtful by the creation of mobile forces with a large striking power. Such a "perestroika" characterises offensive rather than defensive strategy.

It seems to me that adjustments in the NATO military doctrine would match positive shifts on the continent if they envisage renouncing the concept of forward defense, rethinking the "flexible reaction" strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in hostilities, curtailing numerous military programmes, and intensifying political (and generally non-military) cooperation between parties.

I think one should take into account the fact that the formerly opposing military blocs have now developed a direct dialogue, which is crucial to undoing many years of mistrust. In particular, the Soviet Union has recently proposed specific measures to reduce the danger that could arise from contingencies.

Such measures could include establishing a hotline between command posts of the Soviet General Headquarters and the headquarters of NATO's Supreme Command in Europe and exchanging officers, to be permanently present at both headquarters.

Obviously such measures could complement the European structures of security set up in Paris.

Contrasting Views on CFE Treaty's Impact Assessed

*PM0612164190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel I. Vladimirov: "Security for Everyone; CFE Treaty in the Eyes of Western Experts"]

[Text] The Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty is still attracting universal attention. That is understandable. The history of civilization has not seen a treaty of this kind before. More than 120,000 units of various arms are to be eliminated in the vast area from the Atlantic to the Urals. No battle has brought about the destruction of such mountains of weapons. With the implementation of the treaty opportunities for a surprise attack or for wide-ranging offensive operations will virtually be ruled out for all sides. Henceforth security in Europe is to be ensured not by military but primarily by political means in conditions of cooperation rather than confrontation.

NATO political circles and the public in NATO countries have reacted with delight to the treaty. Delivering a government statement in the Bundestag 22 November, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl described it as a "most extensive and all-embracing agreement in the disarmament sphere." The chancellor believes that the treaty lays the foundation for "a new all-European architecture of security." Other heads of state and government involved in the work of the Paris meeting have made similar statements.

Before the national legislatures' ratification of the CFE treaty Western experts, military specialists, and leading strategic studies center and institute personnel are carefully analyzing the treaty's substance. The main question of most interest to them is what effect the treaty will have on the security of its 22 Warsaw Pact and NATO

signatories. Will their defense capability suffer? Has anyone been hurt or has anyone, on the contrary, acquired palpable advantages?

It is being alleged that the NATO bloc has won a victory and has even changed the correlation of forces in Europe in its favor. The Soviet Union will, after all, have to cut back more arms than all the bloc's countries together. However, the USSR has frequently expressed its readiness to eliminate the existing imbalances and asymmetries and establish complete equality in the main types of conventional arms. It is clear from the mandate of the talks that the main aim was to remove the existing disparities in the European balance. That is why there can certainly be no question of the West's winning.

There are experts such as, for instance, P. Lelouche, the French specialist on military-political and military-strategic problems, who sees no comfort for NATO in the treaty provisions. Any positive consequences of their implementation, P. Lelouche claims, are canceled out by the fact that the Soviet Union will be the strongest military power on the European continent. Fueling fears of the Soviet "military threat," he says that 70 percent of the cuts in the USSR's military potential in Central Europe will be made not by destroying military hardware but by transferring it across the Urals. From there—you never know—it is only a stone's throw to the Champs Elysees.

To be fair I must note that those people engaged in the quest for winners and losers are clearly in the minority. Objective approaches to and assessments of the treaty prevail. Most specialists regard the clearly-formulated, well-proportioned system of unprecedented verification measures, which virtually preclude any attempts to violate its provisions, among its obvious merits. In the opinion of specialists from the (London) International Institute of Strategic Studies, this system acts as a definite guarantee that a stable situation will be preserved in Europe, given the difficult reform processes under way in East Europe and the Soviet Union.

Many people in the West are in favor of further progress in European disarmament. Such problems as cuts in naval forces still remain outside the framework of the talks. In this connection the opinion exists that the mandate of the Vienna talks should be expanded to cover the naval aspect.

Moreover, hardly anyone expected the CFE treaty to resolve all Europe's military-political problems at a stroke. It is all the more important to embark on renewed debate without delay.

Chervov Clarifies CFE Inspection Site Numbers

*LD0712141490 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT
7 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[TASS] Moscow, December 7 (TASS)—"All the installations on Soviet territory that interest the West will be

subject to strict international control," assistant chief of the Soviet General Staff Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, told TASS today. He made the comments in light of rumours circulated by the Western media concerning the number of such "objectives" on Soviet territory.

Chervov explained why their number had dropped to 895 by the time the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed at the Paris CSCE summit conference, whereas two years earlier the chief of the Soviet General Staff mentioned 1,500 such installations.

Chervov said the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces had changed during these two years, affecting the number of installations in question. The figure 1,500 was "given during the drafting of the treaty when no exact criteria for determining such 'objectives' were determined."

According to Chervov, several contingents and units were disbanded in the course of Soviet unilateral reductions of armed forces. Thus, Western experts "find missing" the Seventh Tank Division, which was formerly included in the Western Army Group. "It was disbanded," Chervov said.

The Soviet general stressed that all higher military educational establishments had been deleted from the list of such installations.

"The Soviet Union adheres strictly to the letter and spirit of the Paris Treaty. The quota of inspections for 895 installations is realistic," Chervov stressed.

General Staff Official Reviews CFE Treaty

PM0712164590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[“Our Interview” with Lieutenant General F.I. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate, by V. Izgarshev; place and date not given; first paragraph is an introduction: “On a Partnership Basis; The Paris Meeting’s Repercussions”]

[Text] Our old continent has entered a new age of peaceful development. The Paris summit meeting laid foundations for the creation of a new system of all-European security. Readers ask for a more detailed description of this, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]. Our interlocutor is Lieutenant General F. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate.

[Izgarshev] Fedor Ivanovich, whereas European security was previously determined to a certain extent by the balance of power between the two opposed military-political alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, it now appears that conditions have been created for the functioning of new mechanisms and institutions based on cooperation. Is this the main result of the Paris meeting?

[Ladygin] You are correct. The Paris conference documents make up a package of agreements which are unprecedented in terms of their importance and long-term effect. In essence, they constitute an objective action program for ensuring European security and stability.

They are the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" and the "Joint Declaration by the 22 States" belonging to the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance, which proclaim that the countries in these groupings are no longer adversaries. In fact, this document is a multilateral nonaggression pact, based on an awareness that security in Europe will henceforth be ensured not by military but primarily by political means. And finally, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is unique. It translates political statements about the end of the "cold war" into the language of specific rules and lower arms levels.

[Izgarshev] Fedor Ivanovich, we would like to hear you outline this treaty's basic provisions....

[Ladygin] First and foremost, it sets equal levels of categories of potentially offensive arms for each of the two groups of states belonging to the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO—20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft (frontline and tactical aviation, medium-range bombers, Air Defense Forces fighters, and combat training aircraft), and 2,000 strike helicopters. Cutbacks to reach these levels must be implemented within 40 months following the treaty's coming into force, in other words following its ratification by all parties to it.

We attach great importance to the so-called rule on the sufficiency of arms held by any one country. Under this rule, and within the framework of collective levels, we are entitled to 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,700 artillery systems [artilleriyskaya sistema], 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 strike helicopters. In actual fact, under an agreement between the Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union will have 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,175 artillery systems, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 strike helicopters.

In parallel with the overall cutbacks of arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, limits are envisaged on the quantity of arms in individual regions, with a view to precluding any dangerous concentration of troops, especially in Central Europe and along the flanks. As applied to the USSR, this means that along the northern and southern flanks, for example, which cover the Leningrad, Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts, our regular troops can have not more than 1,850 tanks, 1,800 armored vehicles, and 2,775 artillery systems. In addition, we can store 1,000 tanks, 800 armored vehicles, and 1,100 artillery systems in warehouses in the Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts.

The remainder of the total quantity of arms permitted under the treaty will be deployed in the western border and central military districts.

Reliable monitoring of the observance of the treaty's provisions by all parties to it will be ensured by means of a package of verification measures. They will be based on on-site inspection [inspeksiya] without the state being inspected having the right to refuse.

[Izgarshev] Our newspaper's readers would like to know the quantity by which NATO and Warsaw Pact Organizations will be cutting back their arms, and specifically the Soviet Union?

[Ladygin] Cutbacks of arms in excess of the limits set by the treaty will be effected primarily by means of destruction. According to preliminary data, the totals to be cut back are as follows: more than 16,000 units of arms by NATO countries and about 34,000 by Warsaw Pact Organization countries. The Soviet Union will have to eliminate about 19,300 units of arms and equipment, including up to 1,300 combat aircraft, 7,600 tanks, 9,600 armored vehicles, and 760 artillery systems (either by destruction or by conversion for use in the national economy). Out of this total, we are entitled to convert 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles into universal tow-trucks, bulldozers, fire fighting equipment, rescue, quarry, or drilling vehicles, lifting cranes, and other types of equipment for the national economy.

[Izgarshev] Fedor Ivanovich, it appears that the Warsaw Pact countries, and even the Soviet Union alone, will have to cut back more arms than NATO countries as a whole. Why? And what quantities of arms will be cut back by, say, the United States and the FRG?

[Ladygin] Prior to the start of the Vienna talks, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization enjoyed approximate parity in the sphere of conventional arms, including ground forces, air forces, and navies. There was, however, asymmetry in individual branches of the armed forces. Advantage in ground forces was enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact Organization, while NATO enjoyed superiority in naval forces.

From the very start, the Soviet Union's position boiled down to reduction of the sides' overall military potentials and elimination of all imbalances. But the United States and other NATO countries refused to include naval arms on the talks' agenda. With a view to getting out of the blind alley, we decided to begin talks on conventional arms, temporarily setting aside the problem of cutbacks in naval forces but subject to the understanding that the disarmament process will ultimately extend also to this important component of military potentials. Due to the larger total of arms held by their ground forces, the Warsaw Pact Organization countries, including the Soviet Union, will have to cut back larger quantities of such military equipment.

As for the United States, U.S. arms in Europe must be cut by approximately 2,400 units, primarily tanks. The

treaty's provisions do not extend to arms deployed on U.S. territory or on U.S. bases on foreign territory outside Europe. At the same time, the FRG will have to eliminate about one-half of its arms, in other words more than 11,000 units.

[Izgarshev] Comparing the data you have cited on the quantity of arms the USSR can have under the treaty against indicators on the Soviet Armed Forces which were published before the start of the Vienna talks, it emerges that we would have to eliminate a considerably larger quantity of our arms. What is the situation here?

[Ladygin] Indeed, in mid-1988 the USSR Armed Forces in Europe did have more arms than at present—about 41,500 tanks for example. Over the last two or two and a half years, however, the quantity of arms in Europe was reduced by 20,500 tanks, 19,300 armored vehicles, and 28,400 artillery systems following the implementation of the new defensive doctrine's provisions, the unilateral cutbacks of USSR Armed Forces, and the withdrawal of our troops from East European countries.

Thus, our troops in Europe at present have about 21,000 tanks, 29,600 armored vehicles, and about 14,000 artillery systems coming under the effect of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

[Izgarshev] To sum up, then, whichever way you look at it, the Soviet Union will be cutting back more arms than NATO. Will this not be detrimental to the country's security?

[Ladygin] The correlation of military forces is a relatively simple, even though by no means complete indicator of security. Taking into account the processes now occurring within the Warsaw Pact and the forthcoming change of the nature of this alliance, primarily of its military organization, comparisons are increasingly often focusing not on the overall correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization but between NATO and the USSR. As a result of the treaty's implementation, this correlation will stand at 1.5:1 in tanks and armored combat vehicles, 1.3-1.5:1 in artillery, and 1.3:1 in combat aircraft and strike helicopters. But this correlation, which is to NATO's overall advantage, is not at odds with the criterion of minimal sufficiency for defense based on our defensive doctrine. Of course, in terms of qualitative features, our military equipment should not be inferior to the arms of Western countries' armies.

It must also be borne in mind that, in parallel with the cutbacks of military potentials and the reduction of offensive capabilities, the reliable verification of the status and activity of armed forces virtually rules out any sudden launch of military actions and the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. On the whole, and in the conditions of transition from confrontation to cooperation and creation of a new security system on the European continent, the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is in line with the Soviet Union's interests and

will make it possible to ensure the country's reliable defense, and at a considerably lower cost at that.

[Izgarshev] You are chief of the General Staff directorate that cooperates directly with the relevant USSR Foreign Ministry subdivisions on disarmament questions. What could you say about the claim, made by some foreign and even by some of our own mass media, that contradictions on the package of disarmament problems developed between the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry during the talks, and especially at the concluding stage of the treaty's elaboration? Claims that the Soviet military were holding back the talks by taking extremely rigid positions?

[Ladygin] I must say that we have created a successfully functioning interdepartmental organ to back up the negotiations process. It comprises representatives of not only the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry but also of other interested ministries and departments. Decisions are considered and elaborated collegially. The most important ones are made at the country's top leadership level.

Of course, the discussion of problems arising at the talks is not always smooth, without arguments. But this is a natural process. As a rule, there has always been success in arriving at agreed decisions which have been used as guidance by delegations at the talks. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff not only take into account the fact that the treaty is needed but also consider the country's security, for which they are directly responsible to the Soviet people. The main point is to reach a sensible outcome with the negotiating partners and ensure that it is not detrimental to the state's interests.

[Izgarshev] Could you possibly give an example of such an approach?

[Ladygin] Of course, and quite a recent one at that. In early October this year, during the meeting of the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments, agreement on the question of so-called regional differentiation was reached—contrary to the USSR Ministry of Defense opinion—on the basis of the Western countries' position. This, in our view, would have resulted in weakening our defense capability along the northern and southern flanks and would have involved major material and financial costs in relocating sizeable contingents of troops and arms to the central regions.

This "outcome," which we found unacceptable, was reviewed 7-8 November this year during a regular Soviet-U.S. meeting between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker. At that time, following a decision by the leadership, the Soviet side at the talks on disarmament issues was headed directly by Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff. As a matter of fact, the high-level representation of the Soviet military at these talks not only did not hinder but, on the contrary, actually promoted the

quest for mutually acceptable solutions to all questions demanding professionalism and competence in the military sphere.

[Izgarshev] What lies in store for us in the future? What are the prospects for further talks on disarmament issues?

[Ladygin] The elaboration of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on a 50-percent reduction of USSR and U.S. strategic offensive arms is now at its final stage. Once it is signed, and in line with an accord reached between Presidents M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush, talks will begin on strategic stability and further reductions of strategic offensive arms.

The disarmament process in the sphere of conventional armed forces has not come to an end, either. We advocate continuation of the Vienna talks, to be attended by all 34 states, on further reduction of armed forces and expansion of confidence-building measures. Moreover, their scope must also be expanded to cover additional categories of arms, primarily naval arms.

[Izgarshev] But the United States and some other countries still object to the inclusion of navies on the talks' agenda, since navies are supposedly meant to protect maritime communications of vital importance for the United States and other NATO countries.

[Ladygin] Indeed, this argument is often heard from our Western partners at the talks. But you must agree that means for the protection of maritime communications could also be used to disrupt such communications, which are needed not only by the United States and NATO but also by other countries. The less military hardware to be found along the international shipping lanes, the safer they would be.

But the main point lies elsewhere. NATO has considerable carrier-based forces. The U.S. Navy alone has 15 aircraft carriers armed with more than 1,100 aircraft, more than one-half of which are attack aircraft [udarnyye shturmoviki] and assault fighters [istrebiteli-shturmoviki] designed mainly to deliver strikes, including nuclear weapon strikes, against ground targets at a depth of up to 1,000 km.

In addition to all this, the United States is implementing a large-scale program for the deployment of Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM]. Under the program, it is planned to place about 4,000 SLCM's on approximately 200 surface ships and submarines. Only one missile out of every seven is meant for action against water-surface targets. The rest—almost 3,500 SLCM's—are means to strike against ground targets at a distance of up to 2,600 km with a nuclear charge and up to 1,500 km with a conventional warhead (the range of SLCM's is planned to increase to 5,000 km and 3,000 km respectively in the future). This program is already 50-percent fulfilled—the United States has about 2,000 SLCM's on more than 100 launch vehicles.

[Izgarshev] I think that it must be obvious to everyone: Systems like SLCM's with nuclear warheads and carrier-based aviation are offensive systems for the delivery of mass strikes.

[Ladygin] Of course. It must also be emphasized that whereas the quantity of long-range nuclear SLCM's is limited to 880 units in line with the Soviet-U.S. accord that has been reached, there are still no limitations on long-range high-accuracy cruise missiles with conventional warheads. But there must be such limitations.

The question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is also on the agenda. The Soviet Union is prepared to embark on talks on this problem in the very near future. We are in favor of using stage-by-stage reductions to cleanse the European continent of tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, and the nuclear component of aviations. In this sense, the experience and results of the Paris summit meeting offer prospects for further development of the disarmament process in depth and in breadth. They give hope and additional confidence to the peoples.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chernyshev on Tactical Nuclear Weapons Talks

*LD281112990 Moscow TASS in English 1107 GMT
27 Nov 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 28 (TASS)—In the Paris joint declaration signed by 22 nations the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states welcomed the prospects of new Soviet-American talks on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons. The political, military and psychological changes, which were noted and approved by all parties to the Paris summit, naturally give rise to the problem of tactical nuclear weapons.

It is pertinent to note the following key factors, showing that there is a solid foundation for serious and constructive talks on the reduction of nuclear confrontation at the tactical level.

Firstly, in accordance with the agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states will reduce their destabilising conventional weapons to equal, substantially reduced levels.

Secondly, the radical changes occurring within the Warsaw Treaty will produce in the coming years a vast denuclearised zone, separating the NATO countries from Soviet territory. This is due to the fact that our country will fully withdraw its troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by mid-1991, and from the territory of Germany by 1994. Talks are under way with Poland on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. East European countries do not possess nuclear weapons and there will be no nuclear systems on their territories after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Thirdly, the United States has renounced several provisions of the "flexible reaction" concept, which stipulated the use of short-range nuclear weapons. It announced that the "Lance" tactical missiles and atomic artillery system would not be modernised.

All this warrants the conclusion that it is possible to achieve positive results at future talks. President Gorbachev said in his Paris statement that the USSR proposes to determine jointly the meaning of the term "minimum nuclear containment" and fix the limit, beyond which the nuclear retaliation potential turns into an attack force. Our country is prepared to scrap tactical nuclear state-by-state without dramatising the existing differences on the general role of nuclear weapons.

Will the new talks be easy? Despite the existing solid foundation, there are still a number of difficulties on the road to a new agreement. Problems of reducing tactical nuclear missiles and atomic artillery could be solved rather quickly, it seems. However, the problem of air-borne nuclear missiles may become a "stumbling block". It is difficult to solve this problem, because both sides have many "dual purpose" aircraft, designed to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. We are alarmed by U.S. Plans to deploy 450 new air-borne SRAM-T missiles in Europe.

It remains to be hoped that the cardinally changing military-political situation on the European continent will prompt the pentagon to reconsider its plans to "modernise" air-borne nuclear weapons. After the signing of the medium and shorter-range missiles agreement and the agreement on conventional armaments in Europe, and in light of the possible conclusion in the foreseeable future of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons, it will be hard to explain the European and world public opinion why air-borne nuclear missiles and their carriers constituting an important element of nuclear arsenals, are omitted from the negotiations process.

Solton on Nuclear Deterrence After Paris Summit

*LD2911194590 Moscow World Service in English
1310 GMT 29 Nov 90*

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] We continue commenting on the documents signed during the Paris all-European summit. The joint declaration of 22 countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO approved in the French capital welcomes the prospect of the beginning of Soviet-American talks on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons. These comments are made by Yuriy Solton:

The nuclear deterrent strategy lies at the heart of the NATO military doctrine. Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister, was its strong advocate. The new leadership of Britain will probably change the attitude. In any case, blind adherence to nuclear weapons seems incompatible with the current positive changes in

Europe. At one time it was possible to understand the fears of West Europeans about a possible large-scale Soviet tank attack. But now that a treaty has been signed on the reduction of destabilizing armaments, including tanks, to equal and considerable lower levels between the two alliances, such fears evidently have become groundless. However, the question remains where the nuclear artillery shells will drop.

The current serious changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization will result in the formation of a wide nuclear free zone between NATO countries and the Soviet Union in the next few years. All Soviet troops will be pulled out of Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the middle of next year and from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic by 1994. There will be no Soviet troops in Poland. East European countries don't have nuclear weapons, so with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, there will be no short-range nuclear weapons in that region while the United States is still keeping in Western Europe some 3,500 nuclear bombs, artillery shells, mortars, and outdated Lance missiles. But what for?

Well, Washington has made one very reasonable decision and renounced plans for modernizing land-based short-range nuclear weapons. But it is still thinking of deploying 450 airborne nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Isn't it time to give up this plan too? In general it would be better to decide together what minimal deterrent means and what is the limit after which the nuclear retaliation potential becomes an attack potential.

Speaking at the Paris summit, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested beginning talks on the issue in a month or two. The Soviet Union is ready to do away with short-range nuclear missiles stage by stage without dramatizing the existing differences on the role of nuclear weapons in general. Are the United States and NATO leadership ready for this?

NATO 'Reciprocal Move' to Soviet Initiatives Urged

LD0612200790 Moscow World Service in English
1810 GMT 6 Dec 90

[Text] The NATO Nuclear Planning Group and Defense Planning Committee are holding sessions attended by NATO defense ministers in Brussels, Belgium. Vladislav Kozyakov makes these comments:

The current meeting of NATO defense ministers gives rise to many hopes and it is the first one after the end of the cold war, after the unification of Germany, the signing of the treaty on considerable cuts in conventional armaments in Europe, and after the adoption of a joint declaration of 22 countries at the Paris summit saying that they are no longer adversaries and extend a hand of friendship and partnership to each other. In these conditions it would be reasonable to expect that on their part

the NATO defense ministers will contribute to the transition to new East-West relations, help to further dismantle the military machinery in Europe built in the years of confrontation, begin the transition to political functions of NATO, all the more reason that an exact schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany has been worked out. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is stopping its military activities, which will be announced later this month.

In what spheres can one expect appropriate steps on the part of the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee? One of these aspects is the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet approach to the issue is definite: to begin talks in a month or two and agree on the stage-by-stage elimination of these weapons. Are the NATO countries ready to support such an approach or do they still want to build up short-range air-borne nuclear weapons in Europe as recent reports say? The time has come for NATO to demonstrate a constructive approach to naval armaments, in which the alliance prevails. When the agreement on conventional armaments was concluded the Soviet Union agreed to equal numbers of tanks in Europe in which it had superiority. Why can't NATO now follow suit and agree to equal levels in naval vessels and other naval armaments in the European zone?

Other Soviet initiatives are also waiting for a reciprocal move on the part of NATO. This is true of a general and complete ban on nuclear arms tests, new steps to reduce defense budgets, and concert the defense industry into a civilian one. The current situation is very favorable for solving these and other burning problems, keeping in mind the understandings reached at the recent Paris summit of 34 countries, the expansion of Soviet cooperation with many countries that has manifested itself in the friendship treaties with Germany, Italy, and France.

The Soviet-American relations have reached an unseen height. How will this new situation affect the NATO sessions in Brussels? Will there be progress in the fields in which it is time to agree? We'll know the answers after the completion of the two-day meeting on Friday night.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Problems Around USSR Nuclear Testing Eyed

91WC0022A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Article by V. Litovkin, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Novaya Zemlya. Explosion in the Epicenter of Problems"]

[Text] Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, Moscow—I am standing on the slope of a granite mountain at the entrance to the gallery where a little more than a week ago the "first and last" nuclear explosion this year took place. I felt alarmed and confused.

No, the reason for this was not fear for my life and health—the dosimeter shows nine microroentgens per hour—the radiation level is half what it is in Moscow. Other feelings and other thoughts have come over me.

They include the bitter awareness of the fact that in the current international situation, in which one-third of the planet's population live in countries belonging to the "nuclear club," no barrier has yet been placed in the way of creating more generations of this terrible weapon of destruction, or "deterrent weapon" as they call it, and a unilateral nuclear moratorium is hardly possible.

They include the sincere respect and recognition of the high level of professionalism, the mastery—rare in our day—of the test scientists, miners, and military personnel, who managed to achieve unique purity and scientific effectiveness in the experiment: The charge, which lay two kilometers inside the mountain, which had "withstood" the test of the polar winter, went off precisely according to calculated predictions, produced results which science will be analyzing for a long time to come, and did not do the slightest harm to the natural polar surroundings. The radiation and ecological situation did not change for hundreds and thousands of kilometers around the testing ground.

But still, why was the underground nuclear explosion, which was conducted, as reported in the press, at the decision of the Soviet Government and the Council of Defense under the USSR president, carried out as though on the sly? Neither our neighbors in Northern Europe, nor the local authorities in the oblasts adjacent to the testing grounds, nor even the USSR people's deputies, the people to whom the northern residents gave their mandates to represent their interests in the country's Supreme Soviet, were officially informed about it ahead of time.

None of those who were supposed to monitor to make sure that there was no contamination—the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment—were warned about nuclear tests either. And the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet also lodged a stiff protest about the explosion, considering it a violation of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Why did it happen this way?

The USSR deputy minister of atomic energy and industry, Professor B. Mikhaylov, says:

"The list of organizations and officials who should know about the proposed testing dates and the experiment that was prepared and who should participate in it was strictly limited by special instructions from the Council for Defense. This was done not only to preserve state and military secrecy but also to create normal conditions in the work of the testers so that the necessary safety measures could be provided. If the country's Supreme Soviet considers it necessary to expand the group of these individuals, we are prepared to do that."

In addition to the factors on which the deputy minister focused our attention, in my view, there is another one which is not discussed aloud: The scientists and military personnel were afraid that news of the planned explosion would stir up a storm of public passions, already aroused by radiation phobia, the Chernobyl syndrome, and the long struggle surrounding the Semipalatinsk testing ground.

Thus the explosion on Novaya Zemlya was postponed three times for reasons that were by no means technical or climatic. If they missed the "window" at the end of October which was most favorable in all respects, mainly weather, another one would not come soon. And this means that a large amount of hard and costly work would go down the drain, the program for increasing the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons would fail, and ultimately they could fall behind in strengthening the country's defense potential.

"There is nothing more dangerous to our work than the present lack of certainty," I was told by Captain First Rank V. Dumik, a candidate of technical sciences. "We risk losing more than our professional skills, which took years to acquire; the unique, highly skilled collectives of many thousands of scientists, engineers, military personnel, which cannot be created in a day, could fall apart; and the main thing is that we might not develop a reliable replacement for those who created nuclear parity and deterrent weapons."

Look, I was told by military experts on Novaya Zemlya, it was only in September of this year that the American Senate ratified the 1974 treaty between our countries concerning limitation of underground testing of nuclear weapons, but even then they imposed a number of conditions. Among them was this: Nuclear testing will be continued, and national laboratories will be fully provided with all the necessary financing for carrying out the nuclear programs. Our committees of the Supreme Soviet did not even invite specialists from the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry when they ratified this treaty and they did not listen to their opinions and arguments. American expenditures on the nuclear arms complex are growing by 8-10 percent from year to year and ours are decreasing by 15 percent. Because of this we cannot even create normal housing and living conditions for the people working at the Novaya Zemlya testing ground.

I have seen the white tin-plated houses of our scientists and military personnel in the village of Severnyy on the shore of Matochkin Shar Bay where the windows are covered with slabs of logs so that the glass and frames are not blown in by the wind and snow. I have gone into the rooms of dormitories where the program leaders live during the experiment—and it sometimes lasts a month or two—and even there icicles are hanging from the ceilings.

Of course, one should not be surprised about this—it is the Arctic. Something else is surprising: Why is the

existence of our people here, the way they feel, surrounded as it was before by the icy cold of indifference.

"In past years," I was told by a member of the State Commission for Conducting Nuclear Testing, candidate of technical sciences K. Danilenko, "a steamboat would come up to the dock and we would live on it. This year—there is not enough money for that."

We also met with miners from the city of Zheltyye Vody in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, and when they have temporary duty on Novaya Zemlya they live much better than the test scientists do—they live in warm hotels built out of stone, and they create new galleries for future experiments in the granite cliffs. But even they complain about how cold it is in the transportation that brings them to work, the ill-considered wages, and the small amount of leisure time in front of the television set...

I listened to them and I thought, after all, they intend to invite American scientists here to the village of Severnyy in a year or two in return for their visit to the testing ground in Nevada. What can we show them besides the unique diagnostic equipment and the extremely high level of professionalism of our testers—this village forgotten by everyone amid the heaps of rusting scrap metal on the shore?!

And here is what else I thought about when standing in front of the gallery where the nuclear explosion took place a week ago. Many problems which we somehow had not thought about previously came together here. We must not only know what they are but we must also solve them.

It is possible and necessary, of course, to argue, discuss, and ultimately determine the deadlines and decide who should warn whom about the next nuclear experiment and when they should be warned. We can and should consider and make a decision about whether or not we need nuclear arms. If so, what kind and how many? If not, what paths should we take toward disarmament, toward a complete and final halting of tests, and how should we enlist all members of the "nuclear club" in this process, and especially the United States? But one thing is quite obvious today. It is time to clearly determine and for the country's Supreme Soviet to legitimize the state policy with respect to this question. Whether the Union should adopt a nuclear testing program for a year, five years, or a longer period, including underground testing. And, of course, it is necessary, based on present-day requirements, to improve the conditions and procedure for interaction among scientists, military personnel, and the local authorities in preparing for, conducting, and monitoring the implementation of decisions in the sphere of defense and security.

Such a program and such a "code of behavior" should apparently be adopted by a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security and approved by the president, and all organizations and officials included in this

process should be informed of it, including representatives of the local authorities.

The new people's authorities want and demand to be respected and taken into account. This is their absolute, legitimate right, and it must be observed unwaveringly. But it should be the duty of these authorities as well to do everything possible so that the people who defend these authorities, those who have created and are improving the country's nuclear shield, are confident that their cause is right and that they have no need of anything. Only then will it probably be possible to extinguish the passions surrounding the explosions on the nuclear testing grounds.

Comparison of 16 Nov Defense Ministry Statement

PM1611144790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 16 November 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 4 a USSR Defense Ministry Press Center statement. The PRAVDA item, entitled "Nuclear Weapons Tested," has been compared with the translation of the Moscow TASS International Russian version published on page 30 of JPRS-TAC-90-032 of 29 November 1990 under the headline "U.S., British, French Nuclear Tests Criticized" revealing the following variations:

Page 1, column one, PRAVDA omits the dateline and introductory paragraph.

Second paragraph, second sentence PRAVDA reads: ...was to develop new nuclear munitions. The.... (adding "new" and picking up third sentence)

Third paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA ends: ...other nuclear powers.

[Signed] USSR Defense Ministry Press Center (adding signatory)

Defense Ministry Notes French Nuclear Test 21 Nov

LD2211210290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 22 Nov 90

[Statement by the USSR Defense Ministry's Press Center—place and date not given]

[Text] On 21 November, a second underground nuclear explosion this month was carried out at the French Pacific test site on Mururoa atoll. This indicates the continuation of work to improve French nuclear weapons. In all, France has carried out 182 nuclear tests—45 of them in the atmosphere and 137 underground.

This year, the nuclear powers have carried out 18 nuclear tests. The United States has conducted nine explosions, France six, China two, and the USSR one.

Semipalatinsk Nuclear Tests To End in 1993

*LD0412143190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1230 GMT 4 Dec 90*

[From the "television news service" program]

[Text] According to reports from Alma-Ata, a decision has been made to cease nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk as of January 1993. In the next two years, 19 tests are to be carried out at the testing ground.

Kazakh Legislators Reaffirm Nuclear Tests Ban

*LD0612165590 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT
6 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondent Konstantin Borodinov]

[Text] Alma-Ata, December 6 (TASS)—The Kazakh parliament has reaffirmed its firm position on a nuclear tests ban. The parliament took a decision banning nuclear explosions and tests of all types of weapons of mass destruction at the Semipalatinsk test range and elsewhere in the republic.

It also appealed to the Soviet Government to speed up payment of indemnities and benefits to the population of the republic, which has been exposed to nuclear tests for many years.

The republican Supreme Soviet made this demand for the first time in May. Now, six months later, the second session demanded that the Kazakh government report on the fulfillment of its decision. An acrimonious debate resulted in a new categoric demand.

During debates it was stressed that tensions, far from diminishing, are exacerbating. Dissatisfaction, especially among the local population, is caused primarily by the Soviet Government's failure to take effective measures to compensate for the harm done to people's health over many years of nuclear tests and delay in taking a decision to ban tests at the test range.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Examined**

*91WC0026B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Nov 90 Union Edition p 5*

[Report by V. Mikheyev: "The Operation Was Successful"]

[Text] Sydney—They have begun to destroy American chemical weapons shipped from the FRG.

According to a report from the Australian news agency AAP, two transport ships from Germany carrying 100,000 tons of chemical munitions have completed their many months-long trip and delivered their cargo to the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

The ships did not have to withstand any hurricanes, which are frequent at these latitudes, did not lose any of their cargo, and there were no leaks; in a word, American Army Colonel J. Bushong had every reason to say that "the operation went exceptionally smoothly" and precisely on schedule. Until 1994 all the chemical potential now located on the Johnston Atoll—and this amounts to 300,000 charges—left over from World War II and intended for "smoking out" the Japanese from the Pacific Ocean Islands they had taken, which never came to pass, was to be destroyed in four specially constructed furnaces here.

The pipes of this unique crematorium are already smoking. True, with almost regular interruptions caused by forced shutdowns. Inspections and repeat inspections of the technical reliability of the equipment follow one after another. Since the complex was started up this summer it has been shut down six times. The cause is the supersensitive gauges that go into operation. True, as it turns out each time, all the alarms are false, but still they have disrupted all the plans. As of 21 November, of the 10,000 units of ammunition earmarked for destruction during the first four months, less than one-third—3,300—have been eliminated. The "net time" the complex has operated is less than three weeks.

This pressing issue recently brought a representative group of journalists from a number of countries to the Johnston Atoll, a total of more than 70 people who conducted a somewhat independent investigation.

The emissaries from the largest publications and television companies looked over the reinforced concrete bunkers filled from floor to ceiling with weapons containing gases, the complicated system for ventilation and monitoring possible leaks, and the furnaces themselves; in brief, the entire gigantic plant, whose construction cost \$280 million. Officials explained to them that their main concern was not to allow the slightest amount of the harmful wastes to enter the atmosphere.

At a meeting with the heads of state and governments of the Pacific Ocean region, U.S. President G. Bush announced that the activity of the crematorium on the Johnston Atoll "will not lead to harm to the environment."

Prospects for CW Destruction Examined

*PM271114790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Nov 90 Union Edition p 4*

[Interview with Professor Major General I. Yevstafyev, chief of a directorate at the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops, by V. Litovkin, under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Chemical Weapons: How Should They be Destroyed"—place and date not given; first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] Almost five months ago, the U.S. and USSR presidents signed the Agreement on the Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on Measures

To Promote a Multilateral Convention on Their Total Prohibition in Washington. Their elimination should begin in 1992. How will this process proceed, what difficulties will have to be overcome in order to abandon for ever one of the most terrifying types of weapons?

Professor Major General I. Yevstafyev, chief of a directorate at the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops, answered our correspondent's questions.

[Litovkin] Igor Borisovich, it is well known that our country has stockpiled more chemical weapons than anyone else—almost 40,000 tonnes—and we still lack plants for their large-scale destruction. Will we be capable of honoring the pledges we have given?

[Yevstafyev] This question worries us as well. The decision to elaborate a State Program for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons was adopted a year ago. There were 18 ministries and departments involved in this work, and the Defense Ministry was put in overall charge. By 1 April we had submitted a draft program to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which we had substantiated and worked out several options for the destruction of toxic substances. But no decision has been made to this day.

[Litovkin] What are the main difficulties?

[Yevstafyev] The choice of an area, acceptable to everyone, where facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons can be sited. This poses no problem from the technical point of view. Virtually any region would be suitable. But there are also economic and primarily social and psychological obstacles. The population is angrily protesting the setting up of such facilities. This is what happened in Chapayevsk, in Kambarka, and elsewhere.

[Litovkin] You can see people's point: It is not all that easy to overcome the Chernobyl or Kirishi syndrome. And how about the recent accidents at plants where explosives are produced?! It would probably make sense to heed the sober voices and site potentially dangerous facilities in the desert, in the tundra, or on islands in the ocean?

[Yevstafyev] Military chemical engineers have absolutely nothing to do with these accidents and disasters. We have never given any ground for doubts about our professionalism. About islands?.. Alas, in economic terms, such a task would be beyond our country's capabilities. Communications, energy sources, and more or less acceptable conditions for normal life by people engaged in production units are lacking in both the tundra and the desert. And it would be virtually impossible to create such an infrastructure within a limited time period.

[Litovkin] So, where is the way out?

[Yevstafyev] I will not talk about comprehensive enlightenment of the population or its technical education. Take France for example—with an identical quantity of

nuclear power stations and nuclear reactors, and a density of population that is tenfold the figure for our country, nobody is protesting against [as published] the closure of these stations. All efforts are aimed at enhancing operations quality and improving safety... But let us leave this problem aside. In today's sociopolitical conditions, it would probably be not so easy to "change people's minds."

I would like to say something else. All the possible options for solving the problem could be reduced to three main ones: To destroy chemical weapons directly at the places where they are stored; to create two regional centers for their elimination, one of which should be based on existing facilities for the production of chemical substances; and to build a single state center for the destruction of chemical weapons with a complete technological cycle.

Each of these options has its positive and negative aspects. Let us analyze the first. We perceive it as the most complex. After all, there are more than 10 million persons living either inside the zones where toxic substances are stored or within a radius of 100 km around them. In order to observe all the necessary conditions for ensuring their safety—should this option be adopted—we will need capital investments totaling about 1.1 billion rubles (R) and including R730 million for construction and installation work, together with the expropriation of 24,000 hectares of land, the recruitment of 6,000-7,000 service personnel, and the creation of normal conditions for their life.

There are other difficulties which render this option expensive, time consuming, and more theoretical than practical.

In my view, the second option is the most acceptable one. It is expedient from numerous points of view. First, it is quite economical. It will require only R540 million by way of capital investment, together with R100 million for the upgrading of railroads and the ensuring of safety during transportation. Incidentally, the experience of the transportation of U.S. toxic substances across FRG territory showed that, given the appropriate conditions, accidents can be ruled out.

Second, we will not require that many new specialists; the "old hands"—familiar with the work at chemical production units, highly experienced in dealing with potentially dangerous substances, and mentally attuned to handling them—will be of invaluable assistance to us all.

[Litovkin] But the main point evidently concerns not just people's mental attitude and their experience. In my view, the main factors are an absolutely safe technology and production standards.

[Yevstafyev] Without any doubt. And we do have them. The press, including IZVESTIYA, has carried detailed reports on the two-tier technology, elaborated by the Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining

Industry, for the destruction of organophosphorus toxic substances and the conversion [prevrashcheniye] of lewisite into high-purity arsenic suitable for use in the national economy.

Completely new nontraditional methods for the destruction of toxic substances are also being developed by several USSR Academy of Sciences scientific institutes. Including methods using fluid jet propulsion motors, nuclear explosion energy, and microbiology. The method of pumping reaction masses deep inside geological formations also appears highly promising. There are also other options.

I can assert something with utmost accuracy, and it is that—given sufficient resources—our country could create within two or three years methods for the destruction of toxic substances which could enable the state to save hundreds of millions of rubles.

[Litovkin] What prevents you from starting this work right away?

[Yevstafyev] The vagueness and the delays in the adoption of a state program for the destruction of chemical weapons. This gives rise to numerous problems which are insoluble at present. For example, the USSR Council of Ministers set our 1990-1991 financial limits on the basis of cutbacks in purchases of antichemical protection means for the Army and Navy. These sums are clearly insufficient for the creation of a scientific and technical base for the elimination of toxic substances.

Overall, the state program's implementation will require about R2.5 billion, even though it is obvious right now that the actual costs will be higher still. They are in excess of \$3 billion in the United States. In 1991 alone we will need R100 million to begin our work, and we do not have this money.

I think that the time has come to realize that this is a false economy. In view of the program's state importance, scale, and ongoing effect—as you know, it is due for completion in the 21st century—it should be financed on a targeted basis, from the state budget.

[Litovkin] The way I see it, any delay in the adoption of these decisions could thwart the agreement's fulfillment on schedule. What needs to be done immediately in order to avoid it being thwarted?

[Yevstafyev] In my view, there is just one way out: To set up a special government commission which will select specific sites for the building of facilities for the destruction of toxic substances. It must be vested with powers enabling it to resolve at the same time questions concerning the improvement of social and daily life conditions for the population in these regions and the building of schools, kindergartens, hospitals, and cultural and education facilities, as well as to fully ensure their supplies of foodstuffs and industrial products.

I think that this commission's membership should automatically include USSR people's deputies, deputies to

local soviets in the regions where construction is planned, and representatives of the Russian parliament which has still not responded to our worries in any way. After all, it is obvious that the facilities will have to be built on Russia's territory, where the main bases for the storage of toxic substances are located and where the main chemical production units are sited.

It is also necessary to look into the question of possibly purchasing from the United States equipment for the destruction of lewisite using U.S. technology, or having Western firms build such a facility on a "turnkey" basis. Such a solution—priced at tens of millions of dollars—will have to be adopted unless the country finds the resources for fulfilling the agreements signed by the president.

It seems to me that it is time we all realized that externally effective political solutions in the disarmament sphere and the destruction of chemical and other weapons demand appropriate organizational, economic, and social measures for their implementation, costs running into billions. They will have to be implemented in a complex sociopolitical and economic situation.

No, this process cannot be halted under any circumstances. Seeing that we have taken on such a noble and important task, it is necessary to ensure that it is implemented at a high state level, that it is profoundly thought out and comprehensively backed up. There is no other way.

Spokesman Notes Importance of Chemical Arms Talks

*LD2711184890 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT
27 Nov 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Oleg Polyakovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, November 27 (TASS)—The Soviet Union "attaches great importance" to Soviet-U.S. talks on a chemical weapons ban, which resumed in Geneva on November 27, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

Churkin noted that the second round of the talks is being "held at a moment when there exist good opportunities to move towards the signing of a multilateral convention and when military opposition in Europe is easing". Churkin welcomed the pullout of U.S. chemical weapons from Germany, saying it was "a real manifestation" of the easing of military tension.

Churkin said during the talks the sides are expected to complete the elaboration of a protocol on inspections to the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the annihilation and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to promote a multinational convention on a ban on chemical weapons. The protocol was signed in Washington on June 1, 1990.

In order to speed up work on the draft, the sides are expected to discuss unresolved issues in multilateral talks to work out a convention on a ban of chemical weapons.

Churkin said the sides will hold regular consultations during talks on cooperation in the annihilation of chemical weapons, which should help implement the Soviet-U.S. agreement "by the most effective, secure and ecologically safe way".

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

'Leveling' of NATO, Warsaw Pact Naval Forces Urged

*LD2711160590 Moscow TASS in English 1537 GMT
27 Nov 90*

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 27 (TASS)—During the ratification of the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, signed in Paris, I think a number of important matters will arise. The question of naval forces is sure to be one of them.

The CFE treaty ensures deep cuts in the conventional arms of land and air forces, thereby establishing a balance between the two military and political alliances in these areas at lower levels.

Is it fair to leave the third component of the armed forces completely untouched? Only a comprehensive evaluation makes it possible to determine the overall correlation of the military potentials of countries and blocs. The armed forces are an integral whole, in which land forces, the air force and the navy cooperate with one another, complement and reinforce one another.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the North Atlantic Alliance has a considerable edge over the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in naval combat aircraft and in the number of large surface ships, including aircraft carriers and air-capable ships.

The Warsaw Treaty has a certain edge in submarines with missile-and-torpedo armaments. Therefore it would be logical, in light of the CFE treaty, to set about levelling the naval capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organisation, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's position on the issue is consistent and definite. Keeping to the integrity of the disarmament process, it is inadmissible to leave naval forces outside the framework of negotiations.

One should be guided in this respect by the concept of the non-offensive defence. The Soviet Union favours excluding, at last, the possibility of a sudden attack or large-scale offensive operations on the seas.

I would like to note that certain signs of a change in approach to the naval arms issue have appeared in the U.S. Congress in recent months.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July adopted a special provision to a draft military budget for the 1991 fiscal year. It recommends that the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency finalise by February 1, 1991, the preparation of a report to congress on limiting naval arms, including nuclear ones.

Reassuring signs are also provided by Pentagon plans envisaging renunciation of the scheme to increase U.S. naval strength up to 600 combatant ships and even a certain reduction in the existing fleets.

However, it seems to me that it is time the above-mentioned plans were supplemented by a decision to begin talks on reducing and limiting naval forces.

Extension of CSBM's to Naval, Air Forces Urged

*LD0312121990 Moscow TASS in English 1159 GMT
3 Dec 90*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, December 3 (TASS)—A new stage of talks on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM's] in Europe have begun in Vienna. What tasks face the participants? I believe one of the key areas of their work is to, relying on agreements reached at the pan-European summit in Paris, to ensure new thrust and openness in the military-political sphere in Europe.

The Conventional Arms Treaty signed in Paris provides an opportunity to achieve a balance in such an important component of the modern armed forces as ground forces.

This caused special alarm among Western partners.

The Soviet Union made a great step forward towards the West in tackling many important problems, linked with ground forces and strengthening stability on the continent.

At the same time, in conditions when ground forces in Europe are being reduced, the destabilising role of other components of the armed forces is increasing.

It is now absolutely logical to make confidence building measures universal in nature.

This is why it is expedient, and I would say just, as the next step to apply transparency and confidence building measures to all the armed forces of participants in the talks.

There is a firm conviction in the Soviet Union that at the current state of the forum the proliferation of confidence-building measures on naval activities in waters surrounding Europe should have key importance.

SOVIET UNION

JPRS-TAC-90-034
19 December 1990

Can this problem be ignored when devising a qualitatively new set of confidence building and security measures?

To avoid this issue is to seek advantage for the side which already has superiority. And, as is known, the advantage in the sphere of naval forces is on the side of the North Atlantic Alliance.

This means that with a lack of progress in this direction the USSR's concern over the closeness of NATO naval activities will remain.

Moscow approaches the proliferation of confidence building measures on the military activities of air forces in Europe from similar positions.

The preparation of serious measures to limit military activities on the European continent and near-by seas should be another major subject at the talks.

Unfortunately, the sides failed to reach notable progress at previous talks and at the Paris meeting.

At the same time, the logic of developments in Europe confirms the conclusion that limitations are an effective means for strengthening trust between member-states, especially during the transition from a confrontation between pacts to a common continental expanse.

Hopefully, all participants in the talks will realise their responsibility for further progress at the Vienna forum,

for a reasonable and logical setting of new directions in strengthening the transparency and limiting military activities on the continent.

There is very little time—less than one and a half years—left until the meeting of the 34 members of the CSCE in Helsinki in spring 1992.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Medvedev Cited on Soviet Asian Troop Cuts

*LD2211090190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0730 GMT 22 Nov 90*

[Text] The Soviet Union has proposed to the United States and Japan that talks should be started on disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region and confrontation brought to an end.

Speaking at a meeting with businessmen in Seoul, Vadim Medvedev, member of the Presidential Council, declared the willingness of the Soviet Union to cut its armed forces in Asia by 200,000 men and to reduce considerably the naval forces in the Pacific Ocean region.

Speaking about relations with South Korea, Medvedev indicated the interest of the Soviet side in involving South Korean capital and technology in developing the natural resources of the Soviet Far East.

FRANCE

Rafale To Have Nuclear Deterrent Mission

91ES0167B Paris *LE MONDE* in French 31 Oct 90
p 11

[Article by J.I.: "Chevenement Confirms Rafale Will Carry Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Dassault's Rafale will be an airborne "vector" of the French nuclear deterrent, i.e. it will carry a nuclear-tipped air-to-ground missile. Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement made the announcement on Monday 29 October at the Saint-Cloud (Hauts-de-Seine) manufacturing facility, where the first prototype of the production version of the Rafale had just come out of the workshop. To date, four of the five prototypes initially envisioned have been ordered by the government. Now that the work at Saint-Cloud is finished, the Rafale-C-01 prototype will be disassembled and removed to Istres (Bouches-du-Rhone), where it will be reassembled for its first flight in March 1991.

This is the first time the defense minister has publicly said that the Rafale, which will be used by the Air Force and naval aviation, "will also have a nuclear deterrence mission." Mr. Chevenement thus confirmed earlier statements (*LE MONDE* of 16 March) made by the program director of the General Delegation for Armaments (DGA) and high-level authorities in the Strategic Air Force command (FAS).

According to the minister, "the Rafale will shoulder the whole gamut of air defense and tactical support missions—attack, reconnaissance and fire—in all naval aviation and Air Force theatres of operation. It will also have a nuclear deterrence mission. The Rafale should have the broadest possible multirole capability and be able to handle all aspects of modern combat."

Mr. Chevenement also indicated that the nuclear weapon to be carried initially by the Rafale will be the ASMP (medium-range air-to-ground) missile with which the Mirage-IV P and Mirage-2000 N are already equipped: an air-borne missile with a 300-kiloton nuclear warhead (20 times the power of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima) capable of independent flight over distances of 100 to 300 km (depending on the altitude at which it is released from the airplane). Later on, the minister suggested, the Rafale might carry "a long-distance air-to-ground nuclear missile"—the proposed ASLP that would have a range in excess of 1,000 km. Mr. Chevenement noted that development of the ASLP would first have to be approved by the head of state, the government and parliament.

British Cooperation

Great Britain may participate in that nuclear program if it wants the missile for its Tornado aircraft. Mr. Chevenement and his British counterpart, Mr. Tom King, discussed the possibilities last week in London. There

are differences over the proposed development schedule. But France (which is in less of a hurry than its partner) could agree to move faster than its current nuclear modernization plans require, thus satisfying the concerns of the United Kingdom (which is keen to have a Franco-British ASLP in service by the year 2002).

At Saint-Cloud, the defense minister emphasized "the continuity and consistency of the French development effort" in this field. He urged the builders of the Rafale "not to rest on their laurels," since "the fundamental task is the search for better cost-effectiveness and the absolute necessity of containing development costs." Finally, he exhorted them "to do even more to hold down production costs" and to avoid any "unnecessary perfectionism or cost overruns."

For 1991, the government expects to put Fr4 billion into the Air Force and Navy budgets to support the various manufacturers involved in Rafale's development. In all, development and industrialization of the Rafale will cost an estimated Fr40 billion, one-fourth of which must be financed by the builders concerned. The first Rafales to come off the production line will be operational in 1997. The Air Force plans to order 250 of them, while naval aviation wants 86.

GERMANY

Scale of Ex-NVA Munitions Disposal Detailed

91GE0078A Bonn *WEHRTECHNIK* in German Oct 90
pp 76-77

[Article by Erhard Heckmann: "Munitions Disposal in the NVA [National People's Army]"]

[Text] In mid-August, at the invitation of the "Technical Disarmament" Department of the Ministry for Disarmament and Defense of the GDR, representatives of industrial firms of the FRG and of the former contract armament firms of the GDR met in Strausberg for the purpose of a briefing by representatives of the National People's Army [NVA] on the type and amount of munitions stocked by the NVA. An additional objective—it was hoped—was to discuss possible solutions to the disposal problem and to lay the groundwork for an industrial cooperation between East and West.

To get to the point without further ado: Stored in the GDR are 300,000 tons of munitions of various types, which must be stored, maintained, and disposed of. Peace has now reigned for 40 years in Europe, a peace marked by East-West confrontation, during which munitions were produced and stockpiled, even though in the West the NATO goal of a 28-day combat supply was, for many types of munitions, never attained. Not for a long time has there been this extended a period of peace, and it is this fact that has created the following problem: A production period of 40 years, on the one hand, is opposed by an average munitions storage capacity of 25

years, on the other. The problem of munitions destruction—without firing them at human beings and without harming the environment—has so far never come up. The whole problem complex of protecting and preserving the environment is now joined by munitions disposal as the most critical and most difficult, possibly also the costliest, neutralization of war materials. In the case of the munitions stockpiles of the NVA, the physical security of the existing depots is a critical problem, for only in this way can these hazardous "consumer goods" be prevented from falling into the wrong hands. The NVA representatives therefore spoke with concern about this problem area—especially since many conscripts are assigned to guard duties at depots, then claim after a few months to be conscientious objectors and go home. Additional problems are the across-the-board dismissal of NVA members who are over 55 years old and the deactivation of military units, which have resulted in a scarcity of trained personnel such as engineers and ordnance technicians.

The munitions of the NVA—including, among other things, missiles, grenades, explosives, and flare sets—are both centrally and locally stored. A greater centralization—which would simplify the security problem—is not possible for lack of available storage space and because of the security regulations in effect. Of special concern are the pyrotechnic munitions because of their shorter storage life and the danger of spontaneous firing.

The munitions consumers in the NVA are the commanders of the Missile and Military Technology Service, of the Air and Air Defense Forces, of the People's Navy, of the Combat Engineers, and of the Chemical Services.

The overall supply of munitions in the NVA—as mentioned above—is circa 300 kilotons. Of these, circa 45 kilotons are explosives. The investment value of these supplies is approximately 13 billion German marks [DM]. Based on past experiences and careful estimates, the costs of disposing of these munitions is estimated at 1 billion to 1.4 billion DM.

What Disposal Method Is To Be Used?

A certain amount of information has already been gathered from past experience about the disposal of munitions in the NVA, but the procedures used can hardly be

applied because of environmental protection considerations and the relevant time-frames. These are as follows:

- Annealing of cartridges and munitions components,
- Detonation at firing ranges,
- Combustion of explosive charges in projectiles,
- Firing munitions from weapons systems,
- Open-air combustion.

Environmentally friendly, to be sure, are procedures such as

- Fusing of explosives,
- Removal of compressed explosives,
- Disassembly of munitions; but these cannot be applied to all types of munitions, however, and they require the subsequent disposal of the explosives. The munitions stocks of the NVA are given in the accompanying table. What is remarkable are the many different types of munitions, a result of the fact that they stem not only from the NVA but also from workers' militia forces, border troops, the Ministry for State Security, and other security organs. What is required, therefore, are industrial disposal capabilities on the territory of the present-day GDR. To be included in this process are the munitions plants still in existence in the GDR and the munitions facilities utilized by the NVA. With the creation of a suitable infrastructure, further scientific exploration of the disposal problem also becomes essential. From the standpoint of the NVA, the following are perceived as the focal points:

- Handling of explosives and hazardous chemical substances;
- Treatment and subsequent utilization of such residual products as heavy metal compounds, oxides of nitrogen, etc.;
- Further utilization by the civilian sector of the explosives obtained;
- Further utilization of internal components as well as packing materials.

Munitions Stocks of the NVA

Munitions Category	Number of Munitions Types	Total Quantity (in tons)
Infantry Weapons	92	58,600
Artillery and Mortars	87	52,900
Rocket Launchers	6	23,600
Air Defense Artillery and Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Artillery	17	21,800
Tanks, APC's [Armored Personnel Carriers], Infantry Combat Vehicles	63	66,000
Antitank Weapons	12	18,000
Antitank Guided Missiles	8	1,500

Munitions Stocks of the NVA (Continued)

Munitions Category	Number of Munitions Types	Total Quantity (in tons)
Short-Range Air Defense Guided Missiles	4	500
Hand Grenades	9	8,000
Other Munitions Components	25	3,000
Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	3	4,378
Of these, 750 short-range missiles with 900 kg of explosives, 200 medium-range missiles with 1,700 kg of explosives, and 130 long-range missiles with 7,000 kg of explosives.		
Air-to-Air Guided Missiles (total of 17,564)	10	2,429
Air-to-Surface Guided Missiles (total of 711)	7	406
Unguided Rockets (177,346 small and 473 large)	8	1,656
Bombs	15	1,290
Onboard Munitions	5	886
Ship's Artillery and Air Defense Systems	5	2,909
Naval Mines	6	2,208
Depth Charges	2	1,785
Large-Capacity Charges/components (850,000 AT [Antitank] Mines)	5	685
Combat Engineer Munitions (500,000 Off-Route Antitank Missiles, 100,000 Cutting and Shaped Charges)	66	16,000
Flare Sets:		
Illumination and Signal Means	68	6,000
Smoke Generating Units	3	760
Other Smoke Units	6	138
Total	532	295,430

For munitions types and flare sets which exist only in relatively small numbers, a disposal outside the GDR is planned as well.

Competitive bids are planned for the disposal of munitions. The following conditions are to be observed in this disposal:

1. Destruction to begin as soon as possible.
2. Implementation to take place on the territory of the present-day GDR.
3. Labor to be provided primarily by what is currently the NVA (social component).
4. Complete and non-indemnified destruction of all materials and their sales.
5. Acceptance of the military materiel on no more than a zero-cost basis.

The Missile and Weapons-Technical Service of the NVA maintains its own laboratory where it also examines the composition of munitions by age, technical structure, and security regulations. The first steps toward an ecological disposal have been taken. According to findings made thus far, the propellant charges are in a safe condition. There are 85 types of fuzes, with only short-range antiaircraft missiles being equipped with electronic fuzes, however. A melting facility was put into

operation in the year 1984, and 2,900 tons of 21 types of munitions were processed in 1990. With respect to surface-to-air missiles, 90 percent are imports, most of them from the USSR. Technical documentation is nonexistent. Nor was such documentation ever requested, since no production under license was planned. Here a precise analysis of the composition would be necessary prior to destruction. The munitions, without exception, are safe to transport and handle. The sequence of disposal would be dictated by the end of the storage stability, and here no action needs to be taken until 1993.

Munitions of the Air Force

All guided missiles and unguided rockets, all aircraft bombs, aircraft armament, and pyrotechnic munitions are imported, 95 percent of them from the Soviet Union. For their handling and storage, Soviet directives apply. The munitions are hermetically packed in special containers. Of these, 35 percent are assigned to the "aircraft technology" branch, i.e., they are not yet stored at wing-level depots. Their total mass is 6,667 tons. The NVA has at its disposal 17,564 air-to-air missiles of ten different types and a total weight of 2,429 tons, 711 air-to-surface missiles of seven types with a total weight of 406 tons, 177,346 small unguided rockets of eight types and a total weight of 1,656 tons, 473 large unguided rockets, 15 types of air-dropped bombs with a

WEST EUROPE

weight of 1,290 tons, and five types of onboard aircraft ammunition with a weight of 886 tons.

With respect to air defense missiles, the NVA has at its disposal 750 short-range missiles with a total of 900 kg of explosives, 200 medium-range surface-to-air missiles with 1,700 kg of explosives, and 130 long-range missiles with 7 tons of explosives. Aircraft armament ammunition of calibers up to 37 mm has a mechanical impact fuze and a provision for self-destruction. The warheads of the surface-to-air missiles can only be destroyed by blowing them up, since no documentation exists. Initial disposal efforts were made in Poland with antiship guided missiles.

Combat engineer munitions include 850,000 antitank mines, 500,000 off-route antitank missiles, and 100,000 cutting and shaped charges. The arsenal of engineering munitions also includes antipersonnel mines such as bouncing mines and other similar mines. Engineer munitions are in part produced domestically and in part imported from the USSR, the CSFR, Bulgaria, and Poland. The explosive used is primarily TNT. Engineer weapons are divided into hazard groups and transport hazard groups.

Among industrial firms in the FRG, the Buck firm has taken a lead position, and began already some time ago to address the problem of munitions disposal and to make suitable contacts in the GDR.

Dr Volk of the Fraunhofer Institute said the following with respect to the thermal decomposition of munitions: "...By thermal decomposition, by burning at ambient temperature and burning under higher pressure, i.e., by utilizing calorimetric bombs, and by detonation. All emotional argumentation notwithstanding, it is a fact that expending the explosives by means of practice firing is ecologically considerably more gentle than burning them, by a ratio of 1:5,000 per shot." Dr Magenheimer of the Buck firm spoke of the difficulties posed by legal directives for the disposal of munitions. A quick munitions disposal/destruction program cannot be reckoned with, since the process of getting approval for disposal facilities takes between 12 and 16 months to complete, and, according to him, there is no disposal plan in existence for dealing with magnitudes such as 75,000 tons of TNT.

Dr Schmidt of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm [MBB], Schrobenhausen, spoke about a concept of confined burning and purification of the exhaust gases through afterburning in a liquid iron bath. In doing so, he put forward a practical proposal for the erection of a disposal center in the GDR, where the structures, facilities, transportation means, and personnel would be provided locally, and MBB would take care of the financing, the know-how, the management, the technology, and the logistics.

Also on the lookout for partners in the GDR for the purpose of working out a disposal plan within a short time is the firm Rheinmetall.

Industrial enterprises of the GDR—most of them contract firms of the defense and economics ministries—especially bemoaned the fact that all orders were cancelled as of 30 September. The firm Inpar Pinnow GmbH (Inpar=Instandsetzungs- und Lizenzproduktionswerk von Lenkwaffen [Repair and Licensed Production Plant for Guided Weapons]), for example, had 1,600 employees; total sales last year were DM350 million, with sales for another DM88 million being realized this year; orders for the second half of the year totaled DM30 million; what was immediately directed was an abbreviated working schedule for 1,400 employees. Not mentioned during the meeting was the fact that GDR contract firms, like almost all industrial firms in the GDR, are overmanned and were forced to take on support tasks for extended-service NVA members and other security forces. What most of these firms have in common, as well, is that they have considerable real estate at their disposal.

A new expression to replace the hackneyed word "conversion" was heard from the chemical plant Kaden: one spoke of a "redefinition."

Soviet Troop Withdrawal To Continue as Planned

LD0512153290 Hamburg DPA in German 1409 GMT
5 Dec 90

[Text] Potsdam (DPA)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former GDR will continue "according to plan: this year and next year. This was announced to journalists today by the deputy commander in chief of the Western Group of the Soviet forces, Lieutenant General Michael Kalinin.

Of the 20,000 soldiers to be withdrawn this year, 70 percent have already returned to the Soviet Union. In addition, 1,000 tanks, 2,000 vehicles, and another 2,000 "pieces of equipment" have been withdrawn. Kalinin could not say how many soldiers will be withdrawn in 1991. He confirmed that more than 80 soldiers have deserted this year, 24 of them—apparently before 3 October—to the West.

U.S. Nuclear Bombs To Remain in Country

LD0612181890 Hamburg DPA in German 1752 GMT
6 Dec 90

[Excerpt] Brussels (DPA)—The Federal Republic will remain in the future a country for the stationing of U.S. nuclear bombs. This emerged from German delegation circles at the autumn meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels on Thursday. There are no differences of opinion on this in the Bonn government coalition either. There is no intention to seek a new argument with the United States on this issue. [passage omitted]

Reduction of Short-Range Missiles Called For

AU0812173190 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Dec 90 p 5

[“fy.” report: “NATO Autumn Conference in Brussels”]

[Excerpts] Brussels, 6 December—On Thursday [6 December] in Brussels, Defense Minister Stoltenberg briefed his NATO colleagues on Germany's interest in the speedy beginning of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the complete reduction of short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery in Europe. The occasion was the autumn conference of the alliance. As Stoltenberg affirmed, Germany's wish meets with general agreement within NATO. A relevant statement will probably be made in the communique of the ministers' conference to be adopted on Friday [7 December]. Reportedly, the British Government, which especially insisted on the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles in the past, no longer has any objections to the abolition of these systems. However, according to Stoltenberg, a formal initiative is not yet to be expected because a proposal for negotiations, which is to be coordinated among the alliance partners and which has not yet been worked out, is required for this. [passage omitted]

As Stoltenberg reported in Brussels on Thursday, NATO wants to make decisions on a new alliance strategy on the security-policy, political, and military level by next summer. A NATO summit on this topic is planned for the first half of the year. As the minister indicated, this was discussed on Thursday. Stoltenberg said that the establishment of a joint European pillar within NATO and a joint Western European security policy involving France will be dealt with in particular. As Stoltenberg indicated, agreement on the way this objective is to be reached has not yet been achieved. “Some” partners, among them France, want to develop the West European Union. Others, among them Germany, are striving for the extension of political cooperation within the EC to security and defense policy. Stoltenberg also explained that France is to be led back to NATO's military structures, which it left on General de Gaulle's decision, after it had been denied an equal leadership role in the Alliance by the United States. It is NATO's general wish that France be reintegrated into the Alliance and fully participate in the NATO structure and the formation of its political will, he said. The Alliance also agrees that NATO is to stick to its military integration and to even strengthen it by the development of multinational units. Despite the preparedness to promote cooperation with France, NATO's transatlantic quality is not negotiable, not even in the nuclear sector. NATO agrees that the U.S. Armed Forces should remain in Europe with conventional and nuclear forces, though on a lower level. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

MTCR Adherence Seen Important Signal; Impact Negligible

91WC0021A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
14 Nov 90 p 28

[Article by Kai Ove Evensen: “Norway Joining Missile Control Cooperation”]

[Text] Norwegian authorities will support tighter controls on missile exports and combat the spread of nuclear weapons. But this support will have very little practical significance for Norway. It is more important to be in good company.

For although Norway will become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in January of next year, both imports and exports of missile technology will proceed more or less as before. But Norway will be sending a signal that it is important to be part of the international missile control cooperation, according to the Foreign Ministry. At the June summit meeting in Washington Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev issued a joint statement of support for the work carried out by MTCR.

“The MTCR affiliation will have no practical significance for Raufoss, Inc. The export controls were established primarily to limit the risk of spreading nuclear weapons through the use of missiles. Norway does not produce nuclear weapons or missile systems with a range of more than 40-50 kilometers. MTCR applies to missiles with a range of at least 300 kilometers. But it is a positive step that Norway has become a member,” said Chief Executive Officer Bjarne Gravdal.

Undisturbed

Norwegian Defense Technology's missile production can also proceed undisturbed.

“This does not affect us at all. We make missiles that cannot carry nuclear warheads, only conventional ones. In addition current exports are already subject to strict controls,” said information chief Jan Egil Andersen.

We asked Foreign Ministry press spokesman Bjorn Blokhus what importance the MTCR affiliation has for Norway.

“This is an important political signal that Norway wants to be part of the international effort to block the spread of such things as missiles that bear nuclear weapons,” he said.

The Foreign Ministry has met with all the companies that could be affected by the MTCR affiliation. In reply to a question from AFTENPOSTEN, department director Sten Lundbo of the Foreign Ministry said that no protests have been recorded. All the firms understood that Norway has to be part of MTCR.

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